DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 163 535	CS 502 313
AUTHOR	Chu, Leonard L.
TITLE	Planned Birth Campaigns in China, 1949-1976. Case Study No. 5.
INSTITUTION	Hawaii Univ., Honolulu. East-West Center.
PUB DATE	Aug 77
NOTE	145p.
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 HC-$7.35 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Asian History; *Communication (Thought Transfer); Communism; *Family Planning; Foreign Countries; Information Theory; *Mass Media; Policy Formation; Population Education; Population Trends; Propaganda
IDENTIFIERS	*China; *Communication Research

ABSTRACT

National planned birth policy decisions in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1976 and the organizational infrastructure that supports such decisions are reviewed in this monograph. The transferability and limitations of the Chinese experience are also discussed. Specific topics covered are: the development of the planned birth campaigns; organization, information, education, and communication in the campaigns; and the contents and effects of planned birth propaganda. Appendixes contain discussions of population in China and a translation of a Chinese newspaper article urging men to live with their wives' families after marriage. (Author/FL)

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PLANNED BIRTH CAMPAIGNS IN CHINA
1949-1976

Leonard L. Chu

August 1977

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CASE STUDY NO. 5

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CS502 313

ABSTRACT

Planned Birth Campaigns in China reviews the national policy decisions in the People's Republic of China (from 1949-1976), and the organizational infrastructure that supports such decisions—personnel and a network of supplies and services. The transferability of the Chinese experience and the limitations of that experience are discussed.

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This publication was supported by the Office of Population, U.S. Agency for International Development, AID/csd-1059.

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SERIES PREFACE

The body of knowledge and experience in planning, implementing, and evaluating programs for development and social change is extensive and rapidly expanding. On the other hand, the information about this experience is often not in a form that is readily available and easy to apply to new situations. Those with responsibility for conducting development programs suffer simultaneously from the "information explosion" and from the unavailability of ***relevant*** and ***usable*** information. Social scientists are often required to conduct extensive surveys of individuals, communities, or organizations for purposes of generalization ***before*** they have obtained an adequate description of how one case behaves or operates within its natural setting. Knowledge gained in one sector of development often has to be rediscovered in other sectors, and valuable experience from one country often remains unknown to those in other countries who face similar problems of using communication for planned change and development.

The Institute's case study series was initiated under a population communication grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development in response to the expressed need of development program officials and communication scholars for more useful and timely information about some of the innovative ideas and practices applied throughout the world to solve problems related to family planning, population, and integrated rural development.

Intensive studies of one or more cases have often proven useful for the creation of new insights into a problem, new theories and principles, or new techniques for planned programs of change. A case study of a particularly successful communication activity is also an effective way for program officials to break outside the bounds of current policies and practices. To be useful for this purpose, such studies should accurately describe the activity and then analyze its underlying principles so that they can be more easily replicated elsewhere with the appropriate modifications.

One of the unique aspects of communication programs for development, especially for family planning and population, is the tendency for planners and program officials to search for new ideas and practices in countries that already have had more experience with the same problem. At the same time, those in more experienced programs are often interested in the pilot projects of new programs for similar reasons: to see what kinds of ideas and opportunities they might have overlooked. In 1968, for example, a study team from Indonesia went to Taiwan to conduct a case study of their fieldworkers. After a month's study, they returned to Jakarta and recommended that fieldworkers be added to their other IEC activities for family planning. In 1969, they conducted their own pilot project with about thirty fieldworkers. After correcting many of their selecting and operating procedures, more fieldworkers were employed, and by 1971 they had expanded to over 5,000 fieldworkers who were responsible for motivating over one-third of all family planning adopters. The case study of fieldworkers in Taiwan played an important role in the transfer of this communication policy to Indonesia. There are many examples of this kind of transfer of policy alternatives.

A case study is intensive research whose primary purpose is descriptive or comparative analysis. It investigates an intentionally limited or restricted range of phenomena in a relatively thorough manner. It is usually less concerned with providing a data base for the generalization of results than with more extensive, quantitative research. It is based on the assumption that it is sometimes more useful to know a "lot about a little, than a little about a lot." Although a "case study" has a misleading reputation for being relatively less structured than other types of research, it is not unplanned, nor does it lack a well-prepared, rigorous research design. Depending upon the specific topic and the purpose of the researcher, a case study may include quantitative types of data, as well as descriptive information. The definition of a "case" may range from "one day in the life of a fieldworker" to "twenty-five years of experience in China." The particular advantage of limiting the study to one case, or comparing a small number of cases, is that as new ideas and new sources of data are encountered during the study, they can be pursued and thus enrich the final analysis.

This research series has presented a wide variety of case study topics: the use of mothers' clubs in rural Korea, the use of traditional midwives in Asia, family planning communication in the People's Republic of China, communication and rural development in Bangladesh, and so forth. To avoid an unnecessary duplication of effort, we have collaborated with other institutions who desired to study the same topic. We have also attempted to select topics which might have otherwise been overlooked, or underreported. Finally, some preference has been given to activities where a substantial amount of information already existed, but had not yet been synthesized into a comprehensive report.

Case study research is in widespread use throughout the world today. With more planning and systematic direction, it can become an important means of sharing new ideas about mutual problems and for improving the implementation of communication policies and programs.

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PREFACE

Birth control, more popularly known as family planning, is usually a decision left to individuals, in most cases the husband and the wife. This is not so in the People's Republic of China. There, as this case study shows, birth control is a matter of national policy decisions, imbedded as they often are, in ideological imbroglios. In the 1950's, despite the need of the urban dwellers and the endorsement by some economic advisors, the policy of the Party was against birth planning for ideological reasons. Now that the policy has changed, birth planning has become a national movement in China. This basic characteristic needs to be borne in mind when we seek to understand China's use of communication for planned birth.

When the decision to have a baby is primarily an individual matter, the purpose of communication would be to convince the target audience of the desirability of planned birth, to provide the required knowledge, and to offer inducements whenever necessary. The whole approach is to accentuate positive individual motivations in order to enlist popular support. In China, this is not so.

Following a high-level policy decision, the next step is to get ready the organizational support in terms of: 1) the personnel to implement the nationwide birth planning programs and 2) the distribution of supplies and services. Then massive campaigns are initiated to mobilize the Chinese people to practice planned birth activities, including late marriage.

In general, the campaigns do not emphasize individual benefits, but rather stress collective incentives in ideological terms. Practicing planned birth, for instance, is presented as one way of supporting the cause of revolution. The basic component of the campaigns is not the messages transmitted by the mass media; but rather, it is in the form of discussions in small local groups during which technical information is disseminated and group pressure is applied to enforce conformity. The barefoot doctor plays the important roles of distributing the supplies and explaining their usage.

The Chinese approach, efficient as it may seem, works relatively well in a social system which already has a huge organizational infrastructure. Some of the measures employed by the Chinese authorities might be transferable to other societies, as Leonard Chu discusses, but there are limitations; the fact is, these measures are developed in a system built on collective actions and centralized planning. Nevertheless, we believe that because of its uniqueness the Chinese experience needs to be shared with other developing countries, if only to illustrate what is possible.

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August 1977
Honolulu, Hawaii

1
INTRODUCTION

> The wealth of a nation depends not on the number of its inhabitants but on the amount of food at its disposal.
>
> Han Fei-tsu, legalist philosopher,
> third century, B.C.

In the twentieth century, the population explosion has been one of the most crucial problems facing the world. It is a concern for both developed and underdeveloped countries, which for the past several decades have been seeking ways to curtail the growth of their populations. Countries that are poor and populous are especially plagued by this problem. They have been searching eagerly for effective means to bring contraceptive knowledge to their people and to persuade them to use such knowledge.

In the past quarter of a century, China, the most populous country in the world, has also been trying to convince its people of the urgency of birth planning so that its population growth rate could be lowered. Whether or not China's efforts have been successful, the experience itself can be a significant stimulant to both population policy makers and family planning communicators elsewhere.

The purpose of this case study is to review China's experience in attempting to check its rapid population growth through communication and persuasion. This study seeks to synthesize the available knowledge about major information, education, and communication (IEC) activities in China's birth control campaigns since the proclamation of the People's Republic in 1949. An assessment will be made of these activities to determine their effect on the nation's population growth rates, and also on the extent to which China's experiences can be transferred to other countries.

Data Collection Methods

Studies on the People's Republic of China have always been difficult because of the lack of reliable data. Although after former President Richard Nixon's visit in 1972 more outsiders have been admitted, conducting objective social surveys or comprehensive data gathering in the country is still far from a reality. The scope of this study makes the task more difficult since it attempts to cover some 27 years and the entire country.

Because of these difficulties, the author had to depend to a great extent on three major sources. The first source has to do with China's official publications. Newspapers and periodicals such as the *People's Daily*, the *Kwang Ming Daily*, *Peking Review*, *China Reconstructs*, and *Red Flag* have carried reports on achievements and, occasionally, references to failures or difficulties in promotion of birth planning—a term the Chinese have used when referring to birth control and late marriage. These reports were the basis for the major portion of this study.

A few books and pamphlets on planned birth or public health are available outside of China. These publications have provided firsthand knowledge about the contraceptive methods that are recommended and a comprehensive view of the official rationale given for the practice of contraception and late marriage.

In the past five or six years, many scholars have visited China. Some of them have focused their attention on planned birth campaign activities. Quite a few reports have been written about the activities involved in mass persuasion in relation to birth planning. Some have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of such activities. These reports, which constitute the second major source of materials, have provided considerable data for this study.

Related to these reports are recollections of journalists and visitors, who have made references to China's planned birth activities. These accounts have also been of help.

The third major source of materials consists of demographic and economic studies of China. Most of these studies were written by Western scholars who faced the same difficulty as this writer has: that is, how to make valid inferences based on a paucity of materials. These publications have served an important function in helping provide a general understanding of the overall situation in China.

To supplement the foregoing sources, the author has interviewed three Hong Kong residents who left mainland China a few years ago. One was a doctor of Chinese herbal medicine. All three had experience living in China's rural areas. Their views were obtained during several lengthy but informal conversations. Although these views were only infrequently referred to in this report, they have lent considerable support to the author's inferences.

Organization of Report

This report is organized into five major sections. The first section outlines the evolution of China's population policies and their relationship to political events during the past 27 years. There are also presented factors that may have influenced the promotion of planned birth campaigns during the various political or ideological struggles.

The second section deals with the organization of and the mobilization for planned birth campaigns. The strengths and the weaknesses of planned birth organization are discussed. This section broadly reviews three periods of positive action toward a national planned birth program, as well as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution periods when progress toward positive action was suspended or interrupted. The three periods of positive action are designated throughout as "campaigns" although, strictly speaking, it is only in the third period, since 1969, that a comprehensive, nationwide, and grassroots program has been sustained.

Information, education, and communication activities are presented in the third section. It describes the media used, as well as the contents of the campaigns. Features that distinguish China's activities from those in other countries are treated in this section.

The fourth section discusses the effects of the campaigns as they have been reported in official Chinese publications and in foreign visitor's accounts. The purpose is to give a general picture of the statistics as supplied by the Chinese authorities. No attempt is made to prove or disprove their reliability.

The question of reliability is treated in the final section of this report, which draws some general inferences about the campaign effects for the nation as a whole. At the end the extent to which China's approaches to population control can be transferred is examined, especially in light of existing overall social and psychological conditions.

Throughout the report, the author has tried to round out a picture of China's planned birth campaigns by using as many available materials as possible. Except in the last section, very few attempts have been made to discuss the reliability of the data *per se*. However, it should be pointed out that while most of the activities described are reliable to a great extent,* the statistics presented in this report should be viewed critically. These statistics, whether official or not, are, in general, incomplete and represent mostly success stories.

Also, because of the lack of national statistics, perhaps most of the activities described should be considered as "models" which the Chinese encourage emulating. They may not be representative of activities carried out in the entire country. The realities in many places may in fact be quite different from what has been described officially since it has been the practice for the Chinese press to report only successes and achievements. Failures are rarely mentioned and are often buried inconspicuously amidst glorifying statements.

One last caution is that there have been no reliable statistics about the size and features of China's population.† Although some recent visitors report that vital statistics are being dutifully recorded in China, they do not seem to be available outside the country. This makes it very difficult to assess the extent of achievement of China's planned birth campaigns.

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*Most of the activities can be observed and have been confirmed by accounts given by either foreign visitors or former mainland China residents.

†See Appendix I.

2

PLANNED BIRTH CAMPAIGNS: FROM INDECISION TO POLICY

> Controversy over the question of population has never been a purely academic problem. Rather, it is a reflection of the class struggle in the field of ideology. It is a political problem.
>
> Chang Chi-cheng, 1960*

The present positive population program of China has evolved over many years and the process has been marked by indecision and by struggles between opposing philosophies, with periods of progress and periods of retrogression. China is now carrying out its most ambitious population program, built around planned births and late marriages. The program is being implemented with freely available contraceptive supplies and services and with literally millions of paramedic and other workers.

In this report the evolution of China's population program is covered in seven periods: 1) the pre-Communist years up to 1949; 2) the period of Maoist optimism, 1949-1954; 3) the first campaign, 1954-1958; 4) the Great Leap period in which population programs were neglected, 1958-1962; 5) the revival of the birth planning program in what is designated as the second campaign, 1962-1966; 6) another period of interruption during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969; and finally, 7) the current campaign, the most extensive and intensive, dating from 1969. The evolution which has brought about the current campaign has roots reaching far back in China's history.

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*Chang Chi-cheng, "Criticism of Ma Yin-chu's Reactionary 'New Theory of Population,' " *Sun Yat-sen University Journal,* Social Science, No. 1, 1960, Canton, p. 113.

The Pre-Communist Years

Population problems in China were recognized as early as Confucius' time. This ancient sage considered feeding the people as one of the most important things faced by the state. More recently, in the late Manchu dynasty, the problem was again brought to the fore and given deeper thought. In 1793, five years before Malthus' *An Essay on the Principle of Population,* a Mandarin scholar, Hung Liang-chi (1746-1809) observed:

> . . . . When peace reigns for more than a hundred years, the duration may be called a long one. And yet there are inescapable dangers. Take the population question. Population will in thirty years have increased five times and ten times in sixty years. Within a matter of a hundred years it will have increased twenty-fold.[1]

Hung, like Malthus, hypothesized a rapid geometric population growth. While Malthus proposed at least "moral restraint" as a check on population growth, Hung was totally pessimistic and saw no remedies but many natural calamities as flood, drought, plague, and pestillence. Whatever the implications, Hung received no enthusiastic support from his contemporaries.

It was in the twentieth century, growing out of the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and the then-emerging Women's Movement, that there was a frontal attack on traditional social structure, and a more serious consideration for the Malthusian theory of population. In 1922, Margaret Sanger, an American nurse known for her advocacy of birth control, visited China. Though widely publicized, Sanger's visit did not result in any significant actions, nor the formulation of national policy since China then was still torn by civil wars among warlords. However, Sanger did arouse the Chinese intellectuals, who were to pay more attention to China's serious problem of overpopulation.[2]

The 1930's saw only limited progress in the birth control movement. In the early thirties the Committee for the Health of Mothers was organized by a group of doctors and intellectuals in Peking. The Committee stressed the pressure of overpopulation for China and advocated that the number of births to each family be limited so that public education and medical care would not be hindered. However, this movement was aborted by the high cost of contraceptives and opposition from some people in government circles who considered the practice of birth control contrary to the instructions of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang party. Furthermore, the movement was limited to a few coastal towns and to upper- or middle-class women. The great majority of the Chinese people were still ignorant of the movement. Japan's invasion of China and the civil war that immediately followed all meant that birth control in China would have to wait for a more opportune time.[3]

The Period of Maoist Optimism: 1949 to 1954

When the Chinese Communists established their new regime in late 1949, they brought with them a confidence in the solution of China's various problems. As far as the population problem was concerned, the optimistic views of Marx and Engels were taken to be more representative of reality than Malthus' pessimism. Both Marx and Engels insisted that "every stage of development has its own law of population." On Malthus' theory of population, Engels had this to say:

> Malthus puts forward a calculation upon which his whole system is based. Population increases in geometrical progression—1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 + 32, etc. The productive power of the land increases in arithmetical progression 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6. The difference is obvious and horrifying—but is it correct? Where has it been proved that the productivity of the land increases in arithmatical progression? The area of land is limited—that is perfectly true. But the labor power to be employed on this area increases together with the population; and even if we assume that the increase of output associated with this increase of labor is not always proportionate to the latter, there still remains a third element—which the economists, however, never consider as important—namely, science, the progress of which is just as limitless and at least as rapid as that of population.[4]

Marx and Engels' denunciation of Malthus was echoed in Mao Tse-tung's contemplation of China's future population situation. On September 16, 1949, two weeks before the formal proclamation of the People's Republic, Mao Tse-tung said:

> It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly refuted in theory by Marxists long ago but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union

> and the Liberated Areas of China after their liberation. . . . Under the People's Government, it will take only a few years for this problem of unemployment, or feeding the population to be solved as completely as in the northern, northeastern and other parts of the country. . . . Revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population.[5]

Mao Tse-tung not only placed high hope and confidence in the Communist Party but also in the people themselves. He continued:

> Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. . . . We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly groundless.[6]

The press in China, operated by the Communist Party, reflected Mao's position. One journal repeated the theme that China's most precious form of capital was a large population, which could guarantee China's prosperous future.[7] The practice of birth control was regarded as "reactionary," "anti-humanitarian," "capitalistic"[8] and "a means of killing the Chinese people without shedding blood."[9] By 1952, when China's unemployed had reached three million people, the *People's Daily*, the Communist Party organ, still editorialized that the unemployment problem only existed in capitalist countries and that the so-called theory of overpopulation was "totally bankrupt."[10]

This Maoist optimism, however, was soon to give way to a more realistic view of the population problem because of food shortages and famines in 1952. There were conflicting views and actions, or in some cases, lack of action. Official circles began to take note of the seriousness of the food problem and warned that many years would be required before the problem could be satisfactorily dealt with.[11] This awareness did not prompt any immediate action by the government. In fact, in April of 195? Canton's Maritime Customs Office banned all imports of contraceptives.[12] In spite of such action, decisions were made in mid-1953 that measures of birth control should be taken. These decisions were not to become public until 1957.[13] The Ministry of Public Health in July 1954 had also submitted proposed measures of birth control to the Government Administration Council for approval.[14] These actions taken by the Chinese Communist leaders, however, were all submerged in the early chorus of Maoist optimism. Such ambiguity indicated that the leading circle was divided in its views of population. Thus, in August 1954, the *People's Daily* still carried an article ridiculing Malthusian absurdity and boasting of China's "wall of 600 million people."[15]

This early period of the Chinese Communist regime was characterized by a devotion to the consolidation of power, the execution of land reform, and a belief in Marxist-Leninist and Maoist optimism that a large population was not a problem but a rich resource. Although dissident views of population also existed, they were muted by the Party policy in dealing with opposing or dissenting intellectuals.

The First Campaign: 1954 to 1958

The first National People's Congress, held in September 1954, ushered in China's open debates on population problems and the need for birth control. The change in Communist policy was by no means drastic. The food shortages and the quasi-famine situations in a few provinces in 1953 and 1954 had led the Chinese Communist leaders to open up a forum for debate. The first to speak on the necessity of birth control was Shao Li-tzu, an ardent advocate for birth control as early as 1924 when he expressed his worries that Malthusian fears might become realities in China.[16] Shao was deputy to the First National People's Congress. While echoing Mao's attacks on Malthusian perspectives on population, he also spoke of the need for birth control in China in terms of improving the welfare of mothers and children.[17] It seems that Shao had the approval of the Communist Party, whose decision to open up debates on birth control was probably triggered by the returns of the 1953 census.

Shao's speech on September 18, 1954, was given full coverage in the *People's Daily* on the same day.[18] Although he was not without critics, their views could gain no access to the Party-controlled press.[19] In spite of the publicity given to Shao's speech, no immediate official action was taken. When the returns of the 1953 census had come in, the 600 million figure was extolled as a great strength for socialist construction of China.[20] At the same time, the State Statistical Bureau and the Ministry of Public Health abandoned their work of registering vital statistics on the ground that the results might be used by bourgeois elements to advocate the Malthusian theory of population.[21]

This ambivalence was also evidenced in Premier Chou En-lai's derision of population control in the presence of Indian Prime Minister Nehru during the latter's visit to China in early 1955 and in Chou's request for information concerning India's experience in promoting birth control when Chou visited that country in late 1956.[22] The shift in Chou's thinking was certainly abrupt, for in April 1956 he was still telling China's foreign visitors that food production increase exceeded population increase and therefore China had no need for birth control.[23] In fact, Chou was not alone. Mao Tse-tung, Liao Lu-yen, China's Agricultural Minister, and Chen Po-ta, Mao's personal secretary, all expressed hope and confidence in the ability of China's large population to achieve abundant agricultural production.[24] Chen Po-ta even said that China was capable of absorbing another 600 million people.[25]

Amid this euphoria, the awareness of China's population pressure was high. Actions were either contemplated or taken. In late December 1954 Liu Shao-chi, then second only to Mao, called a conference to discuss the problem of birth control. As a result, responsible officials of the relevant departments were directed to organize research groups to discuss the problem of contraception.[26] In March 1955, the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement seconding the "appropriate exercise of birth control."[27] In June 1956, Minister of Public Health Li Teh-chuan acknowledged the inadequate work in birth control and called for "further developed propaganda and education."[28] Two months later the Ministry directed all health departments to establish birth control clinics, train birth control workers, assist and guide the masses in their practice of birth control.[29] In September 1956 Chou En-lai gave his personal approval of birth control. In a report to the Eighth Party Congress, Chou said:

> To protect women and children and bring up and educate our younger generation in a way conducive to the health and prosperity of the nation, we agree that a due measure of birth control is desirable. Health departments should, in cooperation with other institutions concerned, carry out intelligent propaganda and adopt effective measures toward this end.[30]

The most important decision perhaps came in the 1957 version of the *Draft Program for Agricultural Development in the People's Republic of China, 1956-1957,* which recommended:

> Except in a few nationality areas, birth control and planned parenthood should be publicized and encouraged in order to avoid placing too heavy a

> burden on living expenses and in order to give the children a better education and good opportunities for employment.[31]

On February 27, 1957, advocates of birth control received their strongest possible boost from Mao Tse-tung. In an unprepared speech to the Supreme State Conference, Mao expressed his worry about China's huge population and indicated the need for birth control.[32] Although Mao made no reference to Malthus, his views were clearly Malthusian. About a week after Mao's speech, Li Teh-chuan, Minister of Health, reiterated:

> If our population growth is not in accordance with planned childbirth, it will prevent our country from quickly ridding itself of poverty and becoming prosperous and powerful. . . . With such a high rate of population growth, the increase in our industrial and agricultural production, however rapid, will certainly fail to satisfy adequately the requirements of the increased population. . . .[33]

Other Party leaders such as Vice-Premier Tan Chen-lin and Wang Kwang-mei, wife of Liu Shao-chi and then chief agricultural planner of the State Planning Commission, also repeated this same theme in their statements.[34]

Debates were not restricted to the Party's highest echelon. China's intellectuals and many others were also engaged in heated agruments on population problems and the need for birth control. In December 1955, Chao Ching wrote an article in *New Construction* accusing those who advocated population control of "spreading a sense of pessimism among the Chinese people, blurring their view of the power of imperialism and domestic reactionary elements, and openly abetting anti-communist, anti-people, and anti-revolutionary activities in imperialist and domestic reactionary circles."[35]

The advocates' voices were just as forceful. Chung Hui-lan, director of Peking People's Hospital, argued for a control of population growth on grounds of the nation's limited acreage of cultivated land and limited employment capacity. Chung said:

> . . . . we have to control reproduction. If we could manage to keep the population below 700 million within fifteen years, and positively fulfill our nation's economic construction plans, then in 1972, the whole people would be able to have a good life of enough clothing and abundant food. The key to this is whether or not our young people can wholeheartedly

> respond to and carry out Chairman Mao's perspicacious instructions, regarding planned control of reproduction.[36]

Chung's speech was delivered in 1957 at the Political Consultative Conference, China's equivalent to a parliament, and its significance was quite clear. Furthermore, Chung indicated without reservation that Malthus' view of population growth in geometric progression was correct. A Chinese proverb "two in the first generation means a thousand in ten generations" was quoted to support the argument.[37] Chung was joined by Wu Ching-chao, who reiterated the same theme and urged that measures be adopted immediately to reduce the nation's birth rate and accelerate economic development.[38]

Wang Ya-nan, president of Amoy University, was another enthusiastic advocate of birth limitation. Arguing that China's population problem originated from the contradiction between her backward means of production and the advanced socialist goals of production, Wang proposed that the contradiction be resolved by limiting the production of consumption goods, implying that population growth also be appropriately limited.[39] While Wang's thesis was tinged with more Maoist jargon, the essential theme was unmistakingly the same as that of Chung or Wu.

Perhaps the most notable advocate of birth limitation was Ma Yin-chu, an economist and president of Peking University. He set forth a major position on population on March 31, 1957, when the Guidance Committee on Contraceptive Techniques of the Chinese Medical Association convened.[40] On July 3, 1957, Ma had his speech circulated at the fourth session of the National People's Congress. In this speech, entitled "A New Theory of Population," Ma warned that overpopulation might slow down the speed of capital accumulation and industrialization. For solutions, he advocated enhancement of the peasants' productivity and capital accumulation on the one hand and controlling rapid population growth on the other so that a Hungarian or Polish type of revolt would not happen in China.[41]

In spite of the Communist Party's acquiesence in the population debates, advocates of birth limitation in China were careful not to be taken for neo-Malthusian disciples. Ma emphasized that his theory was different from that of Malthus. Others also tried hard to disassociate themselves from being Malthusian while advocating population control at the same time. Wang Ya-nan was very explicit when he said "our present advocacy of birth limitation should not be considered a course of action in keeping with the Malthusian viewpoints. It must be decisively deemed a measure based on Marxism."[42] Yang Ssu-ying, another contraception advocate, also took pains to state that the advocacy of birth limitation was not Malthusianism and at the same time vehemently attacked the Malthusian population perspective as "the most reactionary among the theories of the social sciences in capitalist society."[43] However, even such deliberate and elaborate exceptions did not guarantee the advocates any immunity from accusations when China's leaders later made a sharp reverse shift to their orignial optimism and confidence in China's ability to solve her employment and production problems.

Demographic debates and polemics characterized this period from 1954 to 1958. It witnessed the weak and short-lived beginning of China's official efforts to promote the planning of births throughout the country. Although efforts were largely obscured by the Party's ambivalent policies and Marxist theoreticians' polemic epithets, this incubation period is notable for having awakened leaders in the nation to a very urgent problem, which China could not long afford to ignore.

Campaign Neglect During the Great Leap Forward: 1958-1962

After years of incubation and preparation, everything seemed to suggest China was to have a nationwide planned birth campaign. However, just as the campaign and its advocates were gathering momentum, the Party suddenly discontinued all official efforts to propagate birth planning methods. No specific reasons were given. But that was in 1958, when China's second Five-Year Plan just started and the Great Leap Forward was put into full swing. Optimism and elation based on reporting of inflated production statistics, led the Party leaders to drop the official campaign and the Marxist theoreticians to intensify their offensives against birth planning advocates.

While advocates continued to argue the need for birth planning on the grounds that overpopulation would slow down China's speed of economic development, the "progress" brought about in the Great Leap Forward led the Chinese leaders to adopt a totally new perspective, contradictory to their previous policy. The new stand was that huge population meant huge power. Thus, the pessimistic view that too many people would mean catastrophe for China was erroneous. Liu Shao-chi's report to the second session of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on May 5, 1958, clearly indicated this new approach to the relationship between population growth and economic development. Liu said:

> The great leap forward in agricultural production and construction this year has not only completely knocked the bottom out of their contention that agriculture cannot make quick progress but also blown sky high their argument that a big population impedes accumulation. All they see is that men are consumers and that the greater the population the bigger the consumption; they fail to see that men are first of all producers and that when there is a large population there is also the possibility of greater production and more accumulation. Their views obviously run counter to Marxism-Leninism.[44]

In June a *Peking Review* editorial considered China's 600 million people "a most powerful force to be reckoned with." It said:

> To build socialism in a country as vast and populous as China, of course, poses extremely difficult and complex problems. But a huge population and a vast area mean enormous manpower and rich natural resources, which constitute the material foundation for building up a mighty, prosperous country.[45]

Mao Tse-tung also gave his personal endorsement of this revived optimism. Writing in the inaugural issue of the Party journal *Red Flag*, Mao referred to the 600 million people as "a good thing" and "the decisive factor" in the Leap because "the more people, the more views and suggestions, and the more intense the fervor and the greater the energy."[46] Thus, the question was not whether China was overpopulated but whether China had enough manpower at her service. The Chinese Communist Party seemed to be very positive as reflected in the resolution adopted by the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party at its Sixth Plenary Session on December 10, 1958:

> People in the past often worried about our "overpopulation" and relatively small amount of available arable land. But this idea has been overturned by the facts of our 1958 bumper harvest. Insofar as we succeed in seriously popularizing the rich experience gained in getting high yields . . . it will be found that the amount of arable land is not too small but very considerable, and the question is not so much overpopulation as shortage of manpower.[47]

This confidence in the power of the people to create miracles continued in subsequent years. In early 1960 Vice-Premier Li Fu-chun expressed his confidence in the people's creative fervor to transform China into a prosperous and powerful nation.[48] In September Chou En-lai told a visiting British journalist that China had no problems of overpopulation, food shortages or manpower utilization.[49] In October, Lin Piao reminded the nation of Mao's conceptualization that man was the factor that determined the outcome of war.[50] In March 1961, the Party journal *Red Flag* was elated by the disappearance of unemployment and food shortages from China but expressed some concern with the low productivity.[51] Although there were some more realistic and cautious assessments of China's economic situations, they were drowned in optimistic acclaim of the Leap "progress."

The Leap view of the relationship between population and production had brought birth planning advocates under severe criticism. Marxist theoreticians, armed with Leap production statistics, charged the birth control advocates with denying the superiority of the socialist system and opposing the modernization of China's economy, defending the rule of the bourgeoisie and paving the way for imperialistic colonialism.[52] Enthusiastic proponents like Fei Hsiao-tung, Wu Ching-chao, Lee Chin-han, and Chen Ta were denounced as "rightist" and of using the question of population and birth control to attack socialism.[53] Many other scholars were convinced to remain silent. By June 1958, the Chinese press was virtually silent on birth planning. Ma Yin-chu was perhaps the only advocate who remained heard amid the mounting criticisms. Ma was eventually persuaded to surrender to his critics by none other than Chou En-lai, who himself was once an endorser of birth planning and Ma's personal friend.[54] Insisting that his population theory was correct and that his accusers were biased and obstinate in their thinking, Ma refused to yield and his lonely but spirited replies continued to appear in the Chinese press until January 1960. Three months later he was removed from his post as president of Peking University.[55]

The predominant ideology had painted such an optimistic future for the country that the climate for birth planning worsened. Even to keep the neglected campaign going, new rationalizations were required. These rationalizations were that birth planning was for the sake of the mother's health, and that through birth planning mothers could have more time for study and contribute more to production.[56] Thus, planned births were to be practiced not on economic grounds but on health grounds.

The effect of slackening the promotion of birth planning during the Leap was obvious. For example, at the height of the previous campaign, four contraceptive factories had been opened in China. During the winter of 1958-1959, when S. Chandrasekhar, noted Indian demographer, visited China, two of the factories were closed down. Of the two still operating, one manager was embarassed because he thought no one would be interested and the other factory head indicated that there was no need for the products because under Communism every one had enough to eat and it did not matter how many children one had.[57] Despite such widely prevalent views, the need for population control continued to be recognized. For example, in April 1960, the revised edition of the 1956-1957 national agricultural development plan still retained from the original version a paragraph about birth planning, which stated that planned births should be popularized in densely populated areas so that families would be relieved of heavy burdens and children would have better opportunities for education and employment.[58] In 1961 no propaganda activity was in evidence in the twelve communes visited by Gilbert Etienne.[59] And planned birth guidance committees and contraceptive factories all ceased functioning in later years.[60]

The Leap production statistics spurred the Party leaders' "confidence" in solving China's problems and developing the nation's economy. However, they also brought to a sudden halt the then maturing planned birth campaign and further dampened the spirits of Chinese intellectuals who were concerned with the elevation of the people's standard of living and the advancement of China's economy. Although birth planning guidance was still available from doctors during this period, it was dependent solely on the individual doctor's judgment of the patient's medical need and health conditions. The revival of the planned birth campaign would have to wait for a more opportune occasion when realities again would convince the leaders of the dangers of planning the nation's economy on exaggerated production figures.

The Revival of Birth Planning: 1962-1966

The chaotic economic situation brought about by the Leap and the existence of severe famines was a logical setting in which to revive the birth planning program. However, this did not occur at once. An immediate intensification of propaganda work to promote birth planning might, it was felt, heighten the people's awareness of their problem and move the nation closer to a Hungarian or Polish type of revolt, as feared by economist Ma Yin-chu. These considerations thus delayed the reinstitution of a new campaign to popularize birth planning until early 1962 when the nation's economy began to show signs of recovery.

The approach to the relationship between population and production was a little more realistic than that adopted in the Great Leap Forward years but still equivocal. In June 1960, Foreign Minister Chen Yi in an interview with Japanese journalists warned about the premature prediction of success or failure of building a socialist society in China. He indicated that given China's huge population no other country would be able to supplement her food shortages. Thus the Chinese would have to rely on themselves to produce more food.[61] In September 1960, at the tenth session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party it was decided that the nation's development priority would be placed on agriculture instead of heavy industry.[62] No reference to China's population was made, but the food crisis and the rapid population increase were apparently on the minds of the Communist leaders when they decided to shift the emphasis back on agriculture.

Then there was an article in the *People's Daily* urging the people to work hard and make sacrifices for the building of socialism in China because China was "poor and blank."[63] Another article specifically indicated that China was "basically a country with a large population and a small acreage of arable land."[64] However, there were also articles that still clung to the idea that a large population was a good thing. In March 1962 one big daily in southern China called for the need for birth planning but denied the existence of overpopulation. It reiterated that men were the most precious and that China needed more people.[65] In December 1963, the *People's Daily* editorialized that the 600 million people under the leadership of the Communist Party gave China favorable conditions for the building of a socialist state.[66] In May 1964 the inexhaustive creative power of the people was again praised in the Party journal *Red Flag* amid cautious statements of China's economic situation.[67]

In spite of such ambivalence, China was realistic and cautious in approaching the problem of population. At the beginning of 1962, measures were already being taken by the regime to prepare for the reactivation of the planned birth campaign. In January the Canton Customs

Office removed the heavy duty imposed on imported contraceptives.[68] The reasons given by the newspapers were that contraception would help bring about the happiness of family life since only by having fewer children would mothers be protected from sickness and be able to devote themselves to labor and ideological study.[69] In April, *Women of China*, a popular Chinese magazine, published an article on "Some Questions Concerning Planned Births."[70] Then the propaganda was joined by many other local newspapers and magazines. The government's attitude, however, was more cautious and the content, except in rare cases, gave the health and welfare of mothers and children as reasons for the practice of birth planning.

The first birth planning campaign, between 1954 and 1958, was largely initiated by scholars and public opinion, and the regime played a rather passive supporting role. This second campaign, however, was launched by the regime itself, and Communist cadres played active roles throughout. According to a former New China News Agency journalist, back in late 1961 or early 1962 the Ministry of Health had already summoned provincial and local public health officials to several national symposia to discuss the problem of birth planning. The Ministry of Health was said to have required that efforts be made to bring down the population growth rate to below 2.0 percent annually within the shortest time possible and to 1.5 or 1.0 percent within five or ten years.[71] Relatively strict measures were adopted to enforce the practice of late marriage and contraception and ensure against violations, and more liberal policies were initiated to make abortion and sterilization easier to obtain. It seemed that this campaign was more thoroughly and vigorously executed. Given time, it might have been expected to bring down the population growth rate and reduce the population pressure on the nation's economy. However, official campaign efforts were almost totally abandoned when the Cultural Revolution broke out in mid-1966.

Interruption of Birth Planning during the Cultural Revolution: 1966-1969

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution brought the most tumultuous years in modern China and interrupted birth planning programs. Its ideological and political impact was perhaps second only to that of the pre-1949 civil war. The Cultural Revolution reflected the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and his heir-designate Liu Shao-chi and simultaneously the struggle between a pragmatic approach and a strict Maoist approach to China's domestic development. China's young students were soon out on "long marches" from one city to another at government expense to exchange their experiences in "dragging out those capitalist roaders in power," meaning Liu and his subordinate bureaucrats. Mao knew very well that the dragging out of his opponents would require some support from public opinion.[72] Mao achieved support through the dexterous use of *tatzepao,* or big character poster, which exposed whatever fault could be found with the Liu faction.

While Mao's efforts were successful in smashing Liu's power structure, he had to pay a price for unleashing China's youths. When students and workers roaming the country became uncontrollable, Mao was harsh in dealing with them. Those who were one time Mao's stalwart "Red Generals" now became expendable. First, they were ordered to return to their original locations to resume school or work. Those failing to do so were referred to as "capitalist roaders ensnared by the bourgeois reactionary line."[73] By the fall of 1967, Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, and other Party leaders issued a directive ordering the students and workers to return immediately to their home institutions.[74] In December it was indicated that those youth who refused to return to their rural areas were being instigated by Liu.[75] Then, the army was called to quash armed conflict and return the nation to order.

Amid the intensified attacks against Liu and the bureaucracy, the nation's production slackened. Efforts to promote planned birth were also stopped. In 1966, as the Cultural Revolution intensified, articles on birth planning stopped appearing in the Chinese press. *Women of China,* one important magazine in the dissemination of birth planning knowledge, was a typical example. In the June 1966 issue, the magazine vowed to give support to the Cultural Revolution. In the same month, its director-editor, Tung Pien, was removed by the Secretariat of the Women's Federation of China.[76] Then articles in three consecutive issues denounced Tung. In August the magazine used Mao's calligraphy for its new nameplate and the new director-editor pledged to transform it into "a great school of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts."[77] In December, the journal ceased publication.

Tung Pien's dismissal was apparently because of her association with the Liuist faction. The denunciation was mainly because of two series of articles advising women what to live for and how to choose their husbands. No references were made to the many articles advocating planned birth, to which Tung had devoted space generously. However, the charge that she relied too much on expert advice on marriage, love, and birth control could be easily applied to the articles on contraception and late marriage.[78]

The Women's Federation of China, one of the important organizations in promoting the planned birth campaign, was also deeply involved in the Cultural Revolution. Both its national and local chapters were attacked for following the Liuist line and later were reorganized.[79] It was unlikely that its efforts could soon be again directed to the promotion of birth planning.

The practice of late marriage suffered a temporary eclipse in the chaos. The mingling of student Red Guards had resulted in many pregnancies and early marriages. According to *Wen Hui Pao* in Shanghai, many workers were eager to get married so as to find comfort in small families. Some "not yet emancipated cadres" were eager to find mates for young revolutionary workers to buy their goodwill. Some factories were said to be swept by "a getting-married gust."[80]

However, the practice of early marriage apparently became so widespread throughout the country that the Communist leaders were alarmed. In January 1968 the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee issued a "Notice on Strengthening Planned Birth and Advocating Late Marriage," ordering the masses to follow Chairman Mao's teachings on the problem of population.[81] In April, the *Wen Hui Pao* newspaper denounced as sheer nonsense the charge of "promotion of late marriage as following the bourgeois reactionary line." It said those opposed to late marriage were in fact attempting to restore and defend the "four olds" (old thinking, old culture, old customs, and old habits). The paper also condemned the use of matchmaking as a political deal.[82] The practice of finding mates for young workers and students was accused as "the sugar-coated bullets" fired by the "handful of class enemies,"[83] and needed to be vigorously fought against. Such anomie apparently had nullified the previous endeavor to popularize the adoption of planned birth.[84]

Up to 1966, despite the fact that the Cultural Revolution was being carried out with fanatical enthusiasm, many places were still reported to have held meetings to introduce contraceptive methods to the masses. Abortion was also said to be available and easy.[85] However, there was no report of such activities after 1966. It seems logical to infer that engagement in the Cultural Revolution had drained the nation's energies from promoting planned birth although contraceptive advice might still be available to people who desired it. Birth planning advice and services became elements in the controversy between the Maoist line and the Liuist line. As a result, few people went for such advice unless their health conditions so required. Official efforts to promote planned birth were interrupted for the second time during the Cultural Revolution.

The Current Campaign: 1969 to 1976

China is now several years into its third and most intensive and far-reaching population campaign. Officially the Cultural Revolution is still being carried on, but without its early ferocity and intensity. The year 1969 marked the beginning of the gradual restoration to order and Mao's power. Reorganization and restructuring of the Party and the administrative bureaucracy, immobilized in the Cultural Revolution, has been under way ever since.

Once confusion gave way to order, the campaign to promote planned births was reactivated and began to accelerate. Rationales given for the current campaign are varied, ranging from outright support of planned births to the building of socialism and the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, a nationwide movement in 1973-1974.

References to the relation between the food problem and population at first were either ambiguous or implicit, but later were more explicit. One 1970 article attributed the sufficient food supply in a production team to the practice of planned births and specifically indicated that the team's population had remained stable for the past three years.[86] Another late 1970 reference suggested population problems in a production brigade were resolved through more grain production.[87] The following year Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien expressed concerns with China's huge population but suggested that solution to the problem of feeding and clothing the population had been found.[88]

Although the planned birth campaign is being carried on in China at full speed, the Chinese leaders are careful to point out the country's capability of feeding and clothing the population. At the 17th session of the United Nations Population Commission on November 2, 1973, the speech by China's observer Yu Wang is reminiscent of positions taken during the early years of the People's Republic. At the same time, Yu

Wang's speech states explicitly the Chinese official position on population and birth planning. On China's population, Yu made it very clear there was no such problem as overpopulation and that Malthusian views were erroneous, although he did not even mention the word Malthus. Yu said:

> Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Once the people become masters of their own destiny, every miracle can be performed. As working people, human beings are first of all producers and then consumers. . . .
>
> Over the period when the population grew more than 50 per cent from more than 500 million to over 700 million, annual grain output more than doubled, rising from 110 million tons to 250 million tons, and textile and other industrial products increased several to over a dozen times. Take the average annual rates of growth. China's population has since the founding of New China increased around 2 per cent each year while grain has on the average increased nearly 4 per cent. And there are still great potentialities for an increase in China's agricultural production. . . .[89]

China's position on population is to pursue a policy of population growth in a planned way, as is its policy of economic development. Thus, China does not approve of "anarchy either in material production or in human reproduction."[90]

The Chinese policy of planned birth throughout the country was also spelled out by Yu Wang.

> What we mean by birth planning is not just practicing birth control, but taking different measures in the light of different circumstances. In densely populated areas where the birth rate is high, marriage at later age and birth control are advocated. However, active medical treatment is provided for those suffering from sterility. In the national minority areas and other sparsely populated areas, appropriate measures are taken to facilitate population growth and promote production. However, proper guidance and assistance are also made available to those who have too many children and desire birth control. All those who voluntarily ask for birth control are provided by the state with contraceptive drugs and relevant medical service free of charge.[91]

When the World Population Conference was convened in Bucharest, Rumania, in August 1974, China's chief delegate Huang Shu-tse also reiterated this theme and indicated that "revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population."[92] In addition, Huang thoroughly denounced Malthusian fears and pointed out that population problems in developing countries were the result of exploitations by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chinese delegation to the World Food Conference in Rome in November 1974 repeated this same theme and indicated that a solution to the problem of feeding the Chinese had been found, but cautioned that "further rise in our standard of living calls for continued efforts of our entire people."[93]

Apparently, this position had the approval of the highest Communist echelons. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, disgraced in the Cultural Revolution, rehabilitated in 1973, but to be ousted later in 1976, also shared this optimistic view. At a reception for overseas Chinese and foreign visitors, Teng said that China had no problem of overpopulation and that even with a per capita of arable land of two *mou** China will still have enough food for her people and for reserve "so long as we persist in Chairman Mao's agricultural line." "If one fourth of the country is following the Tachai example,† we will have enough food to eat. If one third is following the Tachai example, our food reserve will surpass that in the United States," Teng continued.[94]

In the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, confidence in the people's power to bring nature (Heaven) under control was extolled and reiterated. Mao's quote "of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed" was repeatedly referred to as guidance and proof.[95] Of particular significance, perhaps, is the reappearance of a quotation from a 1949 Mao Tse-tung speech, which said that "It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production."[96] This quotation appearing in the *People's Daily* was striking especially since it had not been referred to since the Leap years. Whether or not this implies a future policy shift remains to be seen.

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*One *mou* is about 0.066 hectare or 0.1647 acre.

†Tachai Production Brigade, in Shansi province, has been held as a model for emulation in China since 1964 for its experience in turning dry, stone-littered hill land into a productive farm through hard work. For details, see "In Tachai Footsteps," *Peking Review*, Vol. 8, No. 44 (October 29, 1965), p. 27.

Despite these positions avoiding expression of specific concerns about population, the current campaign has moved ahead. The campaign is reported to have been set in State Council Directive No. 51 in 1971, which was keynoted by a quote from Mao: "To allow anarchy in human reproduction is not to be tolerated. It is also necessary to practice planning-of-birth."[97] Various quotes from Mao's works, without providing the context, have been linked to the current campaign. Quotations like "show concern for the growth of the younger generation," "be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people," "in medical and health care, put the stress in rural areas," etc., all have been cited as indicating Mao's support of the planned birth campaign. One poster used in the current campaign is headlined "For Revolution, Do Well in Planned Birth." This poster indicated that the practice of planned birth is beneficial to: 1) the grasp of revolution, promotion of production, promotion of work and promotion of preparation against war; 2) the raising of revolutionary successors of the proletariat; 3) the support of world revolution; 4) the study of Chairman Mao's works; 5) the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariate; and 6) the preparation against war, preparation against natural disasters, and service for the people.[98]

Since mid-1973, the campaign to promote birth planning had acquired a new rationale; namely, to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius in addition to the repudiation of Liu Shao-chi.[99] In 1975, it was tied in with the movement to criticize the so-called "right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts." In early 1976, after the Tienanmen Square riots, Teng Hsiao-ping was stripped of all titles. The criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping was also tied into the promotion of planned birth. In early October 1976, less than one month after Mao Tse-tung's death, the "gang of four," Mao's wife Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen, was crushed and condemned. So, condemnation of the "gang of four" soon became part of the birth planning campaign too.[100]

For whatever reasons, the official position on the practice of planned births is more for revolution than for the welfare of mothers and children, and least for the reduction of population pressures. However, it is the actual campaign for the practice of planned births, not the constant disavowals of existence of population problems, that deserves scrutiny.

The present campaign goes well beyond earlier ones. Elaborate organization and coordination were devised to ensure that the planning of births worked. This intensification is evidenced in a few examples. In mid-1972 Tien-tsin city held its sixth Conference of Women Representatives; promotion of the planned birth campaign and the practice of late marriage was written into the Conference resolution.[101] Furthermore, the present campaign is tied into the fourth and fifth Five-Year Plans, in which units are assigned different pregnancy quotas. Married women of child-bearing ages are assigned the years during which they may bear children.[102] Also, "barefoot doctors," the Chinese term for paramedics, are utilized as the chief promoters in spreading the knowledge of planned births and late marriage, in dispensing contraceptives, and even in performing actual operations needed for fertility control. Birth planning promotion has become one of the top priorities. In Chia-ting County, Chekiang province, the promotion of planned birth and late marriage was written into the local production brigade's agricultural developmental program with a view to maintaining a growth rate of 1 percent per year.[103] In 1974 the Provincial Revolutionary Committee in each of a number of provinces is reported to have convened a "Work Conference on Planned Births" to ensure that the promotion of planned births and late marriage is being carried out at the basic units and by each individual.[104]

The experience of promoting late marriage and planned births in China is in many ways similar to that experienced by many other developing countries plagued by large population and an inadequate supply of food grains. Perhaps they have gone through a similar period of hesitation before fertility control finally became a national policy. As in other countries, politics are closely linked to programs of fertility control. Such a linkage is especially prominent in China. This close affinity also gives China's experience a uniqueness, which is both its strength and weakness in the promotion of birth planning, as will be examined in later chapters. China's experience seems to confirm, once again, that there is no shortcut to the adoption of fertility control as a national policy. The decision demands both time and effort, and the adoption of contraception by the masses will perhaps take even more time and effort.

NOTES

1. As translated in Leo Silberman, "Hung Liang-chi: A Chinese Malthus," *Population Studies,* Vol. 13, No. 3 (March 1960), p. 262.

2. Leon Triviere, "Birth Control in China," in *Contemporary China,* Vol. II. ed. by E. Stuart Kirby (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1958), pp. 94-96. Also Chen Chang-hen, *On the Population of China* (8th Ed. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1928), pp. i-ii, 38-41 and 418. Chen's book has very detailed presentation of the pros and cons of birth control as seen during the early years of the Chinese Republic.

3. Triviere, *op. cit.,* pp. 96-97.

4. Donald L. Meek, ed. *Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb* (2nd Ed. Berkeley, California: The Ramparts Press, 1971), pp. 21, 62-63.

5. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 452-453.

6. *Ibid.,* p. 454.

7. Li Hsu-tan, "A New China with Vast Land, Abundant Resources and a Large Population," *Geographic Knowledge,* Vol. II, No. 1 (January 1951), p. 8.

8. E. Stuart Kirby, "China's Population Problem," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Vol. XXIV, No. 17 (April 24, 1958), p. 613.

9. Sun Ching-chih, "Eliminate Worship-America Ideology in the Field of Geography," *People's Daily,* April 25, 1952.

10. "To Effect Full Employment in a Planned and Systematic Manner," NCNA, Peking, August 2, 1952, in *SCMP,* No. 388 (August 3-5, 1952), p. 58.

11. "Grain Production Increase Is the Primary Task on the Production Front," NCNA, Peking, April 11, 1953; in *SCMP,* No. 551, April 15, 1953, p. 14. Also, Teng Tzu-hui, "Rural Work: Its Basic Mission and Policy," *People's Daily,* July 23, 1953.

12. "Import Ban on Contraceptives," *Ta Kung Pao,* Hong Kong, April 7, 1953.

13. "Exercise Appropriate Birth Control," (Editorial), *People's Daily,* March 5, 1957; in *SCMP,* No. 1487, March 12, 1957, p. 6.

14. Shao Li-tzu, "Concerning the Problem of Dissemination of Knowledge about Contraception," *Kwang Ming Daily,* December 19, 1954; in *SCMP,* No. 976, January 28, 1955, p. 26.

15. Jo Shui, "Six Hundred Million," *People's Daily,* August 7, 1954; in *SCMP,* No. 690, September 17, 1954, pp. 31-33.

16. Triviere, "Birth Control in China," *op. cit.,* p. 95.

17. Shao's speech was delivered to the People's Congress on September 18, 1954. *Kwang Ming Daily*, September 19, 1954.

18. "Deputy Shao Li-tzu Speaks on Birth Control at National People's Congress," *People's Daily*, September 18, 1954; in *SCMP*, No. 920, November 2, 1954, pp. 3-5.

19. Shao, "Concerning the Problem of Dissemination of Knowledge about Contraception," *op. cit.*

20. Pai Chien-hua, "600 Million People–A Great Strength for Socialist Construction of China," *People's Daily*, November 1, 1954; in *SCMP*, No. 926, November 11-12, 1954, pp. 32-34.

21. Ku Wei-lin, "My Understanding of the Suspension of Vital Statistics Experimental Work," *Statistical Work Bulletin*, No. 1 (January 23, 1955), pp. 36-37.

22. S. Chandrasekhar, "China's Population Problems," in *Contemporary China*, Vol. III, ed. by E.S. Kirby (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1960), pp. 23-24.

23. W.R. Geddes, *Peasant Life in Communist China*, Monograph No. 6, Society for Applied Anthropology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1963, pp. 6-8.

24. Mao Tse-tung, *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*, Vol. I (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1956), pp. 1-4, 27-33, 43-44; Liao Lu-yen, "Explanations on the Draft 1956-1957 National Program for Agricultural Development," in *SCMP*, No. 1219, January 31, 1956, p. 23; Chen Po-ta, "The Socialist Transformation of China's Agriculture," NCNA, Peking, February 2, 1956; in *CB*, No. 377, February 15, 1956, p. 36.

25. Chen Po-ta, *op. cit.*

26. "Exercise Appropriate Birth Control," *op. cit.*

27. Chang Pei-kan, Mao Kan, Hu Chun-chieh, "The Socialist Law of Population and Population Problem," *Economic Research*, No. 4 (August 17, 1957), p. 30.

28. Li Teh-chuan, "New Tasks for the Protection of Public Health," NCNA, Peking, June 18, 1956; in *CB*, No. 405, July 26, 1956, p. 15.

29. Editorial, "Active Dissemination of Contraception Knowledge," *Kwang Ming Daily*, August 3, 1956.

30. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy," delivered on September 16, 1956, to the Eighth Party Congress of the Communist Party, in *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956).

31. *The Draft Program for Agricultural Development in the People's Republic of China, 1956-1957*, submitted by the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee, January 23, 1956; in Chao Kuo-chun, ed., *Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China: A Documentary Study, 1949-1957*, Vol. I (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1959), p. 175.

32. Mao's speech was entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." The original text was never disclosed, but his intentions were very clear as indicated by the various responses to Mao's speech: Chung Hui-lan, "Population and Birth Control," *People's Daily*, March 17, 1957; Shao Li-tzu, "Talk About Planned Births with Worker and Employee Comrades," *Worker's Daily* (Peking), March 21, 1957; Chou Chih-chung, "Birth Control Propaganda and Contraceptive Guidance Should Be Strengthened," *Hsin Hunan Pao* (Changsha), May 31, 1957; "Communist China–the Population Problem," *Current Notes on International Affairs*, Canberra, Vol. 29, No. 11 (November 1958), p. 717.

33. Li Teh-chuan, "Birth Control Is a Tremendously Difficult and Complicated Task," *People's Daily,* March 8, 1957; translated in *CB,* No. 445, April 5, 1957, pp. 2-3.

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3

ORGANIZATION IN PLANNED BIRTH CAMPAIGNS

> **At present all branches of our government, from the State Council to each province, municipality, district and rural commune have their own planned birth leadership organizations, which carry out the actual guidance work in coordination with medical institutions at all levels.**
>
> **China News Service, Peking**
> ***Ta Kung Pao,* Hong Kong**
> **August 24, 1974**

The organization for national birth planning and late marriage campaigns which has evolved during the last 25 years in China has reflected the characteristics of Chinese Communist movements and organization. Few sources are available on the detailed scope and form of the Chinese organization of birth planning. Much has to be inferred and gleaned from Communist press articles and visitors' accounts. In spite of such disadvantages, however, much information can still be gained about the nature of operations in China's planned birth campaigns.

Organizational Activities in the Campaigns[1]

When the Chinese Communist leaders decided in 1954 to inaugurate a nationwide birth control campaign, organization and coordination in general were primitive in terms of the vast territory to be covered. Policy was decided at the highest Party echelon and the Ministry of Public Health was responsible for formulating operational measures and establishing birth control guidance committees. Also, the Ministry was to organize meetings or conferences, coordinate propaganda efforts, and supervise research in contraceptive medicine.

During the first campaign, newspapers and periodicals were utilized for discussion of the various problems involving birth control, informing the nation of the campaign and the propagation of contraceptive knowledge.

The Communist Party, as it has always been in other movements, was also engaged in the campaign. Party members were assigned to local birth control guidance committees as "backbone" cadres and in many cases as chairmen. However, the importance attached to the campaign by the Party central was apparently not shared by local cadres, whether they were serving as reporters or as birth control campaign organizers. Neglect of work was quite universal and some cadres were reported to have been reprimanded for failure to publicize the campaign.

Major organizations also utilized to promote the campaign included: the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Students' Federation, the Association for the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the China Medical Association, and the Chinese Red Cross. Even with this extensive involvement of mass organizations, evidence seemed to indicate that not enough attention was paid to the work of birth planning promotion.

Inadequate organization and coordination were also evidenced in the lack of a single central agency for such a task. Reportedly, an Office of Birth Control or Office of Birth Control Guidance was established in 1956 within the State Council, but no evidence is available on its operations.

Birth control guidance committees were established in urban municipalities, but their establishment in rural areas was slow and their operations limited. In general, the first campaign was far more prominent in urban than in rural areas and on the national than on local levels. Although the campaign was started in 1954, some areas were reported to be still ignorant of it in the late fifties. By 1958 when the nation was deeply engulfed in the Great Leap Forward, efforts were diverted into areas other than the promotion and organization for the planned birth campaign, which conflicted with the then prevailing ideology.

With the nation recovering from the chaos of the Leap Forward, "birth control" gave way to "planned births," meaning giving births in a planned way and the practice of late marriage.[3] Under the supervision of local Party and government cadres, planned birth guidance committees were gradually reestablished. However, the process was slow. The provincial guidance committee for the Kwangtung province was not established until the end of 1963 after a meeting a year earlier, at which the chief of the Canton Municipal Health Bureau told the city's medical workers to set up "advisory bodies" and "centers for the sale of contraceptives." In Shanghai, a work committee for planned births was not organized until May 1, 1963. In other areas these committees probably were established much later.

The fact that these committees were staffed by responsible local Party leaders testified to the importance attached to them. The Shanghai committee was made up of officials from the Municipal Party Committee, the Municipal Council, other local government agencies and mass organizations, together with some medical experts. The Kwangtung provincial guidance committees were chaired by the provincial Party secretariat deputy, Party secretaries, vice governors, etc., who also played prominent roles in conferences of planned birth work. Although the cadres were urged to take the lead in planned birth promotion, more talk than action seemed to be the prevailing practice. By mid-1966 even such talks could hardly be heard as a result of the eruption of the Cultural Revolution.

The second campaign was also characterized by the lack of any visible or reported central coordinating agency. Also, it seemed that, as in the previous campaign, propaganda work was more intensive in urban than in rural areas. In 1965 when Edgar Snow visited Tachai, a model farm in Shansi, he was told by the local production brigade leader that able-bodied workers, not birth control, were needed.[4]

Although the Cultural Revolution was on the decline toward the end of 1968, it has not yet been officially brought to a conclusion. The consolidation of power by the Maoist faction, the rebuilding of the Party and administrative agencies all vied for attention and efforts. It was not until the end of 1970 that this task neared completion. Meanwhile, power struggles seemed to have continued at the highest leadership echelons.

Press coverage of aspects of the power struggle left little newspaper space for information about the planned birth campaign. Also, certain women's magazines, such as *Women of China,* formerly active supporters of birth planning, were no longer in existence.

"Office of Planned Births"

It is reported that within the State Council an office of birth control was established in 1956 during the first campaign to serve as an advisory body for making policy recommendations. The office, as it exists now, is called Office of Planned Births.[5] The office is made up of representatives from the Ministries of Public Health, Propaganda, Culture, Commerce and mass organizations such as All-China Federation of Women, Young Communist League, the Chinese Red Cross, and China Medical Association. As an internal office of the State Council, not a ministerial agency, the planned birth office is responsible for coordinating research and drafting major policies concerning birth planning and late marriage.

Offices of planned births are also established at all administrative levels, from provincial or municipal to commune revolutionary committees, and are generally under the leadership of local Party secretaries and staffed by a number of medical workers and women cadres. These local offices of planned births, in coordination with other medical and health institutions, serve as the leading agencies in supervising, coordinating, and conducting local activities relating to planned births.[6] At the provincial or commune level, the office is called Planned Birth Leadership Group. In addition to its supervisory duties, it also engages in publishing pamphlets or books on planned births and late marriage for general dissemination.[7]

Some production teams, China's most basic unit in the rural areas, have also established their "planned birth small groups." Staffed by women cadres, barefoot doctors, midwives, etc., these small groups are responsible for providing guidance in technical matters as well as delivery of contraceptives to the households of those individuals in need of such services.[8]

In urban areas, at each administrative unit, such as the street committee or the resident committee, there is a corresponding sub-unit called "planned birth committee." It is responsible for promoting planned births within the specific area. Both in urban or rural areas, these planned birth committees or groups are usually headed by women cadres assisted by a few volunteers.

Organization of planned birth activities in urban areas can be illustrated by that in the Fengsheng Neighborhood Revolutionary Committee, one of nine sub-divisions in the Western District of Peking. Also, under this committee are 25 residents' committees. Each of the 25 residents' committees also has its own planned birth leading group charged with the work of publicizing the significance of planned birth. Each family is now advised to have no more than two children.

Organization in Health Institutions

Health institutions throughout China occupy dominant and key positions in the nation's medical care and birth-planning delivery system. They are actively engaged in the work of providing preventive medicine and contraceptive knowledge to the masses of the people. Without this health care network, the delivery of medical and contraceptive services in a country as vast as China would be almost impossible.

The following descriptions of responsibilities of the various institutions involved in birth planning activities represent organizational goals. As stated later, there is limited information on the rate at which these goals are being reached, especially in the rural areas.

Ministry of Public Health

The Ministry of Public Health is the highest health institution in China.[10] In the field of planned births, it is charged with the following duties:

1. *Formulation of Regulations Concerning Planned Births:* The Ministry is to carry out the decisions and policies made by the Party's National Congress or the State Council. Thus, the Ministry formulates the rules needed to regulate the practice of planned birth or late marriage. For example, the decision not to promote planned births in national minority regions was decided by the Party central, and the Ministry's duty is to carry out the decision.

2. *Operational Planning:* The Ministry decides what is to be included in the campaign, the procedures to be followed, and supervises the provincial and local planned birth activities and the synthesis of local experiences. The Ministry also oversees the establishment of birth planning guidance committees and clinics throughout the country and makes sure that medical cadres at the country's medical or health institutions are acquainted with the knowledge and techniques required to provide contraceptive services and give advice.

Basic propaganda content and methods used in the campaign are decided by the Ministry. For instance, it is the Ministry that decided that the term "planned birth" instead of "birth control," "family planning" or "planned parenthood" should be used as the central campaign message. Rationales for the campaign are also set by the Ministry, such as the protection of women and children's welfare and health and the facilitation of women's participation in labor and studies rather than the reduction of population pressures.[11]

3. *Coordination of Contraceptive Research:* The Ministry coordinates research in the field of contraceptive medicine and has urged the China Medical Association to form a Birth Control Technical Guidance Committee. Both Western and traditional Chinese doctors and medical workers have been recruited and organized by the Ministry to do experimental research with contraceptives. The Ministry also approves the contraceptive methods to be used and helps disseminate knowledge on their use.

4. *Training and Recruiting of Health Personnel:* The Ministry is charged with the establishment of a medical infrastructure throughout China, through which planned birth knowledge and methods are to be disseminated. The training of barefoot doctors, health workers, and midwives and the setting up of medical co-ops in communes are also the work of the Ministry, as is the recruiting of medical workers in rural areas to receive advanced training in municipal hospitals in performing vasectomy or sterilization operations so that the skills can be further disseminated in rural villages. Mobile medical teams are organized by the Ministry to tour the countryside to bring special services to the peasants. One 1975 report indicated that some 800,000 medical workers in mobile teams had been to the countryside and more than 100,000 of them had been settled in villages.[12]

5. *Coordination with Other Agencies:* The promotion of planned birth requires good coordination among as many social institutions as possible. The Ministry is responsible for enlisting cooperation of papers and radio broadcasting stations in support of the campaign, and organizing publishing houses to put out books and pamphlets on contraception and late marriage. Before contraceptives were provided free, the Ministry of Commerce was asked to set a lower price for them. Since 1971 all

contraceptives and operations (abortion, sterilization, etc.) have been made available free of charge.

Provincial Bureaus of Health

The duties of provincial or autonomous regional health bureaus are to a great extent similar to national responsibilities of the Ministry of Public Health. They design programs to be carried out and solve local problems. Also, they organize mobile medical teams to tour the countryside to provide medical service and contraceptive guidance or perform surgical operations.[13]

In national minority populated areas, planned births and late marriage are not promoted because historically these areas have suffered from a population decrease and national minorities constitute only about 6 percent of the total population. Thus, in these regions the chief health work is to help improve sanitary conditions and provide medical services to the people. Only in individual cases where too many children in a family have become an economic burden are contraceptives provided on demand. However, contraceptive guidance is available to the Chinese, or Han, living in these regions. The same policy is in effect in certain sparsely populated areas. As a result of this measure, health conditions have improved and population in these areas is reported to be increasing.[14]

Planned Birth Guidance in Urban Areas

Planned birth guidance as well as coordination of health and population activities in such urban areas as Shanghai or Canton or other municipalities with 200,000 to 300,000 people are responsibilities of municipal health bureaus. However, the actual work of providing guidance, advice, and delivery of planned birth services and promotion of late marriage falls upon the urban factory health clinics or the street committee health stations.

Each factory usually has its own health clinic or health station, which treats minor diseases of workers and provides contraceptives to women workers of child-bearing age. In addition, the factory clinic is responsible for setting up a "planned birth ratio" so that women workers are assigned the years in which they are scheduled to bear children within the Five-Year Plan. At the factory health clinic a posted chart usually gives the information about the specific years in which married women workers can become pregnant. The factory health clinic also keeps a complete record of the women's menstrual cycles and contraceptives used, or the reasons for not using them.[15]

The street committee is the lowest unit in China's urban administrative hierarchy. The street committee health station is responsible for providing contraceptive services to those women who do not work. Health station workers are mostly women volunteers, who have received some medical and health training from professional doctors. These women do work in propaganda, treat minor illnesses, and provide immunization and contraceptive services. In addition, the street committee is responsible for the street's security, welfare, hygiene, the mediating of quarrels, and other assorted duties.[16]

Planned Birth Guidance in Rural Areas

Since China's rural population constitutes more than 85 percent of the total, the success or failure in the work of planned births in rural areas will have a dominant effect on the nation's population growth rate. Given the high illiteracy rate and pervasiveness of traditional values in rural villages, the task of promoting late marriage and the practice of contraception is extremely difficult.

In the rural administrative hierarchy, the county (*hsien*), is the unit second to the province. Under the county there is the people's commune, an administrative and production unit with some degree of economic and political autonomy. A commune has on the average between 10,000 and 15,000 people, with some having as many as 50,000 to 60,000. The commune is subdivided into 7 to 15 production brigades with each having 7 to 20 production teams. A production team, the lowest unit in rural areas, has 30 to 50 households.[17] Under the supervision and leadership of the county hospital and county health office, the rural commune's clinic is the basic health unit in the countryside. The commune clinic is the most important link between the county hospital and the production brigade's health station. Together they form a three-tier health network in rural areas, which is responsible for health administrative affairs as well as the dispensing of rural health care, especially the development of medical co-ops and the training of barefoot doctors, or health workers, *wei sheng yuan.*[18]

The commune clinic, in cooperation with the commune revolutionary committee and the planned birth leadership group, sets the commune's "planned birth ratio," either projected or actual. The formula for calculating this ratio is: the number of married women of childbearing age using contraceptives divided by the total number of fertile married women. The members of the production teams together with their cadres decide on the number of children to be born and the women to bear them in the respective teams for the next five years. In general, newlyweds get the first priority. Next come couples with three or fewer children. Other women whose youngest children are four or five years old are given the third priority. Also, with the Party's consent, quotas of pregnancy can be exchanged among married women. In all these activities, women cadres perform most of the work, such as keeping records, making arrangements for sterilization or abortion operations, and doing propaganda work.[19]

To make up the shortage of qualified medical personnel in rural areas, mobile medical teams made up of city doctors are organized by either the provincial or county health authorities. These teams are responsible for six main tasks: 1) providing preventive and therapeutic services, 2) training local medical and health personnel, 3) promoting planned births and late marriage, 4) assisting local medical and health institutions, 5) helping and promoting the Patriotic Health Movement, and 6) educating mobile team members in ideology so as to better serve the peasants.[20] Some 1,000 mobile teams were reported to have served the countryside by 1965. Within four months, one team in Jenho Commune of Hupei had distributed 3,475 contraceptive kits, inserted 547 IUDs, performed 48 abortions, sterilized 8 women and vasectomized 10 men.[21] In addition to these general mobile medical teams, specialized medical teams are sent to the countryside. In Hopei, for instance, a mobile eye, ear, nose, throat, and dental team was sent to each commune for a month. A planned birth mobile team may also be sent to rural villages to show films or distribute literature concerning late marriage or contraception.[22] In Yenchuan County of Shensi, organized and led by the county health office, one mobile medical team, made up of barefoot doctors, was reported to have accomplished work of planned births and preventive medicine in 62 production teams within six months.[23]

In recent years, doctors in municipal hospitals have been organized to assist health and medical work in rural counties, communes, and production brigades. On the other hand, health and medical workers in rural counties, communes and production brigades have also been recruited to receive better and more training at municipal hospitals. This system is known as "three ups and three downs."[24] Because of the difficulty involved in promoting late marriage and planned births in rural areas, in the first campaign promotion was carried out only in counties considered to have more favorable conditions. Then successful achievements in these counties were used as demonstrations for emulation by other counties.[25] In the second campaign, promotion in rural areas was much more intensive and a similar approach was adopted.[26] Observations by recent visitors to China seemed to indicate that the campaign is beginning to penetrate the rural areas and is having some initial success.

Barefoot Doctors and Health Workers

China's barefoot doctors, health workers, and midwives are those nameless "paramedics" forming a rural medical network. They are the backbone of the current planned birth campaign. Barefoot doctors were first created in 1965 in response to Mao Tse-tung's call "in medical and health work, put stress in rural areas." On September 14, 1968, the *People's Daily*'s extensive coverage of barefoot doctors set off nationwide efforts to train more of them from among the mass of peasants. Candidates, mostly junior high graduates in their mid or late teens, are recommended by local production brigade or production team revolutionary committees on the basis of their ideological soundness and their determination to serve the peasants. They receive about three to six months of training. They are supposed to be able to treat minor illnesses common among the peasants. They carry out their health duties as well as farm labor. During slack seasons they rotate for more training in the county hospital or sometimes receive special instructions from mobile medical teams.[27] At present most of China's production brigades are said to have two to three barefoot doctors and each production team one to two health workers or midwives.[28] Since some production brigades have more people than others, and considering that a barefoot doctor has to do farm work too, two or three are probably not enough. Recently some production brigades have instituted a "three-three rotation system," with one barefoot doctor working in the health station, one going to production teams to provide medical services, and one participating in farm labor.[29] China now reportedly has a total of one million barefoot doctors and about three million health workers or midwives.[30]

Since women are the main targets of planned birth propaganda, the use of women promoters seems to be more effective because they are listened to more readily. Thus, the training of women barefoot doctors has become one of the important tasks in rural health work. In Yi county of Shantung, for instance, among the 910 barefoot doctors 44 percent of are women. At Tientse Commune, 33 of the 35 production teams have women barefoot doctors, who are said to have contributed greatly to the practice of late marriage and planned births.[31] In some cases, if abortion is necessary, the operation is performed on the spot right in the woman's house by the barefoot doctor who has just succeeded in convincing her.[32]

Other Agencies in Planned Birth Campaigns

In addition to the Ministry of Public Health, other ministries such as Commerce, Propaganda, Culture, etc. are also engaged in the campaign to promote late marriage and planned births although it is difficult to document the extent of their involvement and activities. The China Medical Association is engaged in helping train medical workers and barefoot doctors and conducts research in contraceptive medicine.[33] The Chinese Academy of Sciences is reported to have invited western experts on contraception to China for the exchange of experiences.[34]

Revolutionary committees, as China's administrative organs are called, are responsible at all levels for the supervision and coordination of planned birth and late marriage propaganda. Usually, at least one of each committee's members and its vice chairman is charged with such responsibilities. To carry out their duties they organize conferences to relay instructions and exchange experiences.[35] Or, together with their corresponding Communist Party secretariats, they organize specific inspection groups to tour the districts within their jurisdiction to check on the local planned birth work and to record progressive experiences or models for citation and popularization.[36] Almost all mass or public organizations are represented by participants at these conferences or inspection groups. Both county and provincial revolutionary committees may organize such conferences or groups.

In birth planning, as in all other movements in China, the Chinese Communist Party is the main organizing force. The Party provides leadership and assumes important responsible positions in birth planning organization. The function of these leaders is to supervise the campaigns and to mobilize the masses for the various meetings or study sessions organized for planned birth purposes. In many cases, to achieve results the cadres do not hesitate to use some form of pressure or coercion.[37]

Mass organizations like the Communist Youth League, the women's federations, etc., are the other major groups involved in the dissemination of contraceptive knowledge. These groups help organize the meetings and mobilize public participation in such meetings or shows performed by touring propaganda teams or cultural troupes.[38]

Most barefoot doctors, being single and in their late teens or early twenties, are considered by the peasants to be too young to know much about birth control. Thus, young barefoot doctors have not proved to be ideal for the work of persuading the peasants to practice planned birth. Since 1972, propaganda work carried out by middle-aged women cadres has been the most effective. These women, married, and often in leadership positions, are themselves examples in planned birth. Thus, peasants tend to have more confidence in them. In close coordination with barefoot doctors, health workers, and other medical personnel, these women cadres are now bringing propaganda and contraceptives to each eligible couple. Some do even more. One commune's woman secretary, much devoted to her work, yelled every morning to the women tilling in the fields: "Have you taken your pill today?" Since most peasant women often forget to take their pills, this woman cadre personally checked on every one just to make sure.[39]

These women cadres often simultaneously head local women's federations. Assisted by local activists, they are the ones charged with the major responsibilities of persuasion and motivation for planned birth.

The People's Liberation Army also plays an important role in the planned birth campaign by helping train local barefoot doctors and health workers and by organizing medical teams or propaganda teams to tour rural villages. It was reported that over the years a total of 17,200 such teams had been dispatched to remote and rural areas to help some 73,000 production teams set up or improve their medical cooperative services.[40]

Campaign Organizational Problems

The shortage of information suggests that the described organization in the present planned birth campaign may not be representative of the efforts throughout the country. Most of the available data are from China's major municipalities, sucn as Peking, Shanghai, or Canton, or communes close to these urban centers, and it is unknown to what extent this urban-scale organization has developed in more remote rural villages, especially those in inner provinces. Nevertheless, the description of organization of planned births still has value as the "ideal type," which the government encourages emulation of throughout the country.

As a country in which politics takes command of all aspects of life, China can be said to be more privileged than other developing countries in terms of organization and mobilization of resources for a particular national endeavor. The success of a campaign for planned births and late marriage demands the coordination of as many social and political efforts. Usually, this is difficult to achieve in a developing country, where the central government leadership is more subject to change and its authority less far-reaching. With highly centralized authority, China has been able to publicize planned births and late marriage in a coordinated and organized manner. All institutions in China can be mobilized for the purpose if the Chinese Communist Party so decides. Evidence indicates that the Party has been attempting to do just that. Of particular importance is the close coordination between the administrative and health branches as well as the integration of Party, medical, and women cadres in the campaign. (See chart 1.) The question is then to what extent have these institutions and personnel been able to carry out the directives. The limited available information suggests that there are both successes and failures.[41]

The supply of adequate medical personnel and fieldworkers is one of the most crucial factors in determining the success or failure of the planned birth campaign in a country with a population of 800 million people. China is trying to solve this problem by shortening its medical training programs and by the use of millions of barefoot doctors, health workers, and midwives, who come to receive about three to six months of training. Such measures, while having alleviated the problem greatly, still suffer from some shortcomings.

First, these barefoot doctors or midwives, receive only a brief three to six months of training. Although there have been plans to rotate them for more advanced training at a county or municipal hospital, it is hard to determine the extent to which such programs have been executed. It seems that with this limited training and their young age, these "paramedics" do not evoke the desired professional confidence of the masses. One 1973 article in the *Red Flag* reported that in Chuansha County near Shanghai there were those who did not trust these paramedics. "Young girls treating illnesses? Even a yellow cat would have laughed so much as to lose its eyesight. Don't try the bargain at the expense of big things (meaning curing of diseases)!" Thus, some barefoot doctors are reported to have referred patients to hospitals or clinics without even attempting


State Council
Ministry of Public Health
Office of Planned Births
Provincial or Municipal Revolutionary Committee
Provincial or Municipal Health Bureau
Planned Birth Leadership Group
County Revolutionary Committee
County Hospital
Planned Birth Leadership Group
Commune Revolutionary Committee
Commune Clinic
Planned Birth Leadership Group
Production Brigade Revolutionary Committee
Production Brigade's Health Station
Planned Birth Small Group
Production Team Revolutionary Committee
Production Team's Health Room
Planned Birth Small Group
Individual Workers
- barefoot doctors
- health workers
- midwives
- women cadres
- planned birth propagandists, etc.
lines of authority
lines of communication

CHART 1. Organizational Network of Planned Birth Campaign in Rural Areas to treat them.[42] The article urged that such attitudes be corrected. However, more than a year later such attitudes apparently still existed. This same county is reported to "have been swept by an insidious wind" circulating that "barefoot doctors just do not look like doctors."[43]

A second problem is that these paramedics are burdened with too much work. One article in the *People's Party* reports that a certain production brigade's health station in Shensi had only one barefoot doctor. Yet this same barefoot doctor was also the brigade's cashier and accountant. Another production brigade in this same northern province also had a similar problem because its only barefoot doctor was also a druggist and a night school teacher. The latter duties had occupied almost all his time. Still in another instance, one health station's single barefoot doctor was simultaneouly the vice chairman of his brigade's revolutionary committee, secretary of the Young Communist League, and a standing member of the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants' Trade Management Committee. Being so busy with meetings and out-of-town travels, he had no time to treat members of the brigade.[44]

Although the use of barefoot doctors or health workers seems an ingenious measure for solving the manpower shortage, China still lacks enough qualified medical workers. The problem is especially serious in rural areas, where the few educated and ideologically qualified ones are simultaneously burdened with too many duties. Thus, the cadres are simply too occupied to devote extra time or energy to the promotion of planned birth and late marriage.

Finally, the success of China's planned birth work depends to a great extent on its rural medical cooperative network, which, if successfully established, would mean almost free medical and health care for all Chinese peasants at a nominal cost of one to two JMP* each person annually. However, the functioning of these medical cooperatives seems to vary from place to place. In some rural areas, they seem far from adequate. For instance, the Chen Chiang Kuang Production Brigade of Shih Pa Li Ku Commune in Hsin County of Shantung formed a medical cooperative with four neighboring brigades in early 1970. Within a year the cooperative system was breaking down because leaders and cadres of the commune and its brigades, claiming they were too busy, were simply indifferent to its operation. In August 1972 the cooperative was terminated and its barefoot doctors were relieved of their health duties. Although the incident occurred more than two years earlier, it was not disclosed until March 1974. And the purpose of the disclosure was to criticize such mistaken ideas and attitudes.[45]

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*Jen Min Pi (one yuan) equals about US$0.43.

Although such shortcomings or failures have had infrequent mention in the Chinese Communist press, those that are mentioned do not seem to be isolated individual cases. The Chinese herbal medical doctor, whom this author has interviewed, said that actually more than 80 percent of rural medical cooperatives had collapsed as a result of financial difficulties and lack of Western medicine. He said that at best only less than 10 percent of rural medical cooperatives, which depend on a local supply of herbal medicines, have been successful. This doctor also indicated that the training barefoot doctors receive is generally inadequate. Further, if all the millions of barefoot doctors and health workers should perform their medical work fully, there would be a tremendous loss of labor, which rural areas simply cannot afford.

All these difficulties must be borne in mind when attempting to assess China's planned birth organization on the national level and when contemplating tranfer of the Chinese experience to other countries.

NOTES

1. Much of this section on the first and second campaigns is based on John S. Aird, *Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in The People's Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1972), pp. 244-247, 294-295. Also, it is based on synthesis of previous discussions.

2. Francis Harper, ed., *Out of China* (Hong Kong: The Green Pagoda Press, 1964), p. 18. Refugees from Chungshang County, Kwangtung, told that though villagers did hear about the campaign, many did not have the slightest idea what contraceptives looked like and did not like the idea at all.

3. S. Chandrasekhar, "China's Population Problems," in E.S. Kirby, ed., *Contemporary China*, Vol. III (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1960), pp. 31-32. See Chandrasekhar's conversation with then Vice Minister of Health Wu Yun-fu.

4. Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 45. Snow was in China in autumn of 1964 and early winter of 1965. This leader was none other than Chen Yun-kwei, who became a vice premier in January 1975.

5. China News Service Dispatch, Peking, *Ta Kung Pao*, Hong Kong, August 24, 1974, p. 1.

6. *Ibid.*

7. "Delayed Marriage and Planned Birth," compiled by the Planned Birth Leadership Group of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, translated by Loren Fessler.

8. Commentary Group of the Yenchiao Commune Revolutionary Committee, Chuansha County, "Childbirths Must Also Be Planned," *Red Flag*, No. 262 (June 1, 1973), pp. 50-51.

9. "Family Planning Gains Popularity," *Peking Review*, Vol. 17, No. 38 (September 20, 1974), p. 17.

10. Huang Yu-chuan, *Birth Control Movement in Communist China* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1967), pp. 78-80.

11. Chandrasekhar, *op. cit.*

12. Wu Chieh-ping, "Medicine and Health (1): For Workers, Peasants and Soldiers," *Peking Review*, Vol. 18, No. 8 (February 21, 1975), p. 10.

13. Huang Yu-chuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

14. "Chinese Observer on Population Question," *Peking Review*, Vol. 16, No. 49 (December 7, 1973), pp. 49-50; "Iteration of Our Nation's Position on the Major Problems Concerning World Population," *People's Daily*, August 22, 1974, p. 6;

Li Teh-chuan, "Ten Years of Health Work," *Ten Years of National Construction*, Vol. II (Hong Kong: Chi Wen Publishing House, 1959), p. 118.

15. *Population Dynamics Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 1; Emmett Dedmon, *China Journal* (New York: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 106, 132; Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. XII, No. 5 (1973), p. 12.

16. Christopher Lucas, *Women of China* (Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1965), pp. 160-162; V.W. Sidel, "Medical Personnel and Their Training," in *Medicine and Public Health in the People's Republic of China*, ed. by J.R. Quinn (Washington, D.C.: DHEW Publication No. NIH 72-67, 1972), p. 157; Dedmon, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40. Ruth and Victor Sidel, "The Human Services in China," *People's China*, ed. by David Milton, Nancy Milton, and Franz Schurmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 185-187.

17. Pi-chao Chen, "Panorama: People's Republic of China," *Population Dynamics Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 11.

18. Chin Wei, "Continue to Do a Good Job in Rural Health Revolution," *Red Flag*, No. 268 (December 1, 1973), pp. 34-35.

19. Pi-chao Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-13.

20. Joshua Horn, "From Away with All Pests," in *People's China*, ed. by Milton, Milton and Schurmann, pp. 159-175.

21. NCNA, December 7, 1965, as reported by Leo A. Orleans, "Evidence from Chinese Medical Journals on Current Population Policy," *China Quarterly*, No. 40 (October-December 1969), pp. 138-139.

22. Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 159; Seymour Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 292; Dedmon, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

23. Staff Commentater, "Barefoot Doctors Who Can Make Great Achievements," *People's Daily*, October 12, 1974, p. 3.

24. Pi-chao Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Interview with the Chinese herbal medical doctor.

25. "Hopei Maternal and Child Work Conference Decides Its Work Duties for 1957," *Health News* (Chien Kan Pao), Peking, January 29, 1957; "Contraceptive Guidance Work Penetrates Deep into Rural Villages," *Kwang Ming Daily*, Peking, January 30, 1958; "Hsian-hsian County's Planned Birth Propaganda Penetrates Deep into Rural Villages; the Masses Urgently Demand Giving Births in a Planned Way," *Hsin Hunan Pao, Changsha*, September 3, 1957.

26. Huang Yu-chuan, *op. cit.*, p. 84. Chou En-lai told Edgar Snow that planned birth was only gradually penetrating the rural areas. See Snow, *The Long Revolution*, pp. 226-227.

27. Chang Kai, "Health Work Serving the Peasants," *Peking Review*, Vol. 8, No. 50 (December 10, 1965), pp. 12-16; "Barefoot Doctors," *Peking Review*, Vol. 16, No. 21 (May 25, 1973), pp. 15-17, 21.

28. Chaing-cheng Commune Party Secretariate, Chuansha County, Shanghai, "Strengthen the Team of Barefoot Doctors Amid Struggles," *Red Flag*, No. 275 (July 1, 1974), pp. 78-80.

29. Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, *Daily Life in Revolutionary China* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 283, 275.

30. "One Million Barefoot Doctors in Our Nation's Countryside Are Growing Strong," *People's Daily*, June 26, 1974, p. 1; Chang Chien-ping, "The Rapid Development of Health and Medical Industry," *Ta Kung Pao*, Hong Kong, September 28, 1974, p. 4.

31. "Yi County Trains with Great Efforts Its Women Barefoot Doctors," *People's Daily*, March 13, 1974, p. 4. Also, Staff Correspondent, "Medical Co-op's Roots Deepen and Foliage Thrives," *People's Daily*, January 11, 1974, pp. 1,4; Staff Correspondent, "Reinforcements in Maternal and Child Health Care Work," *People's Daily*, March 10, 1972, p. 3.

32. Lu Hui-hsia, "Women and Children's Health Is Protected," *People's Daily*, March 20, 1974, p. 3; Macciocchi, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

33. Carl Djerassi, "Some Observations on Current Fertility Control in China," *China Quarterly*, No. 57 (January-March 1974), pp. 40-56.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

35. See articles on birth control in the following issues of FBIS's *Daily Report: People's Republic of China:* Nos. 21, 52, 57, 207, 209, 226, 234 and 236 of 1974 and No. 23 of 1975.

36. FBIS, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, No. 215 (November 6, 1974), J 3 and No. 248 (December 24, 1974), J 1-J 2.

37. Francis Harper, ed., *Out of China*, pp. 116-117; Staff Correspondent, "Our Party Secretariat's Woman Member," *People's Daily*, September 4, 1972, p. 2; "Better Develop Woman Labor's Functions," *Red Flag*, No. 259 (March 1, 1973), pp. 43-45; "Mobilize the Mass to Transform Customs and Change Habits and Persist in Late Marriage and Birth Control," *People's Daily*, January 27, 1974, p. 4; "Strengthen Women's Work and Develop Their 'Half-sky' Functions," *People's Daily*, March 8, 1974, p. 3.

38. M. Vincent Mayes, *China Close-up: Life Styles of the 800 Million* (New York: Drake Publishers, 1972), p. 62; "Women of White Snow Production Brigade Persist in Reading, Studying and Diligent Productive Labor," *People's Daily*, February 15, 1974, p. 4; "Warmly Care for the Growth of Women Intellectuals Residing in the Countryside," *People's Daily*, November 5, 1974, p. 2; "New Age, New Rural Villages, New Women," *People's Daily*, November 27, 1974, p. 3; "Educate Youth to Practice Late Marriage and Planned Birth," *People's Daily*, November 20, 1972, p. 2.

39. Han Suyin, "The Chinese Experiment," *UNESCO Courier* (July-August 1974), p. 55.

40. "With Full-chest of Warmth Support Socialist New-Born Things," *People's Daily*, January 19, 1974, p. 1; FBIS, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, Vol. 1, No. 126 (June 28, 1974), pp. E 9-E 10.

41. As a rule the Chinese press does not report failure stories. However, it is possible to glean from the various articles reporting success that work is not all desirable. See also, Ross Terrill, *800, 000, 000: The Real China* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972), p. 103; Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 45; Pi-chao Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

42. Wang Kuei-tsen, "Through Practice Elevate Medical Treatment Skills," *Red Flag*, No. 259 (March 1, 1973), pp. 49-51; See also, NCNA, "Struggle to the End Anyone Who Denies the Work of Barefoot Doctors," *People's Daily*, March 23, 1976, p. 1; and NCNA, "Fight the Right Deviationist's Reversal of Correct Verdicts and Hail the Revolution in Health," *People's Daily*, April 1, 1976, p. 1. Many similar reports can be found in the *People's Daily*.

43. "Amid Struggles Strengthen the Team of Barefoot Doctors," *op. cit.*

44. *Ibid.*; Han Wei-hsiu, "Barefoot Doctors Should Not Take on Too Many Duties," *People's Daily*, November 10, 1972, p. 2; Macciocchi, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

45. "Shantung Barefoot Doctor Defends Mao's Line on Health Work," "*Tachung Daily* 20 March Investigation Report," and "*Tachung Daily* 20 March Commentary," in FBIS, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China,* No. 61 (March 28, 1974), C 1-C 4.

4

INFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND COMMUNICATION (IEC) IN PLANNED BIRTH CAMPAIGNS

> **Planned birth* is practicable, but it requires proper publicity and education and it takes time.**
>
> **Chou En-lai, late 1964**

Chinese Communist terminology does not include "information, education and communication," but the word *hsuan chuan*, propaganda, encompasses all these activities. Propaganda is perhaps one of the most pervasive techniques of the Chinese Communists. Almost without exception, each major movement or policy is supported by an intensive, coordinated propaganda campaign to spread the word and ensure that the directives are closely followed.[1] In each propaganda campaign virtually every communication technique, modern or otherwise, is used. To use a popular Chinese phrase, in promoting their campaigns or policies the Chinese Communists have applied "all the 18 kinds of *wu yi* (martial arts)."[2]

Media and Channels Used in Planned Birth Propaganda

All Chinese media of communication, whether mass or interpersonal, are under the tight control of the Communist Party. The State Council has, among its agencies, the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of Culture, the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs, the New China News

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*As recorded by Edgar Snow, the words are "family planning." Since "planned birth" had replaced all other terms in the late fifties, it is unlikely that Chou En-lai himself would have used "family planning." See Snow's *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 232.

Agency, and the Administration of Publishing Affairs. Thus, the Party encounters little or no problem in utilizing the kinds of media desired.

Newspapers

Articles in the Chinese press explain the rationales for planned birth and late marriage and the advantages for the individual, the family, and the state, as well as contraceptive methods. The *People's Daily, Kwang Ming Daily, Wei Hui Pao, Chung Kuo Ching Nien Pao* (Chinese Youth Daily), and provincial newspapers have all been utilized in the campaigns. Since all newspapers are under the Party's control, when the official policy shifts the newspapers follow suit and articles about planned birth appear or disappear.

Chinese newspapers perform the function of informing the public of available contraceptive methods and the rationales for practicing birth control and also that of supervising the campaigns. For instance, by reporting on the danger of self-induced abortions and deaths caused by taking non-prescription drugs, public attention was directed to medical abortion and eventually helped to bring about a more reasonable regulation on abortion.[3] At the time of the first campaign, many people considered birth control immoral. Newspapers soon started criticizing these attitudes. When contraceptives were still distributed through sale at drugstores newspapers criticized the stores for failure to give contraceptives prominent display. As a result, the drugstores rearranged their displays. During the second campaign newspapers devoted much less space to articles or editorials on planned birth, perhaps to avoid creating the impression of an overpopulation problem. Instead, magazine articles were used. Knowledge of planned birth and late marriage was presented in the form of providing health or medical information or answering readers' questions.

In the present campaign, newspaper references on planned births seem limited to inconspicuous references tucked away in the middle of articles reporting improvements in the people's health conditions. These references are for the most part very general. Late marriage seems to have received more coverage. Many articles report how people have overcome their feudalistic thinking, how they have postponed their marriages, and how young people have decided to do away with traditional expensive weddings. There are constant disavowals of a population-food problem, suggesting the Chinese Communist Party's sensitivity to the charge of overpopulation.

Magazines

Magazines in China serve specific audiences. The *Red Flag*, the Party's ideological organ, has published articles providing ideological and policy guidance on planned birth. Before their suspension in 1966, *Youth of China* and *Women of China*, because of their specific readership, were popular magazines that devoted many pages to explaining the advantages of late marriage and planned birth as well as the introduction of contraceptive methods. *Youth of China* was less involved than *Women of China*.

Women of China, with a circulation of more than one million, was one of the most important mass media in disseminating information and knowledge of planned birth to China's women. Editorially, there was a department of planned birth or "planned birth letterbox." Medical doctors were mobilized to write articles on the physiology of reproduction and contraception, the advantages of late marriage and planned birth, and the disadvantages of early marriage and having too many children. According to one researcher's count, *Women of China*, from January 1955 to April 1966, had published a total of 100 articles on this topic.[4] *Women of China* had no articles on birth control before 1955, during the Leap years and after May 1966. Again, this illustrates the tight Par[illegible] control of the magazine as well as the close affinity between politics an[illegible]lanned birth in China. Neither *Youth of China* nor *Women of China* has yet resumed publication since their suspension in 1966.

It is difficult to ascertain how people responded to the planned birth message carried in these magazines or newspapers. Presumably, the articles were generally read since the Chinese Communist dictum has been "ignorance of newspaper reading is ignorance of politics." Furthermore, Party cadres organized study sessions to read newspapers and magazines under their supervision.[5]

Books, Pamphlets, and Posters

Although planned birth activity started in 1954, books on contraception did not appear until three years later. These books or pamphlets were written for specific audiences. The first group of books gave detailed descriptions of conception physiology and the various contraceptive methods. These books were meant for medical workers, "maternal and child" women workers, and women cadres of middle ranks. One such book was *Manual of Contraceptive Guidance*, published by the Central Publishing House, which also put out *Musts for Tying-off of Sperm Transporting Tube and Egg Transporting Tube* (*vas deferens* and fallopian tube) and *Contraception Illustrated*. The procedures of and reactions after vasectomy and sterilization were described in detail. *Contraception Illustrated* used mainly pictures, comic strips, and brief descriptions in simple language to present the significance of practicing contraception and methods of using various contraceptives. It was targeted at the less educated workers and peasants and had a circulation of more than 100,000 copies. The local presses also published books on contraception. According to the Ministry of Public Health, a total of 5 million books, and 3,000 illustrations or posters had been published by the end of 1957.[6]

In 1958 the number of publications continued to increase. Public health education authorities of Liaoning, for instance, published 13 kinds of contraception propaganda materials, 160,000 copies of training materials for contraception propaganda, and 500 sets of contraception posters for exhibitions. Hsin Hua Books of Shengyang put out some 300,000 copies of contraception materials.[7] When the campaign was resumed in 1962, book publishing continued and books were for sale at very low prices. Some were among the reading assignments for local planned birth promoters. Tens of millions of people read these books. Sets of illustrations on contraception were published for use at exhibitions.

Calendars were used for planned birth propaganda. According to a visitor to China in 1966, a calendar for sale in Peking had three days each month for planned birth publicity. For instance, the eighth day said too many children would be a burden on work, production, and study and would do harm to the health of both parents and children. The twelfth day reminded the people that abortion is provided free of charge and women who undergo an operation would receive special care. The eighteenth day stated that it would not be proper for men below 28 years and women below 24 to get married. Instead, they were urged to devote more time to ideological studies.[8]

The current campaign also has seen publication of planned birth books although total numbers published are not available. *Late Marriage and Planned Birth*, for example, was published by the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee's Planned Birth Leadership Group. It presented in simple Chinese the physiology of contraception and pregnancy as well as the rationales for practicing late marriage and planned birth.[9]

One Chinese who observed China's planned birth programs in the summer of 1972 obtained a number of pamphlets or instructional manuals. These publications were put out by the People's Health Publishing House for both the public and barefoot doctors or midwives. The pamphlets provide rationales for planned birth, the recommended age for marriage and information on how to use or prescribe contraceptives. Instructional manuals are more technical in nature and contain detailed descriptions of surgical procedures for inserting or removing an IUD, inducing abortion and performing a vasectomy or sterilization.

These pamphlets or manuals are compiled either collectively by the staff of a medical college or by individual doctors. The cost varies from .09 yuan to 3.25 yuan. One pamphlet, "Oral Contraceptive and Contraceptive Injectable: Questions and Answers" (1971), is distributed free of charge at Shanghai drugstores. Apparently they are in wide circulation. One manual for the retraining of barefoot doctors is said to have had a first printing of 141,000 copies. Others were already in their eleventh printing.[10]

Broadcasting

Television, being underdeveloped, plays no significant role. Radio is widely used to report success stories, announce directives, and popularize models. The role of wired broadcasting in rural areas is more direct and close to the masses. In rural communes, loudspeakers air planned birth messages in addition to music and other programs. The frequency of planned birth broadcasts on the air is said to be particularly intensive before holidays.[11]

Aside from regular planned birth messages, a special "broadcasting rally," *kwang po ta hui*, may be convened. For instance, in Hanchuan County of Hupei, Jenho Commune called a "broadcasting rally" to announce the decision of young women to do away with traditional expensive weddings and urged women to organize ideological study and discussion sessions. In that commune 34 men and women abandoned the tradition of accepting wedding gifts, 28 deferred their marriage, 15 returned their gifts and 30 couples had new inexpensive weddings.[12]

Films and Slides

In 1957 the Shanghai Scientific Educational Film Manufacturer produced a short film on "Control of Conception." This film was shown in theaters throughout China and to various rural groups. After a short while, however, the film was withdrawn.[13] In 1962 the film was reshot, and the narration was revised. More emphasis was placed on the advantages of planned birth. The film was first shown at various public institutions and factories. Public showings came later.[14]

Slides are used, too. The Ministry of Health in 1957 estimated that some 700 sets of slides and 150 copies of the short film on contraception were circulated. In Shengyang alone, some 150,000 people were said to have seen the film in the first few months of 1958 and the provincial film distributor was considering purchase of another 20 copies for showing to all adults in the cities and rural areas. The plan was dropped when the campaign was called off in late 1958.[15] Slide shows were sometimes presented before the showing of the film. Showing of slides or films on contraception or late marriage is also being undertaken in the present campaign. However, few details are known.

Cultural Performances

Ever since the Chinese Communists were in Yenan some 40 years ago, cultural performances, mostly presented on makeshift stages or street corners, have been used for propaganda. Specific scripts have been written for planned birth propaganda. For instance, in Yicheng County of Kiangsu, the spare-time cultural propaganda team of the Yunchiao Production Brigade in 1972 wrote a short script called "A Pair of Shoes That Takes Three Years To Finish." This story told of the heroine Hung-yin's struggle against the old ideology in order to insist on late marriage. Hung-yin's role was played by a peasant girl, Chen Chang-hung. Because of her role as Hung-yin, Chen was well liked and she herself vowed to postpone her marriage.[16]

In Heroes' Commune, Nantung of Kiangsu, the women's federation chairman and Young Communist League secretary of one production brigade wrote a script called "Late Marriage Is Good!" She also married late.[17] Shows promoting late marriage and planned birth can be easily understood by the rural audience. However, their effectiveness is doubtful.

Exhibitions

Exhibitions were an important means of planned birth propaganda in the early campaigns. They were viewed by men and women at the same time and were accompanied by lecturing guides. Temporary birth control clinics were set up to teach the visitors how to use the various contraceptive methods. In Peking, from October of 1956 to August 1957, 830,000 people, a remarkable 40 percent of Peking's population at that time, were said to have visited the exhibition.[18] Nanking held its exhibition in March 1957, which was visited by 150,000 people. Neighboring counties sent representatives to the exhibition.[19] In Hangchow, more than 40,000 people a month visited its exhibition.[20] Rural responses were equally enthusiastic. In Yutien, Hopei, within seven days, more than 50,000 people visited an exhibition. In Changchi, Shansi, 118,000 people saw an exhibition in one week. As a result, the county's maternal and child clinics had to set aside extra hours for birth control guidance. In Hsin County of Shansi, 32,000 people saw an exhibition in four days.[21]

These early exhibitions left little room for imagination. Even foreigners felt embarrassed by the complete and intimate details of the animated diagrams. One foreign visitor observed:

> . . . . the exhibitions I visited in two of China's principal cities, Peking and Canton, were well attended, though I visited on working days. Both displayed long series of drawings, showing the vertiginous figures of the increase in the Chinese birth rate, the happy home with the small family and the exact method of arriving at this desired result. Forbidding female guides lectured to little parties of visitors in front of each exhibit.[22]

In the second campaign, exhibitions continued to be important. Within two weeks more than 100,000 people visited a Canton planned birth exhibition, which was then extended for two more weeks. Another 100,000 came to visit the exhibition so it was extended further.[23] Fifteen birth control propaganda teams, made up of some 400 doctors, nurses, etc., were organized in 1963 in Canton to tour the countryside for mobile exhibitions. Going to these exhibitions was considered a political duty for all men and women over 16 years old. Cadres were stationed at the exhibitions to persuade the visitors to buy contraceptives and to urge users to report reactions to local women's federations.[24]

Similar exhibitions were also held in northern cities. Various incentives available were announced in posters mounted in conspicuous places. For instance, women requesting contraceptive guidance were exempt from the red tape of registration, or paying of fees. No limit on age or number of children was set for abortion or sterilization. Only one partner's consent was needed. If they were workers or employees all expenses would be covered by insurance. Residents were given a 50 percent discount. Poor people would not be charged.[25]

Exhibitions in the present campaign are mostly locally-oriented. It seems that they are used less extensively than previously.

Along with wide use of the print, broadcast, and visual media, the Chinese program has made intensive use of conferences and rallies, group discussion meetings, home visits and, to some extent, the schools.

Conferences and Rallies

Conferences add some support for planned birth activity. Conferences are generally held at the provincial or county level and usually annually, while rallies are locally-oriented and held more frequently. Province-wide conferences are organized by the provincial revolutionary committees and attended by leadership cadres responsible for planned birth or health and medical work and standing members of Party committees or vice chairmen of revolutionary committees at various levels. Also attending the conferences are leadership cadres of workers, women, youth, commercial and planning departments, the provincial military district, etc. Virtually all concerned departments are required to send representatives to the conferences. In addition to "studying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the guide and criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius as the key link," the conferences are mainly charged with the duty to convey directives, review present situations, report success models, exchange local experiences, and plan for future actions. Almost invariably, resolutions call for the strengthening of party leadership, heightening of mass awareness, deepening of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, improving maternal and child care, carrying out extensive propaganda and education, and *implementing* (not merely popularizing) the Party's policies.[26] The extent to which these conferences support the planned birth propaganda cannot be determined precisely. It seems that they can help boost morale, arouse public awareness, and alert the responsible cadres to exert more effort.

Local rallies are perhaps more effective in achieving results since it is during the rallies that social pressure can best be created for maximum group conformity. For instance, in 1974 in Shunyi County near Peking, Tientsu Commune's 121 young women jointly advocated late marriage and the abolishment of betrothal gifts at a rally to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius as well as to condemn the *Book on Virtuous Womanhood* (*Nu Erh Chin*), a Chinese classic that outlines women's submissive role in family and society. At a nearby production brigade 51 men and women responded to a similar call and pledged to practice late marriage.[27]

Group Discussion Meetings

Group discussion meetings characterize the present campaign. They are conducted in the form of a study session, a criticism and self-criticism session, or a "remember bitterness and think of sweetness" session. For instance, in Hsian-yin County of Hunan, the women's federation of the Sankuang Commune's White Snow Production Brigade organized study sessions to study Chairman Mao's works and Marxism-Leninism. Through such study, reading and repudiation of old customs, old habits, and old thinking, 70 young women agreed to postpone their marriage and many others adopted planned birth.[28] In another instance, Party secretaries organized many special topical sessions. Married women were mobilized to study Chairman Mao's "The Direction of Youth Movement," which educated them to continue the revolution and break away with old traditional ideas and take the lead in planned birth.[29] As a rule, Party cadres and women cadres play active roles in organizing and leading these sessions.

Women not practicing planned birth or unwilling to marry late meet in "remember bitterness and think of sweetness" sessions, where they are told "the bitterness or suffering of the old society" before 1949 in contrast with "the sweetness of the new society" under

Communism. Having too many children is considered being in a feudalist conspiracy characteristic of the exploiting class only.[30] Many reports say that after such sessions women are moved and agree to practice planned birth or to postpone their marriage.

Group meetings are held three times a week or whenever deemed necessary by local Party or women cadres. At the height of campaign activities one or more sessions may be held each day. At the Hungwei (Red Defense) Production Brigade, Tai County of Kiangsu, for instance, within a period of some two months in late 1973 and early 1974 local women had held more than 80 criticism meetings of various size. Some 210 women spoke at these sessions, a "great criticism" billboard was set up more than ten times, and some 150 criticism articles were written. In between these criticism sessions were various "remember bitterness and think of sweetness" meetings.[31]

The rationale for these group sessions is that through study, criticism, and "remembering" the masses are supposed to develop a correct Marxist-Leninist-Maoist attitude toward love, marriage, and family. Once this attitude is formulated, China's planners believe, the mass of people will voluntarily postpone their marriage and practice planned birth.

A group approach is also used to persuade the grandparents who are opposed to their children's practice of planned birth or marriage postponement. They are mobilized to attend similar sessions, taught the correct thinking about family and childbearing, and reminded of women's sufferings under the former feudalist society exploited by landlords and rich capitalists.

In addition to persuasion, complaints of complications due to contraception are discussed in these periodic meetings. If the complication is found to be the result of inadequate instructions, better communication methods are discussed and developed for the planned birth workers. An interim plan is adopted until the group meets again.[32]

Home Visits

The individual household visit is another important technique of China's planned birth communication. Local women or Party cadres and barefoot doctors are largely responsible for these household visits. They perform the dual function of persuasion and delivery of medical and contraceptive services.

The press reports examples of effective household visits. For instance, Lu Hui-hsia of Loting County, Hopei, had five children and was complaining of frequent back pains and other ailments. So the production brigade's woman barefoot doctor decided to visit her and talk about the advantages of planned birth. Lu Hui-hsia's political consciousness was said to have been greatly heightened as a result of the barefoot doctor's frequent visits. Lu asked for sterilization, which was performed by the barefoot doctor right on her *kan* (a heated bed made of brick and clay, common in northern China).[33] In another instance, a woman student residing in the countryside was considering marriage so early as to affect her study and work. The poor and lower-middle peasants came in time to educate her, to persuade her to marry late, and to adopt a correct attitude toward individual problems. This woman student was said to have made great progress.[34]

That rural areas are now beginning to be penetrated is due to the efforts and personal approach of women and Party cadres. House-to-house visits can overcome those "too busy to go to the clinic" or " I forget to take my pill" alibis. In addition, women cadres are better able to exert peer pressure on their neighbors.

Schools

In China, sociology departments and sociology courses were abolished in 1952. In mid-1957, when both the Hundred Flowers Movement and open debate over China's population policies were at their peak, Chen Ta and other Chinese demographers protested this abolition of sociology courses. In addition, they urged the establishment of a population research institute and the reinstatement of sociology and demographic courses in universities.[35] Their proposals as well as the advocacy of birth control were swept aside in the Great Leap Forward, which soon followed.

In terms of population/family planning education in schools, no curriculum can be clearly identified as either favoring or not favoring the practice of planned birth and late marriage. Primary and secondary school textbooks, saturated with ideological content, do not yet have lessons related to the concept of planned birth or late marriage.[36] However, schools seem to be playing important roles in disseminating the knowledge of planned birth. In March 1975 the *People's Daily* reported that a middle school in Shuangliao County of Kirin had organized special peasant classes to teach medical and health courses as well as planned birth lessons.[37] Also, schools play a secondary role in implementing the practice of late marriage since no married people would be admitted to colleges and those who get married before graduation are subject to expulsion. Throughout the years propaganda work urging students to marry late is also carried out through organizations such as the Young Pioneers and the Communist Youth League.

The potential role schools can play in instilling a strong motivation for planned birth in the students seems to have been recognized. Two Western obstetricians who visited China in March 1972 were told by planned birth workers that fundamental principles of planned birth were beginning to be taught in schools.[38] If so, they were probably not included in textbooks because Chou En-lai was reported to have asked Norway's foreign minister during the latter's visit to China in May 1973 for copies of textbooks on birth control used in Norwegian schools for possible adaptation in China.[39] The use of any kind of contraceptives, however, is not taught in either middle schools or universities and such information is available only for married couples.

Characteristics of Communication Activities

Chinese society under Communism has developed a unique social structure within which has evolved a unique propaganda apparatus. As far as planned birth promotion is concerned, this is perhaps unparalleled in any other country. The Chinese Communist propaganda for planned birth and late marriage includes the following characteristics.

Ideological Orientation

First of all, the propaganda for late marriage and planned birth is closely linked to ideological indoctrination, which has prevailed in all other movements in China in the past 25 years. Propaganda for planned birth and late marriage is a part of the ideology. While in other countries these matters are purely individual matters, they are never so in China. Both are linked to the building of socialism, the support of revolution in and out of China, the study of Mao Tse-tung thought, the preparation against war, famines, etc., the criticism of Liu Shao-chi and more recently the criticism of Lin Piao, Confucius, Teng Hsia-ping, etc. Thus, Chinese women are not giving births just for the sake of giving births nor for continuing the family name. They are producing children for revolution. In Chinese Communist terms, they are "nursing young plants for the revolution," which should be carried out resolutely by every Chinese. Anarchy in reproduction would make parents too overburdened with household chores to devote to studies, work, and education of the young revolutionary successors. Traditional thinking "more children greater happiness" is now considered obsolete and representative of the exploiting class.[40] Planned birth is a revolution within the society's superstructure. It is a social as well as an ideological revolution, within which there shall always be struggles between two lines, two ideologies, and two classes.[41]

Being ideologically oriented, birth planning is something that must be observed. During and after the Cultural Revolution, not planning birth could be associated with being a follower of the Liu Shao-chi clique. In the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, the campaign for planned birth and late marriage was also tied in. For instance, in Changting County of Fukien, a woman with four daughters was not practicing planned birth because she still wished to have a son so that the family line could be continued. After participation in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, this woman, deeply educated, began to realize that "it is a different era now" and that "both male and female children are revolutionary posterities." So before long she underwent surgery for sterilization. The woman's lane neighbors were also said to have advanced greatly after criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius.[42]

In another instance, in Chingpu County of Kiangsu, poor and lower-middle peasants of the First Production Brigade gathered for a session to criticize Confucius. Deeply moved, many youths of the brigade decided to postpone their marriage and married women in child-bearing age voluntarily adopted planned birth. All these, the *People's Daily* reports, are the achievements of criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius.[43]

Planned birth propaganda with a heavy dose of ideology has both advantages and disadvantages. On the advantage side, the planned birth campaign automatically has priority and importance. It is more likely that it would be followed seriously, especially for those who wish advancement in Communist circles. Since planned birth is associated with the building of socialism and the study of Mao's works, etc., refusal to practice can be a serious offense that can greatly hamper one's opportunities for promotion. On the disadvantage side, there is the danger of over-emphasis on ideology at the expense of planned birth promotion. With ideology built in, there is a risk that planned birth propaganda can be resisted by using other ideological slogans or Mao's quotes. The extent ideology is involved in planned birth propaganda cannot be easily determined.

Organization and Coordination

Elaborate organization and coordination constitute a second feature of China's planned birth propaganda. Virtually all Chinese can be tabbed for the task, in addition to health workers, barefoot doctors, and Party and women cadres organized for propaganda work. Pharmacy sales clerks, office clerks, Party members, theater managers, etc., are also mobilized for the task. Personnel departments of various organizations and agencies have helped by providing information on the size and conditions of each family.[44] With such information the promoters are more able to formulate approaches adapted to individual conditions in persuading families to adopt planned birth.

Another practice in planned birth organization and coordination is called in Chinese *chuan chin sung pao,* meaning literally "transmission of the classics and delivery of treasures." That is, successful units in planned birth would be mobilized to teach less successful ones their experiences or to offer assistance. In Wenteng County of Shantung, for instance, in 1971 four of its communes were slow in their planned birth work. And in some other more advanced communes there were still certain backward production brigades. After reviewing the situation, the County Party secretary immediately took the following measures to "grasp backward units and promote balance."

First, the Party secretary organized members from the backward communes or production brigades for study at more advanced units.

The second approach was *chuan chin sung pao.* For instance, cadres of Hsiaokuan Commune were not taking active leadership in planned birth work. So the County Party secretary asked leadership cadres of Tsaomiaotse Commune and Suitao Commune over to tell of their experiences. As a result of this exchange of experience, four of the five members of Hsiaokuan Commune's Party secretariat, who had not taken initiative in planned birth, now volunteered to do so.

Furthermore, married members of the production brigade were all mobilized and the brigade's "contraception rate" soon reached 91.3 percent.

The third measure taken by the Party secretariat was to provide assistance to backward communes. The county health units and the county hospital jointly organized four small groups, with a total of 20 people, to tour the backward communes to launch a village-to-village propaganda campaign and to do ideological work. In addition, leadership cadres of Wenten County were careful to incorporate planned birth work with other projects so that the advantages of planned birth would be frequently talked about. The cadres also tried to make good use of festivals and local functions to strengthen planned birth propaganda.[45]

Mobility and Flexibility

The task of convincing the millions of traditional and conservative Chinese peasants is enormous. The best method is definitely to approach each individual frequently. The Chinese Communists have been trying to employ this method by the use of China's most abundant resource: people–mobile medical teams, barefoot doctors, health workers, women and Party cadres, etc.

The use of mobile medical teams or propaganda teams has alleviated the problem of insufficient numbers of qualified personnel. Their work is further strengthened by local barefoot doctors and health workers. These paramedics live and work with the people they are to convince. They have at least one tremendous advantage. They know the people's individual needs and conditions. They can approach them often enough to repeat the message and thus to create a kind of pressure. As one Communist cadre told a Western visitor, "we do not impose anything on anyone. But we do return often to the work of discussing the importance of contraception."[46]

The number of barefoot doctors and health workers together is estimated by the Chinese press at more than 40 million. This would mean a paramedic living and working on the average, among every 200 Chinese. If all or most of them are as professionally capable as reported in the Chinese press, they would definitely be a great blessing to the Chinese people and in terms of planned birth their presence itself would mean a kind of pressure and constant reminder.

These paramedics can engage in face-to-face contacts with the masses. The effects of direct contacts have been well documented. It is these paramedics, women cadres, and planned birth cadres that are constantly engaged in personal conversations with their women neighbors. It is through such personal contacts, in the form of household visits, that they are able to use different tactics in explaining advantages and disadvantages according to each individual's situation.

In recent years the number of women barefoot doctors, health workers, and midwives, has greatly increased. Their efforts have been supplemented by the women cadres. Chinese women are among the most conservative and shy people in the world. Marriage and contraception are among the most private and personal affairs, which respectable Chinese women have not talked about in public for thousands of years. The use of women workers helps greatly in overcoming this reticence.

The effort needed to obtain contraceptive services, no matter how little, has slowed acceptance of such services The presence of millions of barefoot doctors and health workers have made these services more readily available. Instead of the people having to go to clinics for service or guidance they receive them free of charge at their doors.

Integration of Persuasion and Coercion

The Chinese official position has always been that coercion is not used to achieve results. Nevertheless, propaganda with an ideological orientation itself means a degree of coercion since ideological offenses can be very serious indeed. Because planned birth is for the sake of revolution, for the building of socialism, for the study of Mao's works, for participation in productive labor, etc., refusal to practice planned birth can be equated to opposition to the Party's directives. Of course, Party cadres do not have to resort to such charges but the threats always exist. Non-compliance could bring about criticism and even public disgrace. In the cases of students, Party or League members, and government functionaries, etc., non-obedience would bring about more serious outcomes, such as expulsion or suspension of promotion.[47]

The ideological umbrella held by the Communist Party has cast a shadow over the Chinese people. A short story written in 1974 by a young student refugee in Hong Kong serves as a good illustration. Two Chinese youths residing in a rural village of Hainan Island were deeply in love. However, for fear that their love might impair their chances for advancement, the two could only meet with each other while all others were asleep. Furthermore, whenever they met the girl was constantly plagued by the thought that their future would be ruined by the affair, which was in diametric opposition to a revolutionary spirit. The story ends when one night the young couple parted too late to return to their barracks in time. The affair was discovered. The young man was taken off a promotion list. The girl became insane and was henceforth heard talking to people about her experience in fighting selfishness and constantly reciting Chairman Mao's "three most read articles."[48]

This story may sound unbelievable to people outside China. However, in Communist China love or marriage has never been a personal matter. People love and marry for the revolution. Early love and marriage are considered to be standing in the way of serving the people and performing productive labor. Though fictitious, the story does have a chilling effect and is supported by other refugee accounts.

To ensure the implementation of planned birth, penalizing measures were adopted. During the previous campaigns, it was reported that in some areas the grain allotment was reduced when an unplanned baby was born. In other places couples were encouraged to work in different locations and dependents of military personnel were forbidden to stay overnight at the base.[49] According to a *New York Times* report, cumulative evidence seems to indicate that since early 1973 great pressure has been imposed on women who are having their third pregnancy to undergo abortion and that the third child born to a family would not be granted the usual food rations.[50]

Such coercive measures, according to a collection of refugee accounts in Hong Kong, were at times practiced widely, even though without benefit of written regulations or procedures. For instance, if a third baby was born to a family already with two children cloth and cooking oil ration coupons were not issued. College students or factory apprentices would be dismissed if they got married before completion of the apprenticeship. Men below 30 and women below 28 (in some places 28 and 26) would not be able to obtain marriage permits. If both partners were Party or League members, they would require the approval of their higher level Party secretariat. Although women workers were entitled to a 56-day maternal leave with pay, such benefits might be withdrawn if it was a fourth birth.[51] Although such practices might not be universal throughout China, the knowledge of such measures would suffice to coerce a substantial number of people to adopt planned birth or postpone their marriage.

The foregoing are, of course, refugee accounts, which may not be representative. The Chinese press, however, abounds with stories telling how people with traditional thinking are still opposed to planned birth or late marriage in spite of persuasive efforts. It is only after the intervention of the local Party secretary or women's federation that they yield. There is the press story, for example, of Chen Chang-hung, who played the role of Hung-yin in the vernacular play "A Pair of Shoes That Take Three Years to Finish," wanted to postpone her marriage. Her brother, her fiance, and her brother's wife, however, would not agree with her. Chen tried several times to persuade her brother and brother's wife but to no avail. They even blamed her for "not listening to their words."* Her persuasive efforts on her fiance also failed. The production brigade's Party secretariat learned of this and supported Chen. They criticized the feudalistic thinking that "bearing a son early will bring profits early; bearing a daughter early will seat one more honorably at a feast." Chen's brother and brother's wife finally yielded to the decision to postpone the marriage and so did her fiance.[52]

The practice of assigning pregnancy quotas among married women in child-bearing age is another example of coercive persuasion.[53] The only alternative available to the women is the choice of years in which to bear children. They no longer have the option of bearing children without the approval of local Party or planned birth leadership cadres.

Coercion alone cannot be depended on to do the job. Incentives and recognition have also been used. In 1963, a factory's deputy director and his wife were granted the honor of being received by Chou En-lai. This couple, though married for 12 years, had only two children, with one at four and the other at ten. Further the husband had had a vasectomy two years before. Chou personally commended the couple's voluntary practice of planned birth and praised them as "models." The husband was especially praised for his initiative in undergoing vasectomy, which Chou urged others to emulate.[54]

Some areas have adopted other incentives. In one county, a woman who was sterilized immediately after giving birth to a third child, was given all the maternal benefits and also food gifts of milk, eggs, and meat. In this same county, transportation to and from the hospital was provided for those women who requested sterilization. Women cadres were assigned to accompany those too shy to go alone. On other occasions when a number of women demanded sterilization, a doctor arranged to come to the production team to perform the operation.[55] In another instance, a woman peasant with five children was sterilized by a woman barefoot doctor right at the woman's house. Furthermore, the barefoot doctor volunteered to help this woman with her household and farm chores. On the fifth day, stitches were removed and the woman immediately returned to work on the farm.[56]

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*There is a Chinese saying that goes "the eldest brother should be treated as father, his wife mother." They would assume parental authority after both parents' death.

Since 1971 free contraceptives and operations (sterilization, vasectomy, or abortion) have been provided. In addition, the general practice in China now is to allow three weeks of leave with pay for sterilization, one week for vasectomy, two days for inserting an IUD, two or three weeks for abortion.[57] This practice is considered by the Chinese Communists as a necessary compensation for loss of pay during recuperation.

Planned birth promoters with outstanding achievements are also encouraged and praised. Shen Li-ping, a vice chairman of Shaokuang Production Brigade's women's federation in Shaoshang of Hunan, was cited by her superiors for outstanding achievements in promoting late marriage and planned birth amid such ridicule as: "How can a young unmarried girl become a good leader? Promoting planned birth? How can she open her mouth?"[58]

It is this blending of coercion and persuasion, pressures and incentives, which serve as the push and pull, that will lower China's birth rate or at least keep it stable. Achievements are particularly conspicuous in schools, public institutions, factories, as once told by Chou En-lai himself to Edgar Snow.[59] Most likely it is in these places that coercion and incentives can be most closely administered and supervised, while in rural areas the Party seems to be unable to administer such coercive measures if the peasants choose to defy the Party's directives.

Emphasis on Both Young and Old

As China is a country where parental authority still is strong, propaganda work specifically aimed at the older generation is as important as that aimed at the younger child-bearing generation. Such importance is realized by the Communists in the planned birth campaign. Both young men and women are exhorted to marry late and practice planned birth after marriage so that they can have more time and energy to contribute to the revolution and building of socialism. Often young people are willing to marry late or practice planned birth but their parents or sometimes elder relatives wish them to marry early and have more children or at least one son. Since old people occupy the main positions in the family, if they are not convinced of the necessity of planned birth they become stumbling blocks in the process of "destroying the old and establishing the new" and in changing old habits and customs. To overcome these attitudes, old men and women are often mobilized to attend study or criticism sessions, to watch movies, television, revolutionary cultural programs, or to attend a new-style wedding. Through these measures, members of the older generation are said to have yielded to their children's decisions in favor of planned birth or late marriage.[60]

In Lichuan County of Hupei, for instance, Hsu Shiu-ching was a Communist Party member and deputy commander of a women's militia platoon. She was engaged to a young man of a nearby commune but she did not plan to marry until she reached 25. However, her father wanted her to get married and had tried many times to persuade her to do so. So Hsu Shiu-ching invited all the parents of the platoon's women soldiers to study together the Party's directives about late marriage and planned birth. The parents were told the advanced deeds of the "iron girls" (women militia) in the model Tachai Brigade as well as the women's own ambitions in building a new mountain village. Together they repudiated and criticized the old thinking, old habits, and old customs of "early marriage brings a son earlier and happiness earlier." Both Liu Shiu-ching's parents spoke at the meeting and vowed to follow the Party's directives.[61]

Huang Lung-chun, another member of Liu Shiu-ching's platoon, also pledged not to marry until she reached the minimum marriage age. However, her mother still pressed her to go ahead with the wedding preparations. So Huang Lung-chun invited her mother to the "iron girl militia squad" to attend meetings to study, to "remember bitterness and think of sweetness," and hear her squad mates talk about the advantages of late marriage. Under the inspiration of these "iron girls," the report goes, the old woman "happily agreed to her daughter's late marriage." Other members of the platoon, moved by the model of Liu Shiu-ching, all changed their marriage plans.[62]

In Peking, Yang Pao yung's son was married in 1967. The moment his son was married, Yang wished to "hold his grandson" (*pao sun tze*). However, the first birth was a girl. So he wished the second would be a boy. The second, nevertheless, turned out to be a girl too. Then he hoped the third would be a boy. When the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius started, his daughter-in-law decided to follow the Party's call not to have any more children and wanted to practice planned birth. Yang, however, was opposed. So the daughter-in-law got Yang involved to criticize the old thinking. Through such criticism, Yang was said to have realized the erroneousness in the old Confucian saying that "among the three unfilial things having no posterity is the greatest" and "resolutely supported his daughter-in-law's revolutionary action."[63]

Apparently, in some areas propaganda work aimed at the older generation, mostly in the form of small group meetings or house-to-house visits, turns out to be quite effective. Some elderly have begun to take initiatives. One grandmother was reported to have given contraceptives to her son and her son's fiancée as a nuptial present.[64] In another instance, one old woman in a commune personally asked the physician to prescribe a contraceptive for her daughter-in-law and she herself was actively spreading the gospel of planned birth and late marriage.[65]

Attacks on Traditional Values

Since the family is one of the oldest institutions, the promotion of late marriage and planned birth inevitably conflicts with some of the traditional values concerning the family.

In Chinese society women were traditionally considered inferior to men and even "useless." Male offspring have always been considered more important and preferred by Chinese men and women alike.

In addition to such discriminations against women, there is the traditional thinking favoring early marriage and many children.

Traditional beliefs exist, such as "grown-up men should be wedded and grown-up women be married," "more children greater happiness," "a family with daughters and no sons is finished," "marry early, get a son early and enjoy happiness early," etc. All these ideas are deeply imbedded in Chinese thinking and remain important among China's less educated and rural peasants.[66] These ideas are holding fast in spite of being attacked ever since the early republican years in the 1910's. They are still factors in resistance to late marriage and planned birth.

Successful promotion of late marriage or planned birth will require first of all the removal or rechannelling of these traditional ideas. The bombardments against traditional family values and the waging of the campaign simultaneously represent another characteristic in propagation of planned birth. This feature is especially outstanding in the present campaign. One 1973 *Red Flag* article unequivocally stated that "to realize planned birth we must engage in struggles against traditional feudalistic ideas held for hundreds and thousands of years so as to establish new mores through the process of criticism and repudiation of old mores."[67]

Books that set forth traditional behavioral conduct and submissive roles for women have been under severe criticism as an integrated part of the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. All these books, such as the *Three Character Classics* (San Chih Chin), *Book on Virtuous Womanhood* (Nu Erh Chin), and *Revised Book on Virtuous Womanhood* (Kai Liang Nu Erh Chin), and traditional ideas favoring more and male children are being linked to plots to restore capitalism and a move backward to the "bitterness of the old society."[68] Expressions favoring early marriage, in particular, are considered attempts of the "five black classes"* to "corrupt the younger generation so as to make them indulge in the small world of family life and eventually lose their revolutionary will to struggle for socialism and Communism."[69] Adherence to these old ideas could thus be associated with following Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line or Lin Piao's anti-Mao plots. These serious charges are used to "coercively persuade" the people to discard the old ideas and follow the Party's directives to practice planned birth.

Traditional values are attacked simultaneously when the planned birth message is being given. For instance, in Heroes Commune, Nantung

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*The five black classes, or *hui wu lei*, are landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad people, and rightists. Bad people are such people as beggars, prostitutes, shoplifters, thieves, etc. Being marked as members of these five classes may cause one to lose a lot of benefits or even be placed under close surveillance.

County of Kiangsu, the Party secretariat of the Fifteenth Production Brigade not only emphasized the advantages of late marriage and planned birth, but also criticized "the crimes of the class enemies' insidious attempts to sabotage late marriage and planned birth."[70]

Short of a comprehensive survey, there is no way to determine the effectiveness of this approach. It can encourage new thinking and new ideas for the long run, if not the present.

Repetition and Emphasis on Small Groups

Acceptance of the practice of planned birth and late marriage requires constant reminding. The Chinese tactic is "repeat and repeat" until the message is gotten across and action taken. To ensure that people continue the practice, the message is repeated often enough to make ignorance difficult, it not impossible. Thus, you may be told to marry late or practice planned birth in a factory clinic. Upon returning home you may be approached by a member of your street committee or woman's federation to tell you the same message. In the evening, you are mobilized to attend a specific study session or to watch a cultural performance.

Closely related to repetition is the combined use of communication media. Radio, newspapers, magazines, talks, cultural performances, barefoot doctors, etc., almost all kinds of communication techniques and media have been used. To use a Chinese traditional saying, "all 18 kinds of *wu yi* (martial arts) have been used."

The press has noted the group emphasis. In Chitung County of Kiangsu, the Party secretary of Huiho Commune dispatched a cadre to the Fifth Brigade to organize a "symposium of poor and lower-middle peasants" to promote late marriage and planned birth and to do away with traditional expensive weddings. Study sessions were organized, broadcasting meetings were convened, models in planned birth were introduced to the public, demonstrations were given, and the "one man one thing" ideological work was carried out. Through these efforts, a *Red Flag* article indicated, the commune had achieved great results in planned birth, and anarchy in human reproduction had been undergoing a transformation.[71]

In Wanteng County of Shantung, similar tactics were used in promoting the planned birth campaign. The County Party secretariat organized conferences, symposia, study sessions, etc., and used broadcasting, slide shows, cultural performances, small propaganda groups and distribution of pamphlets and many other techniques to promote Mao's directives concerning planned birth and the significance of planned birth to eradicate the ideological influence of the exploiting classes. These programs were carried out continuously for several years and the natural population growth rate for the county was said to have dropped from 11.83 per thousand in 1972 to 10.44 per thousand in 1973.[72]

Emphasis on the small group approach has been especially prominent in the present campaign. The planned birth message is now being carried increasingly to the mass of people through small group meetings presided over by local cadres, barefoot doctors, or medical doctors. In cities, usually two or three meetings a week are scheduled while in the countryside the number of meetings scheduled varies from place to place and from time to time depending on the season.[73] In addition, coercive persuasion is used in these small group meetings. Non-complying individuals are under great group pressure to adopt planned birth methods or to postpone their marriages. The effectiveness of these small group meetings is further strengthened by approaching the non-complying people individually. Again, the frequent visits by a barefoot doctor or a woman cadre to one certain house would create a kind of peer pressure. For those who are already adopting planned birth methods, their decision is constantly reinforced in the small group meetings and whenever they go to the local health station or whenever a barefoot doctor or a woman cadre comes to visit at their homes.[74]

Mass media support has shifted from communicating the technical knowledge of planned birth to the largely reinforcing role of reporting on the success and work in other communes or provinces. Such coverage of achievements, never failures, helps create a favorable, conducive atmosphere for the promotion and adoption of planned birth methods. In addition, coverage of achievements provides local cadres and barefoot doctors with some substantive examples to talk about and to urge the people to emulate. Thus, mass media and face-to-face communication, whether through a small group or a barefoot doctor or local woman cadre, mutually reinforce their persuasiveness and effects. China's planned birth persuasion efforts are more of an individual or small group than a mass approach.

NOTES

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9. *Delayed Marriage and Planned Birth*, translated by Loren Fessler. See *Fieldstaff Reports*, Vol. XX, No. 1.

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13. S. Chandrasekhar, "China's Population Problems," in *Contemporary China 1958-1959,* Vol. III, ed. by E.S. Kirby (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 26.

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16. "Act As Hung-yin and Learn From Hung-yin," *People's Daily,* February 15, 1972, p. 2.

17. "Educate Youth to Practice Late Marriage and Planned Birth," *People's Daily,* November 20, 1972, p. 2.

18. "830,000 People Received Propaganda Contraceptive in Peking," *People's Daily,* August 21, 1957.

19. *Nanking Daily,* Nanking, April 5, 1957.

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21. "Birth Should Be Appropriately Controlled," *People's Daily,* March 5, 1957; "Changchi Starts Birth Control Propaganda," *Shansi Daily,* Taiyuan, September 5, 1956; "Hsin County People's Hospital Starts Winter Patriotic Health and Birth Control Propaganda," *Shansi Daily,* Taiyuan, December 4, 1956.

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60. "Establish Socialist New Mores," *People's Daily*, February 7, 1974, p. 4.

61. "Sentinels in The Transformation of Customs and Change of Habits," *People's Daily*, January 23, 1974, p. 2.

62. *Ibid.*

63. "Deepen Criticism of *Revised Book on Virtuous Womanhood* Which Advocates the Confucius-Mencius Way," *People's Daily*, September 7, 1974, p. 3.

64. Hwa Yu, "China," *Christian Century*, No. 88 (January 27, 1971), p. 142.

65. Han Suyin, "The Chinese Experiment," *UNESCO Courier* (July-August 1974), p. 54.

66. "The Complete Liberation of Women Is an Important Task in Socialism's Historical Stage," *People's Daily*, November 14, 1974, p. 2. *People's Daily* is abundant with articles on this subject.

67. "Childbirth Must Also Be Planned," *Red Flag*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

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69. Chu Tsao-hsin, "The Evil Wind of Buying and Selling of Marriages Needs To Be Swept Once More," *Red Flag*, No. 222 (February 28, 1970), pp. 56-58; Wang Kuei-hua, "Planned Birth Has Many Advantages," *op. cit.*

70. "Educate Youth to Practice Late Marriage and Planned Birth," *op. cit.*

71. "Break Up Old Habits and Establish New Customs," *Red Flag*, No. 258 (February 1, 1973), pp. 64-67.

72. "Mobilize the Mass to Transform Customs, Change Habits and Persist in Late Marriage and Birth Control," *op. cit.*

73. Graham Leonard, who visited China in the summer of 1974, reported three meetings or more a week. Leonard, *op. cit.*

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5

CONTENTS AND EFFECTS OF PLANNED BIRTH PROPAGANDA

> It is ideologically necessary to understand the significance and advantages of delayed marriage and planned birth.
>
> *Delayed Marriage and Planned Birth. 1972**

Significance of Planned Birth and Changing Propaganda Themes

Understanding the significance and advantages of planned birth and late marriage is considered essential for full acceptance of the planned birth messages. The Chinese rationale is that teaching the significance will clear away any ideological stumbling blocks in the way of persuasion and adoption efforts. This has implications for both the promoters and the general adopters. Promoters, such as planned birth propagandists, medical workers, and women cadres need to be taught this significance so that they may be more effective in their persuasive or medical functions. The common people, those who are to practice planned birth or delay their marriage, would be freed from the bonds of tradition.

In addition to technical and practical considerations, the teaching of the significance of planned birth helps guide the campaigns in desired directions. Unauthorized interpretations of the planned birth message are ruled out. Thus, in instructional manuals for barefoot doctors, midwives, and health workers or in pamphlets for rural women and the common mass, the rationales for planned birth are clearly delineated to ensure the correct transmission of this important message down to the very grassroots. Local group meetings, conversations occurring during personal visits by promoters, in particular, and newspapers, journals, and broadcasts all play their roles in the dissemination and reinforcement of the significance of planned birth as prescribed by the Chinese Communist leaders.

**Delayed Marriage and Planned Birth*, a pamphlet compiled by the Planned Birth Leadership Group of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, was published in 1972. Its English translation, by Loren Fessler, was published as one of the East Asia Series of the *Fieldstaff Reports*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January 1973).

Significance of planned birth as communicated to the Chinese mass has undergone some notable changes during the three active propaganda campaigns.[1] Each campaign is characterized by its own propaganda themes, reflecting different dominant orientations and shifting emphasis. For the first campaign, the propaganda theme was predominantly population-reduction oriented. And the Communists were very explicit about this. One editorial in the *People's Daily* argued that if population growth could be slowed down the standard of living would be raised quickly.[2] Li Teh-chuan, then China's Minister of Public Health, considered China's population growth rate, at 2.5 percent per annum, so high as to impair its economic development and industrialization. She urged people to practice birth control so that the family finances and the mother's health could be improved and children could be better cared for.[3]

Even more explicit was Chung Hui-lan, then director of People's Hospital in Peking, who indicated that the main reason for China's birth control was that her population increased too rapidly. Such rapid growth had created problems which the nation could no longer ignore. These problems included: 1) threats to the people's economy and restrictions on raising cultural and living standards; 2) hindrances to the attainment of perfect and happy family life; 3) harm to young people's career development; 4) effects on the health and work of young people; 5) adverse effects on the next generation's clothing, food, housing, education, culture, and health; and 6) creation or accentuation of problems of unemployment and scarce school facilities. Chung argued that a planned birth control policy would ensure China's accumulation of capital and guarantee the early realization of socialist construction.[4]

China's scholars like Ma Yin-chu, Wu Ching-chao, Chen Ta, Fei Hsia-tung, etc., and many other Chinese leaders all shared Chung's views on birth control. They agreed that birth control was good for both the individual and the national economy. For the first campaign, then, birth control was significant for both individual and collective benefits.

The second campaign was launched in 1962 when China was barely recovering from the Leap economic chaos of 1958 and subsequent natural calamities. While both collective and individual benefits of planned birth were being preached, the emphasis seems to have been more on the latter than the former. Reference to the policy's contribution to the reduction of population pressures on the national economy was dropped. Fu Lien-chang, chairman of the China Medical Association, gave the following "positive significances" of planned birth: 1) it can better protect the health of the mother; 2) it is beneficial to the health and education of the next generation; 3) it relieves the parents of being burdened by too many children so that they can devote more time and energy to the elevation of their cultural and ideological levels and to engaging in socialist construction; 4) it can further liberate women for socialist construction; and 5) it can reduce the family's financial burdens and avoid unnecessary worries within the family.[5] Fu was less explicit that birth control would contribute to the nation's construction and prosperity. Even the contribution to domestic economy was underplayed. Fu mentioned it at the very end. When Chou En-lai personally complimented a couple for having set an example in practicing birth control, the news coverage was careful to indicate that the couple was not motivated by economic concerns.[6]

The significance of planned birth as preached to the Chinese people in the present campaign has taken another turn. While better protection for maternal and child health continues to be the most important benefit planned birth can contribute, there is more emphasis on collective than on individual benefits. Other advantages of planned birth, in order of their importance, are: 1) benefit to the strength of revolution and production and preparation against war; 2) benefit to socialist construction; 3) benefit to the study of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism since more time and energy can be made available; 4) help to the raising of the next generation to become proletarian successors; 5) raising of the family's living standards; 6) contribution to national and state prosperity; and 7) support of world revolution.[7] Also mentioned is its benefit for women's liberation and for the development of women cadres.[8]

In terms of propaganda approaches the first two planned birth campaigns were in fact not too different from typical birth control campaigns carried out in other countries. Family and national benefits were taught. Birth control's contribution to "a perfect and happy family life" was frequently mentioned and even emphasized. The two campaigns can be said to have been non-Marxist. The present campaign, however, took a rather sharp turn. Planned birth is no longer considered something personal. Under socialist conditions, how many children one may have is not only a family matter, but one that links with revolution and the construction of socialism. Thus, the planned birth policy is also one that attacks the traditional concept of private ownership. Women are now giving birth not for their own sake but for the revolution. Planned birth is an attempt to eliminate "anarchy in reproduction" in accordance with the teaching of socialism.[9]

Planned birth propaganda in China is also unique in its meticulous attention to semantics. Since any kind of population control program would contradict orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Chinese Communist leaders and policy planners have been very scrupulous about the terms used in the campaigns so as to avoid any impression of having an overpopulation problem. In the first campaign in the fifties, terms such as "family planning," "birth control," "contraception," or "population control," etc., were freely referred to in the media. No attempt was made to ignore that rapid population increase had prompted China's birth control campaign.

Beginning with the second campaign, however, the Chinese Communists became more meticulous in terminology. In late 1958 it was decided that only the term "planned birth" would be used. To China's policy makers, "planned birth" means "giving births in a planned way," while terms like "family planning," "birth control," or "planned parenthood" have completely different connotations.[10]

Since the present campaign began to gain world-wide attention and interest, and following the Chinese decision to admit foreign and overseas Chinese visitors, terms like "planned parenthood" and "family planning" have appeared in publications for circulation outside China.[11] Furthermore, planned birth has been interpreted as a policy for "planned population growth."

While terminologies for foreign publications have changed, terms like "family planning," "population limitation," "fertility control," "fertility limitation," "planned parenthood," "population moderation," etc., have never appeared internally in the present campaign. In Maoist conceptualization, family is "a small world" standing in the way of building one big socialist family, that is, the state. The Chinese Communists have tried hard to channel the Chinese people's traditional family loyalty to the country and to Peking's Communist leaders, especially to Mao Tse-tung. They consider that the family, being the warm bed for "selfishness," must have its importance reduced to a minimum. This is why the Chinese people have been told that planned birth is a policy for "planned birth growth," and least for the family welfare or happiness.[12]

General Propaganda Message for Contraception

To facilitate the adoption of contraceptive methods, some basic physiology concerning the process of conception and the mechanics of contraception is taught. In addition, propaganda is specifically directed at doubts or fears associated with the practice of birth control.

During the first two campaigns, propaganda was aimed at both married and single people. Life-size models and birth control posters were displayed conspicuously at department stores and exhibitions. Even a children's movie theater projected films on contraceptive methods. Such indiscriminate propaganda caused public concern about its impact on juveniles.[13] The present campaign seems to have redirected its emphasis. Propaganda is now directed at married couples only. Counselling for newlyweds is provided when they register for marriage. Contraceptives are no longer sold but distributed free to married couples.

The following are among the main points the Chinese are being told regarding the use of contraceptives:

Men and Women Are Both Responsible—Men are told that contraception is now relatively easy for men and they are urged to change their attitude toward birth control and adopt a more positive and considerate attitude.[14]

Harmony Between Yin and Yang—Traditionally the Chinese believe that sex life between men and women contributes to the harmony between *yin* and *yang*, two natural forces existing in the universe. Many Chinese have feared that contraception might upset this harmony and result in the interruption of mutual nourishment between husband (*yang*) and wife (*yin*). Thus, they consider contraception against nature and having adverse effects on either health or sex life. The Chinese are advised that this concern is totally groundless and without scientific foundation.[15]

No Fears of Future Infertility—The Chinese are told that contraception will not harm either the production of sperm or ovum or the reproductive organs. It is merely a method of preventing the meeting of sperm with ovum. They are assured that if couples decide to have children again they can stop contraception any time.[16]

Newlyweds Should Practice Birth Control—Newlyweds are advised to practice contraception without fear of future infertility. They are told that contraception is good for their health, their work and study, their family economy, and their children's education.[17] Newlyweds are asked to see a doctor before adopting any methods. They are told that the use of condoms is most appropriate for them.[18]

Space Childbirths—Chinese fatalism holds that the number of children one will have is predetermined. Thus, there is no use practicing contraception. Chinese women are told that such fatalism is obsolete. They can now determine the number of children they want. They are told that too many and too frequent childbirths can have adverse effects on both the mother's and the child's health. If they can space five years between two childbirths, the mother will have sufficient time to recuperate following delivery and have more time and energy to care for her children.[19]

Sons and Daughters are the Same—As in most other countries, there is a traditional preference for male children. This preference for male offspring is still one of the most important deterrents to adoption of contraception. The Chinese consider that male children are their guarantees against old age and that they can carry on the family worship. Since girls are married to another family, they cannot carry on the ancestor worship. Thus, Chinese want to have sons. Or in other cases, one with sons wants to have daughters because of the Chinese belief that "sons and daughters make perfection." The Chinese are told that under socialism there is no worry in old age, for everything will be taken care of by the state when one cannot work.[20] The ideal family size now advocated is two children, regardless of their sex, for urban families and three children for rural couples.

To further promote planned birth, in some places men are now married to families with no male children* so that there is no worry about losing labor or having someone to take care of the parents.[21]

Chronic Medical Patients Should Practice Contraception—Pregnancy and childbirth may prove dangerous for people who suffer from chronic illnesses. Pregnancy and childbirth may worsen their health condition or even jeopardize their lives as well as those of their babies. People such as those suffering from heart disease, tuberculosis, nephritis, hepatitis, or malnutrition, should definitely practice contraception. In serious cases, even permanent prevention of conception should be considered. Women who have undergone a Caesarean section or have had a miscarriage should wait at least one to two years to conceive another child or until they have fully recuperated.[22]

Methods of Planned Birth

Methods of planned birth advocated in the three campaigns have undergone some changes. In the first campaign the main emphasis was on contraceptive methods and less attention was paid to promoting late marriage. Since the second campaign, both contraception and late marriage have been emphasized equally. With China's post civil war "baby boom" children now entering the child-bearing age, the present campaign seems to emphasize late marriage even more than contraception. Throughout the three campaigns, abortion has been discouraged as a substitute for birth control, but accepted as a last resort in cases of contraceptive failure.

Traditional Chinese Contraceptive Measures

As oral contraceptives were yet to be successfully developed in the fifties, the Chinese turned their attention to China's millenia-old medicinal herbs and acupuncture. This is understandable, especially as

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*For a detailed discussion of the methods used to achieve this behavioral change and its relation to planned birth, see Appendix II.

China then probably had more traditional than Western-trained medical doctors.

Chinese medicinal herbs did not attract much attention as contraceptives until the birth control movement was launched and the Ministry of Public Health decided to collect and study herbal prescriptions. The most notorious herbal contraceptive was the "tadpole formula" made public by Shao Li-tzu in June 1956. Shao told that herbalist Yeh Hsi-chun, then deputy director of Chekiang Provincial Bureau of Health, had a traditional Chinese contraceptive formula, which everyone could easily prepare. According to Yeh, if a woman swallowed 14 springtime live tadpoles with cold boiled water on the third day after menstruation and ten more on the following day she would become sterile for five years. If permanent sterilization was desired, the woman could simply repeat the formula twice. Yeh's formula was carried in the *Health News* (Chien Kang Pao), organ of the Ministry of Public Health, and later in the *Peking Daily* and subsequently endorsed by many provincial papers.[23]

The tadpole formula was not so effective. Many women rushed to their neighborhood streams for tadpoles and many were poisoned or became pregnant instead of becoming sterile. Only then did the press begin to question the validity of this formula and asked the Ministry of Public Health to look into the formula more closely.[24]

At the same time the tadpole formula was being publicized, the Chinese press was actively soliciting and printing many kinds of herbal prescriptions. Contraceptive herbs recommended in the press ranged from "mung beans" to "persimmon stalks" to "bombyx mori" (three mace of eggs), which were reported to be effective for a month, a year, or even for permanent sterilization.[25]

Acupuncture for contraception was first reported in August 1956. One specialist told that he had performed it on his wife and several years later successfully reversed the effect.[26] In April 1957 acupuncture was reportedly introduced in Hangchow's Birth Control Technical Guidance Committee.[27] There were cautions against the premature publicity on acupuncture as a method of contraception.

The publicity of herbal formulas and acupuncture as a means of contraception did not appear in the second and the present campaigns. However, research on herbal contraceptives continues[28] and experiments still proceed with acupunctural contraception.[29]

Western Contraceptive Methods[30]

The usual Western contraceptive methods available have been recommended to the Chinese. These methods include the following: condoms, contraceptive jellies, tablets, suppositories, powders, diaphragms, and IUDs.

ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES

The use of oral pills has increased rapidly. Although there was a report in 1957 that China had developed an effective oral contraceptive,[31] there was no widespread use of any oral contraceptives until late 1969. At present, oral contraceptives No. 1 and No. 2, both with very small dosage,* are being popularized. They are the most widely used contraceptives in China. Usually, there are no complications or side effects. Specific instructions are provided if undesirable reactions should occur. Women who experience bleeding complications are instructed to take the "ethinylestradiol tablet."* Both oral pills No. 1 and No. 2 are 22-day pills manufactured in China.[32]

A once-a-month oral pill has been under experiment since 1969. Once-in-three-months and once-in-a-year pills are also believed to be under development.[33] The once-in-a-month pill is recommended to women whose husbands are usually away for long periods and to those who only occasionally engage in intercourse. Meanwhile, a "Thin Type Oral Contraceptive Sheet" is now being developed in Shanghai. Each edible rice paper sheet, about 6 x 4 centimeters, is divided into 22 perforated squares. Each day's pill can be easily torn off. This sheet pill is being popularized and is believed to have fewer side effects.[34]

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*Each ¼-dose Pill No. 1 contains 0.625 mg of norethindrone and 0.035 mg of ethinylestradiol and each ½-dose Pill No. 1 contains 1.25 mg and 0.0375 mg of the respective ingredients. Each ¼-dose Pill No. 2 contains 1.0 mg of megestrol acetate and 0.0375 mg of ethinylestradiol and each ½-dose Pill No. 2 contains 2.0 mg and 0.0375 mg of the respective ingredients. Both pills are regarded by Western gynecologists as highly advanced. Each "ethinylestradiol tablet" contains 0.005 mg of ethinylestradiol.

CONTRACEPTIVE INJECTION

A once-a-month injection, called Contraceptive Injection No. 1, has been developed and is said to be more than 98 percent effective with no adverse effects on either health or fertility. It has to be used under medical guidance. Women with acute or chronic hepatitis or nephritis or breast lumps are advised against using it.[35] The injection is yet to be publicized.

NATURAL METHODS

Natural methods of contraception, such as extended lactation, post-coital urination, rhythm method, coitus interruptus, etc., are considered undependable and their use is not advised.[36]

ABORTION

After the Chinese Communist takeover of China, strict rules continued to be imposed on abortion. Even though the rules were liberalized in 1953, only women with six children or more were eligible for abortion. When the birth control campaign was launched in 1954, women with four or more children were allowed to have abortion.[37] Still, many Chinese medical doctors and scholars, who were birth control proponents themselves, argued against abortion on moral grounds and its adverse effects on women's health.[38] Nevertheless, abortion continued to be used by many women as a substitute for contraception. Many women reportedly had two or three abortions a year.[39] Women were advised of the dangers of multiple abortions. Only women with heart disease, hypertension, chronic nephritis, or tuberculosis, etc., were urged to undergo abortion since pregnancy or child delivery might endanger their health or even their lives.[40]

Abortion is now recommended as a remedial measure for failure of rather than a substitute for contraception.[41] First pregnancy mothers are persuaded against abortion unless health is jeopardized. Women who undergo abortion are allowed a 15-day rest with pay and 18 days if an IUD is inserted following abortion.[42] Rural women who have abortions are also compensated for earnings lost during recuperation. Since the "birth in turn" practice has been introduced in some areas, women who become pregnant out of turn may switch the turn with their neighbors or request an abortion, which is performed free of charge, usually in a hospital.[43]

PERMANENT PREVENTION FROM CONTRACEPTION

Both men and women are assured that vasectomy or tubal ligation will have no effect on their sexual functions. Men, in particular, are assured that vasectomy is not castration. Thus, they should not fear it.[44]

Doctors write articles to clear away doubts surrounding vasectomy or sterilization. Men and women who have had such an operation are encouraged to write of their experience in making up their mind before the operation and their normal life afterwards. Men, in particular, are urged to undergo vasectomy because the operation is simpler and more convenient than tubal ligation. Men are told that contraception imposed on women alone means an inequality forced upon women.[45]

Late Marriage

The promotion of late marriage is necessary in China because of the tradition of early marriage at age 15 or even younger. Chinese peasants and the less educated have held for thousands of years that "early marriage brings a son early and happiness early," or "plant a tree early, flowers will bloom early," or "travellers make good use of early morning while childbearers make good use of youth." Such beliefs have continued to influence the Chinese peasants.

In 1962, for example, a cadre on an official trip to a remote countryside village was told that peasants would start worrying as soon as their sons had reached 12 or 13 years of age. And it would be unheard of for girls of 15 or 16 to still remain single.[46] Although reports of teenage betrothals have not been heard in the seventies, early marriage continues to be popular in rural areas. Press articles are still found characterizing early marriage as a "venomous measure" employed by landlords, the bourgeois, and Confucius.[47]

Legal marriage age was raised to 18 for men and 16 for women in the early republican years and again in 1952 to 20 for men and 18 for women when the Communist Marriage Law was promulgated.[48] This law requires people to register their marriage. However, the Chinese continue to find ways to marry at early ages. They either ignore registration, or register higher than actual ages, or postpone the registration until they reach the legal minimum age. Thus, many men are getting married at 18 or 19 and women at 16 or 17.[49] During the first massive propaganda campaign for birth control, late marriage was considered and discussed, but never actively promoted. In the spring of 1957 when the third session of the Second National People's Congress met in Peking, six proposals were made to raise the legal marriage age to around 23 for men and 20 for women.[50] These proposals, however, were not passed. People were only asked to marry late but no specific minimum age was recommended.

Active promotion of late marriage as a measure of planned birth did not gather momentum until the launching of the second campaign. The age recommended for men was 25 to 29 and for women 23 to 27, depending on whether in rural or urban areas. Young men and women were constantly reminded that early marriage might have adverse effects on their studies and careers. In addition, they were assured that there would be no complications whatsoever associated with conception or delivery if a woman was married at a later age.[51] Students were not permitted to marry before graduation. Strict regulations on marriage were imposed on Party and Youth League members, who were also asked to take the lead and set examples.[52] Pressures from the top were applied to make sure that people delayed their marriages.

In rural areas, since the Party had fewer controls over the peasants, marriage registration was used as a measure of restraint, but peasants simply did not register because of extended red tape or being turned down several times on other excuses.[53] During the Cultural Revolution, there was a slackening of control and discipline throughout the country. Many peasants continued to marry at an early age. The Chinese press charged that there had been an "evil wind of early marriage" sweeping the countryside. In addition, millions of young Red Guards and students were roaming the country and many had to get married because of pregnancies.[54]

The present campaign for planned birth has brought even more intensive efforts to promote late marriage. This is essential because the tens of millions of babies born after the civil war are now reaching their reproductive years.

Today the Chinese young people are exhorted to develop a correct attitude toward love, marriage, and family. They are told that late marriage is good for their own physical and ideological growth as well as for the health, growth, and education of the next generation.[55] The age stipulated in the marriage law, it is explained, is only the minimum, not the most suitable, age for marriage.[56] (The general rule seems that the combined age for bride and groom should exceed 50.)

Late marriage propaganda is aimed at both the young and the old. That for the young focuses on the advantages of late marriage and the disadvantages of early marriage, from both the ideological and the physiological points of view. From the ideological view, young people are told that marrying late enables them to devote more time to national affairs, to collective living, to political theories, to political struggles, and to the continuous elevation of their ideological level.[57] The physiological arguments are that marriage at the recommended age has no effect on conception or delivery while marriage before the recommended age does. Men and women, young people are told, are not fully matured physically and emotionally until about 25 or 23, respectively.[58]

Persuasion targeted at the older generation is another important feature of late marriage propaganda. This is because Chinese parents still push their children to get married early so that they may enjoy grandchildren. Parents who oppose their children's late marriage are told that early marriage belongs to the old feudalist society. It should be abandoned. They are also constantly reminded of the hardships they themselves had to endure because of marrying too early. They are asked to develop a socialist attitude toward their children's marriage.

Effects of Planned Birth Propaganda

To assess the effects of China's planned birth campaigns is hazardous for people inside and outside China, for China has not kept its vital statistics up-to-date. Even when such statistics are available, details are never made known outside China. The reported 1964 national sample census provides a typical example. One inference holds that the Chinese Communist authorities purposely concealed the results to avoid embarrassment of failures in planned birth propaganda.[59] Whether such is the case can be neither proved nor disproved. The census was never officially announced outside of China.

Recently, Communist China seems to have taken a great pride in her achievements in planned birth work. The Party's official organ, the *People's Daily*, and many foreign language publications have reported such stories quite amply. However, such coverage is of little or no statistical value. In general, it uses phrases like "having made great achievements in planned birth," "an X number of youths have decided to postpone their marriage," or "many women have practiced planned birth," etc. Those few reports that do contain meaningful statistics are mostly local, usually at the production brigade or commune level and only occasionally at the county level. Furthermore, these are only success stories. No failures have been reported.

Accounts by visitors to China who have witnessed planned birth results are also based on the few areas to which they are allowed access. These are mostly urban or rural communes close to urban centers. These places are reported to have kept very detailed records of local vital statistics and the number of people practicing contraception or having undergone sterilization or vasectomy. Statistics for the whole country, however, remain uncertain. In view of the lack of vital statistics in China and the limited areas from which detailed statistics are reported, any national projection of effects of planned birth propaganda must be considered preliminary. Any final judgment must wait until more data are made available.

Two measures of the effects of planned birth propaganda are generally used. One is the number of adoptions of the various contraceptive methods advocated. The other is the current population growth rates for various regions. Both these measures are used in the following examples gleaned from visitor accounts and Chinese press coverage.

Effects in Areas Populated by Minority Nationalities

For areas populated by minority nationalities, which constitute about 6 percent of China's total population, the announced policy is to direct planned birth propaganda at the Han, or Chinese, only. The ultimate aim is to raise the population growth rates in these minority areas, while at the same time providing planned birth services for the Han people and those minority individuals who have requested guidance.[60]

These areas formerly lost population due to unsanitary conditions and food shortages. The present growth rates seem to be very encouraging. The 1973 population growth rate in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was reported to be 3.0 percent and that of the Tibetan Autonomous Region was 2.7 percent.[61] Both regions showed substantial gains over 1950. Population in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was also said to have doubled since 1949.[62]

In Yunan, a historically poor and backward province, the target of propaganda has been the 12 million Han among the total of 23 million people. In 1963, it was reported, 1,788 IUDs were inserted, 6,000 births aborted, 2,650 women sterilized but no men vasectomized. Ten years later in 1972, however, the figures jumped to 54,000 IUD insertions, 79,000 abortions, 15,000 sterilizations, and 85,000 vasectomies.[63]

Effects in Urban Areas

It is only natural that planned birth propaganda has been better received in urban than rural areas. Chou En-lai observed:

> . . . . Work in this respect has brought about fairly good results in the cities, particularly in the schools, factories, and government organs where the young people realize the advantages of late marriage and are willing to practice family planning after marriage.[64]

Chou made this remark in 1964 to Edgar Snow. The situation still holds true now. In 1973 when he received a group of overseas Chinese in Peking, he made an almost identical statement about China's planned birth work. Chou's observations were confirmed by many visitors' accounts of achievements made in Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin, Hangchow, and in certain urban lanes or streets. The following paragraphs summarize these latest reports of planned birth achievement.

PEKING

Peking city's achievements in planned birth promotion are perhaps only second to Shanghai. One 1973 report stated that 70 percent of its 4,200,000 city workers and 60 percent of its 3,700,000 rural workers were protected by some kind of contraception.[66] The estimate in 1972 was that 66 percent and 40 percent of all women in need of contraceptive services in Peking's urban and rural outskirts, respectively, used pills.[67]

In the factory served by Peking's Obstetric and Gynecological Hospital more than 90 percent of its 3,320 workers in need of contraception were practicing some kind of birth control.[68]

Oral pills are the most popular contraceptive used by Peking's women. In 1972 the Capital Hospital reported that 30 percent of the adopters were oral pill users.[69] The hospital also reported some 10 abortions each day.[70]

In Peking No. 3 Textile Factory, up to 1971, 400 of its 3,900 married women in reproductive ages were sterilized and 45 husbands were vasectomized.[71]

In Fengsheng Neighborhood, with about 53,000 people, on the average each family had only 3.75 members in 1974. Among the 14,000 families, 90 percent of the more than 4,000 women of child-bearing age regularly practiced contraception while the remaining were either newlyweds or infertile women. The natural population growth rate dropped from 6.95 per thousand in 1972 to 6.12 per thousand in 1973.[72]

The Friendship Hospital in Peking reported about five to ten abortions a day. About 85 percent of the women served by it were using pills in 1972.[73]

TIENTSIN

No statistics for the city are available. At the No. 1 Tientsin Carpet Factory about 60 percent of the married women workers in 1971 were said to be using oral pills for protection.[74]

NANKING

No information was available about the total achievement in planned birth work for this city of 1.4 million people. As an example, however, the Maternity Hospital recorded in 1962 that it performed 301 abortions, 967 tubal ligations, and 66 IUD insertions. In 1971, there were 7,435 abortions, 1,032 tubal ligations, and 3,760 IUD insertions. Reports on the use of other contraceptives were not available.[75]

In a Nanking street committee with a population of 13,000, there were 1,300 women in potential child-bearing age. Among those protected, 36 percent were sterilized, 32 percent took oral pills, 13 percent used IUDs, and 11 percent depended on condoms or diaphragms.[76]

SHANGHAI

This city of 11 million people is reputed to be the most successful in promoting planned birth. This is expected since Shanghai has been China's most developed and Westernized city.

In Shanghai's International Peace Maternal and Children's Hospital, in 1971 there were 500 abortions, 1,500 tubal ligations, and some

2,000 IUD insertions.[77] The Hospital also had the statistics for the whole city. It recorded in 1971 that 900,000 of the 1,290,000 women, or some 70 percent, were practicing planned birth.[78] In 1972, 210,000 were protected by oral pills and another 80,000 underwent abortion.[79]

Among the 8,978 fertile women of the 68,000 population served by a Street and Lane Health Station, it was reported in 1972 that 1,242 were protected by pills, 115 by once-a-month injections, 3,902 by sterilizations, and 352 by IUDs. Also, 425 husbands were vasectomized while other couples were using condoms or diaphragms.[80] In other words, more than 90 percent of the married couples were protected from pregnancy.

Hope Hospital of Shanghai also has some striking statistics. In 1962 the Hospital recorded 1,600 abortions and 1,232 sterilizations. In 1971 the figures were 6,260 abortions and 1,127 sterilizations. The babies delivered for the same two years were respectively: 5,795 and 4,856. The Hospital had no record of women using other contraceptive methods.[81]

In the Pon Pu New Village, populated by some 17,000 factory workers in 1971, more than 90 percent of the couples in need of contraceptive services, were protected from pregnancy.[82]

HANGCHOW

No data were available for this capital of Chekiang province, but some fragmentary information has been reported.

In a silk brocade factory of 1,700 workers, 850 women were in child-bearing age in 1973. Among them, 20 percent were sterilized, 10 percent used oral pills, 20 percent used IUDs, and another 50 percent were protected by condoms or diaphragms.[83]

In Shao Yun Shang, a residential area populated by 28,000 people, among its 2,920 fertile women in 1971, there were 727 women using pills, 157 having IUDs, 584 with tubal ligations, and 19 using injectables. In addition, 157 of the women's husbands were using condoms and 45 underwent vasectomy.[84]

An unidentified Lane Health Station reported in 1972 that among the 369 couples it served in need of birth control, 24 percent of the women were sterilized, 3 percent of the men were vasectomized, and another 27 percent of the women and 19 percent of the men were regularly protected by other contraceptive methods. The Lane's annual birth rate in 1972 was 0.8 percent.[85]

WUHAN

In this port city on the mid-stream of the Yangtze River, 70 percent of those in need of contraception were protected in 1972. Among them 30 percent were using pills, 10 percent had IUDs, and 20 percent underwent tubal ligation.[86]

Population growth rates are also very revealing of the planned birth achievements in urban areas. Table 1 gives the annual rates for five cities for different years. It should be noted that Table 1 reporting population growth rates and changes in the five cities does not rest on a uniform reporting system but rather has been constructed from different sources, some of which are non-Chinese. Ten different sources are listed for the rates reported from the five cities and even the yearly changes indicated for Peking and Shanghai are based on diverse sources. On the basis of Table 1, it is clear that in 1963 even in Peking and Shanghai the rates were very high. Perhaps as a result of the propaganda campaign, the growth rates reportedly dropped to 1.6 percent in 1965 for Peking and 0.14 percent in 1971 for Shanghai. The rates were further lowered in 1974, 0.97 percent in Peking and 0.48 in Shanghai. Changsha, capital of Hunan, already had a low population growth rate of 0.97 percent in 1971. The situation in Sian, Shensi, was less satisfying in 1969. The growth rate there was as high as 3.0 percent annually. Again, these results cannot be projected to other cities in China.

Effects in Rural Areas

Preliminary indications are that prospects in rural areas seem to much less bright than those in urban areas. This is understandable since in the first two planned birth campaigns propaganda hardly reached the rural villages. This was because of inadequate communication resources and an unfavorable social infrastructure. The lack of rural penetration is exemplified by the model Production Brigade of Tachai in Shansi. In 1965, the leader of the brigade, Chen Yung-kuei, now one of China's vice premiers and a member of the Politburo, was reported to have said that the brigade did not need planned birth and only able-bodied workers were needed.[87] Such a position undercut the planned birth

TABLE 1. POPULATION GROWTH RATES IN SELECTED CHINESE CITIES

City	*Year*	*Growth rate % per annum*	*Sources*
Peking	1963	3.5	E, F
	1965	1.6	F
	1969	1.6	H
	1972	1.2*	D, F
	1973	1.17	E
	1974	0.97	C
Shanghai	1963	2.50	E
	1971	0.14*; 1.318†	B
	1972	0.68*; 0.80*	D; A, G
	1973	0.60	E
	1974	0.48	C
Sian	1969	3.00	H
Changsha	1971	0.97	I
Yangchou	1973	0.40	J

*Growth rate for the city proper.

†Growth rate for suburban areas.

Sources:

A - Carl Djerassi, "Some Observations on Current Fertility Control in China," *China Quarterly*, No. 57 (January-March 1974), pp. 40-62.

B - Pi-chao Chen, "China's Population Program at the Grass-Roots Level," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August 1973), pp. 219-227.

C - "Family Planning Gains Popularity," *Peking Review*, Vol. 17, No. 38 (September 20, 1974), pp. 17-18.

D - Anibal Faundes and Tapani Luukkainen, "Health and Family Planning Services in the Chinese People's Republic," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 3, No. 7, Supplement (July 1972), pp. 165-176.

E - Han Suyin, "The Chinese Experiment," *UNESCO Courier* (July-August 1974), pp. 52-55.

F - Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. XII, No. 5 (1973), pp. 8-16.

G - Victor W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel, "The Delivery of Medical Care in China," *Scientific American*, Vol. 230, No. 4 (April 1974), pp. 19-27.
H - Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1972).
I - Ross Terrill, *800,000,000: The Real China* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1972).
J - FBIS, "NCNA Reports on Birth Control Activities in Three Provinces," *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, No. 21 (January 30, 1974), B 10.

campaign since all Chinese rural communes and brigades had been asked to emulate this model brigade in Tachai.

Although propaganda now seems to be penetrating rural areas, the results are perhaps not too satisfying, judging from the lack of reports of success by the Chinese press and by visitors. In general, IUDs and oral pills are preferred by rural women. Sterilization and vasectomy are gaining popularity. In some provinces, Sezchwan and Shantung for instance, it was said that 90 percent of the operations were vasectomies and tubal ligations accounted for only 10 percent. In Hsingtou County of Sezchwan alone, 12,000 men of the 51,000 married couples with wives of child-bearing age were vasectomized by 1972.[88]

Other rural area achievements reported are:

SHUNYI COUNTY OF HOPEI

This rural district outside Peking had a population of 450,000 in 1971. About 59 percent of its 49,297 fertile women practiced contraception. The birth rate for 1971 was 21 per thousand.[89]

COMMUNE Y NEAR PEKING

In 1971 Commune Y had a population of 46,000. The birth rate for 1971 was less than 24 per thousand.[90]

LUNG-CHIH COMMUNE

Fertile women in this rural commune in Changyi County of Shantung were said to have a 81 percent planned birth rate. Population growth rate in the commune was lowered to 0.80 percent in 1973.[91]

COMMUNE X NEAR SHANGHAI

This commune had a population of 35,800 people living in about

7,000 households in 1972. In all, about 68 percent of the Commune's 4,606 fertile women were protected from pregnancy.[92]

TON WAN COMMUNE

Some 23,000 people in 5,400 families lived in this commune about 40 kilometers from Shanghai. In 1972, more than 90 percent of the couples in need of birth control were protected.[93]

Table 2 gives the annual population growth rates in a number of communes or counties. In Table 2 as in Table 1, the growth rates are presented in a tabular form but have been assembled from diverse sources. Eight sources are relied on for the data on five counties and three communes. The rates range from a low of 0.38 percent in Nankung County of Hopei in 1974 to a high of 1.8 percent in Kwatien of Tung County in Hopei in 1972. All these places report a rapid decline in their annual population growth rates.

TABLE 2. POPULATION GROWTH RATES IN SELECTED CHINESE COUNTIES AND COMMUNES

Place and location	*Year*	*Growth rate % per annum*	*Sources*
Counties			
Wenteng, Shantung	1972	1.18	C
	1973	1.04	C
Hui, Honan	1973	1.40	E
Nankung, Hopei	1973	0.699	D
	1974	0.383	D
Ting, Hopei	1974	0.90	F
Suite, Shensi	1973	1.30	B
Communes			
Evergreen, Peking outskirt	1972	1.33	A
	1973	1.14	A
Kwatien, Tung of Hopei	1963	3.20	H
	1972	1.80	H
Lungchih, Changyi of Shantung	1973	0.80	G

Sources:

A - "Family Planning Gains Popularity," *Peking Review*, Vol. 17, No. 38 (September 20, 1974), pp. 17-18.

B - FBIS, "NCNA Reports on Birth Control Activities in Three Provinces," *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, No. 21 (January 30, 1974), p. B 10.

C - NCNA, "Mobilize the Mass to Transform Customs and Change Habits and Persist in Late Marriage," *People's Daily*, January 27, 1974, p. 4.

D - NCNA, "Nankung County's Planned Birth Work Has Gained Conspicuous Achievements," *People's Daily*, February 7, 1975, p. 1.

E - NCNA, "Strengthen Women's Program and Develop 'Half-Sky' Functions," *People's Daily*, March 8, 1974, p. 3.

F - Staff Correspondent, "Break Up Old Habits and Establish New Mores," *People's Daily*, March 14, 1975, p. 3.

G - Staff Correspondent, "Medical Co-op's Roots Deepen and Foliage Thrives," *People's Daily*, January 11, 1974, p. 1.

H - Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. XII, No. 5 (1973), pp. 8-16.

Communities where only annual birth rates are available are given in Table 3. These are based on four sources. Statistics in this table and other information seem to confirm the conclusion that planned birth propaganda did not obtain very good results in the first two campaigns and has only begun to show achievements in recent years.

While it is possible that in some urban areas the penetration rate of planned birth services and propaganda may have reached as high as 90 percent, the coverage rate in rural areas is hard to estimate. The Province of Kwangtung serves as a good basis for inference. This province is near to Hong Kong, yet it lags far behind in planned birth work. In 1971 the birth rate was as high as 30 per thousand. Quite a few overseas Chinese are residing in the province, but it is unlikely, however, that frequent childbirths among them would be significant enough to contribute to the high birth and growth rate of the province.[94] Conservatism and the lack of propaganda penetration seem to be more important than other factors.

Although Kwangtung is conservative by China's urban standards, it is more liberal than many other Chinese inner provinces. Thus, the propaganda penetration in Kwangtung should be more representative of China's rural areas. One visitor to China in 1973 estimated that contraceptive coverage in the country's rural areas was about 20 percent.[95] This figure can be neither proved nor disproved. It seems, however, as far as planned birth is concerned, China's rural areas still remain to be developed.

TABLE 3. BIRTH RATES IN SELECTED CHINESE COUNTIES OR COMMUNES

Place and location	*Year*	*Birth rate per 1,000*	*Sources*
County			
Shunyi, Hopei, 450,000 population	1971	21	D
Communes			
Ton Wan, 40 KM from Shanghai	1963	46	C
	1971	17	C
Commune X, 15 KM from Shanghai, 35,800 population	1965	28	B
	1971	18.4	B
Commune Y, near Peking, 46,000 population	1971	24	D
Yenchiao, near Shanghai, in Chuansha County	1963	34	A
	1967	14	A
	1972	11.6	A

Sources:

A - Commentary Group of the Yenchiao Commune Revolutionary Committee, Chuansha County, "Childbirths Must Also Be Planned," *Red Flag*, No. 262 (June 1, 1973), pp. 50-51.

B - Anibal Faundes and Tapani Luukkainen, "Health and Family Planning Services in the Chinese People's Republic," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 3, No. 7, Supplement (July 1972), pp. 165-176.

C - Tameyoshi Katagiri, "A Report on the Family Planning Program in the People's Republic of China," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August 1973), pp. 216-218.

D - Victor W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel, "The Delivery of Medical Care in China," *Scientific American*, Vol. 230, No. 4 (April 1974), pp. 19-27.

Effects of Late Marriage Propaganda

It is difficult to document the effects of late marriage promotion in terms of the number and age of people married in a given year. Virtually no visitor has ever reported this statistic. Thus, all inferences have to be based on the Chinese press and the comments made by Chinese officials.

Again, it can be assumed that people in cities marry later than rural people. The Party's call to delay marriage is also followed by far more urban than rural youths since in the cities there are more potential economic and political sanctions. Besides, it is easier for rural young people to find odd jobs or simply live on their parents' income. Reports in the Chinese press and comments made by Chinese officials seem to have confirmed this assumption. However, in rural areas the results are less than satisfying. Young people continued to marry at very young age. During the Cultural Revolution many young people, both rural and urban, were married before the recommended age. Even now the Chinese press still reports the practice of early marriage.[96]

Of course, there are quite a few communes or brigades that have achieved success in promoting late marriage. For instance, in 1971, among the more than 200 couples married in the Brass Well Commune of Kiangsu the average age for men was between 27 and 28 and that for women between 24 and 25.[97] In 1972, 150 couples were said to have married in the Kwatien Commune, Tung County of Hopei. Their average age was 24. During the first half of 1974, some 80 couples got married. The average age was slightly raised, to 25.4.[98]

The average wedding age in urban areas is higher than in rural areas. At the No. 5 Steel and Iron Factory in Shanghai, about 135 couples were married in 1974. The average age for men was 29 and that for women 25. In Dairen City of Liaoning, workers at the Dairen Motor Vehicle Factory were developing new mores of late marriage. While in the past love and marriage used to be considered a man's "life-long matter," these reasons are giving way to "continuous revolution under the proletarian dictatorship." The Factory's League secretary had postponed his marriage twice before he finally got married in 1974.[99]

Although the statistics are limited, late marriage seems to be gradually becoming a social institution in urban areas and among China's youths. In the old days girls who remained single at 17 or 20 would be subject to public ridicule. The case now seems to be that the later you marry the more proud you are. This is what the Chinese Communists have been pushing very hard for in the country. Those who marry young are no longer envied or emulated.[100] Instead, they may be ridiculed in a criticism session or a public rally. If this can be considered achievement, it is an impressive one.

Whatever the statistics, the Chinese Communists are very realistic. They have never set any specific targets for the nation to achieve. The

State Council Directive No. 51 that accelerated the current campaign only urged the attainment of outstanding results by the conclusion of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975). Short-term goals set by the various provincial authorities, on the other hand, were aimed at lowering annual population growth rate to 1 percent in cities and 1.5 percent in the countryside.[101] Based on available statistics presented in the preceding pages, it seems safe to infer that only very few urban and rural places would have achieved the goals by the end of 1975.

NOTES

1. Discussion is based on Chinese publications intended for internal circulation. No one outside China has really witnessed the actual persuasion sessions or propaganda in action.

2. "Appropriately Exercise Birth Control," *People's Daily*, March 5, 1957; in *Hsin Hua Semi-monthly*, No. 7 (April 10, 1957), p. 98.

3. Li Teh-chuan, "Birth Control Is a Tremendously Difficult and Complicated Task," *People's Daily*, March 8, 1957; in *Hsin Hua Semi-monthly*, No. 9 (May 10, 1957), pp. 126-127.

4. Chung Hui-lan, "Birth Control Must Be Exercised in a Planned Way," *People's Daily*, March 17, 1957; *Hsin Hua Semi-monthly*, No. 9 (May 10, 1957), pp. 128-131.

5. Fu Lien-chang, "Planned Birth's Positive Significance," *Women of China*, No. 4 (April 1, 1963), p. 8. *Women of China* will be referred to as *WOC* hereafter.

6. Wang Po-ching, "Amiable Concerns and Warm Encouragements," *Youth of China*, No. 17 (September 1, 1963), p. 15. *Youth of China* will be referred to as *YOC* hereafter.

7. Based on analysis of six pamphlets or instructional manuals published in China. See Pi-chao Chen, "China's Population Program at the Grassroots Level," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August 1973), p. 226; *Delayed Marriage and Planned Birth*, translated by Loren Fessler, see *Fieldstaff Reports*, East Asia Series, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 3-5.

8. Hsia Ping, "Actively Cultivate Women Cadres," *Red Flag*, No. 268 (December 1, 1973), pp. 18-22.

9. "Childbirth Must Also Be Planned," *Red Flag*, No. 262 (June 1, 1973), p. 51.

10. S. Chandrasekhar, "China's Population Problems," *Contemporary China*, Vol. III, ed. by E.S. Kirby (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 1960), pp. 31-32.

11. "China Explains Her Views on the Population Question," *Peking Review*, Vol. 16, No. 17 (April 27, 1973), pp. 16-17; "Chinese Observer on Population Question," *Peking Review*, Vol. 16, No. 49 (December 7, 1973), pp. 10-11; "Family Planning Gains Popularity," *Peking Review*, Vol. 17, No. 38 (September 20, 1974), pp. 17-18. China's propaganda enthusiasts like Han Suyin and Snow have used "family planning." They also take pains to clear away doubts over China's having an overpopulation problem.

12. Nothing the Chinese Communists have been doing in public, especially for Western consumption, is without purpose. This change in terminology perhaps also

deserves the attention of China watchers. Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 2-4. Snow presented his own experience and analysis.

13. Wang Su-cheng, *et al.*, "Opinions on the Practice of Planned Birth," *Hsin Hua Semi-monthly*, No. 17 (September 10, 1957), p. 79.

14. *Delayed Marriage and Planned Birth, op. cit.*, p. 8. The pamphlet will be referred to as *DMPB* hereafter.

15. *DMPB*, p. 8; Ku Yi, "Contraception Will Not Affect Bodily Health," *YOC*, No. 14-15 (July 28, 1963), p. 31.

16. *DMPB*, p. 8.

17. Yu Cheng, "Contraception for Newly Weds Has Many Advantages," *WOC*, No. 10 (September 1, 1964), p. 26.

18. Kwei Ching and Huang Sheng, "Can Newly Weds Practice Contraception?" *WOC*, No. 10 (October 1, 1963), p. 31.

19. Ku Yi, "Planned Birth Is Good," *WOC*, No. 12 (December 1, 1962), pp. 30-31; Liu Ching-yin, "My Childbirths Are Planned," *WOC*, No. 11 (November 1, 1963), p. 29; Huan Hsin, "The Harms of Non-Spaced Childbirths," *WOC*, No. 8 (August 1, 1964), p. 31.

20. Ho Ting, "The Thinking of 'Passing on the Family Name and Continuation of Ancestry' Is No Good," *YOC*, No. 13 (July 1, 1963), pp. 23-24; Kao Yi, "Is It Necessary to Have Both Sons and Daughters?" *WOC*, No. 7 (July 1, 1963), p. 29.

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22. Chen Shih-fu, "Those Who Suffer from These Diseases Should Be Even More Insistent on Contraception," *WOC*, No. 1 (July 1, 1963), p. 30.

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25. For a collection of the publicized herbal contraceptive formulas, see Table 13 in H. Yuan Tien, *China's Population Struggle* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1973), pp. 252-256.

26. Wang Yuan, "Acupuncturist Talks About Contraception," *Chinese Youth Daily*, Peking, August 10, 1956.

27. "Hangchow Establishes Birth Control Technical Guidance Committee," *Chekiang Daily*, April 24, 1957.

28. Snow, *The Long Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 43; Tillman Durdin, "Tientsin Doctor Says His Needles Cure Many Ills," in *The New York Times Report from Red China*, by Tillman Durdin, James Reston and Seymour Topping (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 296. Also see various reports in July through September in 1976 in *Ming Pao*, Hong Kong.

29. Ross Terrill, *800,000,000: The Real China* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972), p. 96.

30. See various articles in *WOC* and *YOC* in 1963 and 1964. Carl Djerassi, "Fertility Limitation Through Contraceptive Steroids in the People's Republic of China," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 15-16. *DMPB*, pp. 9-10. Planned Birth Writing Group, *Planned Birth*, (Peking: People's Press, 1975), pp. 50-82.

31. "Oral Contraceptives Successfully Developed in Tientsin," *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, August 2, 1957.

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33. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 43; Anibal Faundes and Tapani Luukkainen, "Health and Family Planning Services in the Chinese People's Republic," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 3, No. 7, Supplement (July 1972), p. 175

34. Djerassi, *op. cit.*, p. 18; Graham Leonard, "A Report for IPPF on Education for Birth Planning in China" (London: IPPF, 1974), p. 10.

35. Djerassi, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

36. Sheng Tan-ching, "Is Is Safe Without Contraception During the Safety Period," *WOC*, No. 12 (December 1, 1962), p. 30; Ma Shih-yin, "Why Pregnancy Still Occurs During Lactation When There Is No Menstruation," *WOC*, No. 11 (November 1, 1964), p. 30.

37. "Artificial Abortion and Sterilization; Health Ministry Has New Regulations," *Weh Hui Pao*, Shanghai, May 17, 1957; Shao Li-tzu, "My Opinions About the Questions of Contraception," *People's Daily*, June 26, 1956.

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40. Yin Si, " Artificial And Induced Abortion," *WOC*, No. 10 (October 1, 1962), p. 29.

41. *DMPB*, p. 11.

42. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

43. Yi Ke, "Maternal and Child Care," *Peking Review*, Vol. 15, No. 23 (June 9, 1972), p. 16; Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 33; Pi-chao Chen, "Panorama: The People's Republic of China," *op. cit.*, p. 13; Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control," *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. XII, No. 5 (1973), p. 16; Han Suyin, "The Chinese Experiment," *UNESCO Courier* (July-August 1974), p. 54.

44. Soong Hung-tzao, "Talk About Sterilization Again," *WOC*, No. 7 (July 1, 1963); *Planned Birth*, pp. 85-100; *DMPB*, pp. 12-14.

45. Soong Hung-tzao, "Does Vasectomy Affect Health?" *WOC*, No. 4 (April 1, 1963), pp. 10-11; Soong Hung-tzao, "Is It Good for Women to Undergo Sterilization?" *WOC*, No. 5 (May 1, 1963), p. 28; Ho Shih-sheng, "This Is a Selfish and Self-Centered Thought," *WOC*, No. 8 (August 1, 1964), p. 30; Chang Chi-yun, "Vasectomy Does Not Affect Health," *WOC*, No. 1 (January 1, 1964), p. 30; Tan Fang, "Should Believe In Science," *WOC*, No. 2 (February 1, 1964), p. 29; and Wang Kuei-hua, "Planned Birth Has Many Advantages," *People's Daily*, December 12, 1974, p. 3.

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48. Chin Ti, "The Communist Chinese Marriage System," *China Monthly*, No. 28 (July 1, 1966), pp. 2-9.

49. Chiang Ai-chih, "Must Prohibit Early Marriage," *op. cit.;* Tai Wen-yi, "The 'Evil Wind of Early Marriage' in Communist China," and "Marital Problems of Youths in Mainland China," *op. cit.;* Marinus J. Meijer, *Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People's Republic* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1971), pp. 2-3, 192-193.

50. Shao Li-tzu, "Give Childbirths in a Planned Way," *Hsin Hua Semi-monthly*, No. 9 (May 10, 1957).

51. Yeh Kung-shao, "On Marriageable Age and The Question of Child Delivery," *WOC*, No. 8 (August 1, 1962), pp. 16-17; Lin Chiao-chih, "Will Late Marriage Result in Difficult Child Delivery?" *WOC*, No. 4 (April 1, 1963), p. 9.

50. Tu Cheng-yao, *et al.*, "Late Marriage Is Good," *YOC*, No. 5 (March 2, 1964), p. 27.

53. See Note 49.

54. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, pp. 32, 45; Seymour Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 292-293; Tsai Kai, "An Account of Chou En-lai's Meeting with Taiwanese," *China Monthly*, No. 691 (April 1, 1973), p. 49.

55. *DMPB*, pp. 2-3; *Planned Birth*, pp. 15-19.

56. Pi-chao Chen, "China's Population Programs at the Grassroots Level," *op. cit.;* Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *op. cit.*, p. 14; Tameyoshi Katagiri, "A Report on the Family Planning Program in the People's Republic of China," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August 1973), p. 217; Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 172; Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 32. Reports of the recommended age vary from place to place.

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58. *DMPB*, p. 3; Yeh Kung-shao, *op. cit.;* Lin Chiao-chih, *op. cit.;* Yin Si, "Why Young Mothers Experience Difficult Child Delivery," *WOC*, No. 2 (February 1, 1964), p. 29; Chang Chin-chiao, "I Did Not Have Difficulty in Child Delivery," *WOC*, No. 10 (October 1, 1963), p. 31. See also, Hung Yun, "Have a Child After Three Years," *WOC*, No. 3 (March 1, 1964), p. 30; Lin Chiao-chih, *op. cit.;* Yeh Kung-shao, *op. cit.;* Lin Chiao-chih and Hsia Chung-fu, *Questions and Answers on Hygenic Common Sense for Rural Women* (Peking: People's Health Publishing House, 1966), p. 35; Chang Li-chu, "Will Late Marriage Result in Child Delivery Difficulty?" *YOC*, No. 20-21 (November 11, 1962), pp. 28-29.

59. Hsueh Feng, "Communist China's General Census in 1964," *China Monthly*, No. 56 (November 1, 1968), pp. 17-18; Huang Yu-chuan, "Latest Figures on Population of Communist China," *China Monthly*, No. 56 (November 1, 1968), pp. 13-17.

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62. Chang Chien-ping, "The Rapid Development of Health and Medical Industry," *Ta Kung Pao*, Hong Kong, September 28, 1974, p. 4. Also see Huang Yu-chuan, "Latest Figures on Population in Communist China," *op. cit.*, for estimates of population growth rates for the several autonomous regions.

63. Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *op. cit.*, p. 16.

64. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 231.

65. Tsai Kai, "An Account of Chou En-lai's Meeting with Taiwanese," *op. cit.*, p. 49.

66. Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *op. cit.*, p. 12; Han Suyin, "The Chinese Experiment," *op. cit.*, p. 54.

67. Katagiri, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

68. *Ibid.*

69. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

70. Evelyn M. Adey, "Population Control in China," *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 2, (June 8, 1974), p. 549.

71. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

72. "Family Planning Gains Popularity," p. 17.

73. Emmet Dedmon, *China Journal* (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1973, pp. 39-40.

74. Durdin, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

75. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, Table 2, p. 167.

76. Djerassi, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

77. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

78. Pi-chao Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

79. Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," *op. cit.*, p. 12. Han reported that in Shanghai 1,200,000 women were in reproductive age.

80. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

82. Katagiri, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-217.

83. Djerassi, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

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85. Victor W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel, "The Delivery of Medical Care in China," *Scientific American*, Vol. 230, No. 4 (April 1974), p. 24.

86. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

87. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 45.

88. Han Suyin, "The Chinese Experiment," p. 55; Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," pp. 15-16.

89. Sidel and Sidel, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

90. See Note 88.

91. "Medical Co-op's Roots Deepen and Foliage Thrives," *People's Daily*, January 11, 1974, p. 1.

92. Faundes and Luukkainen, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

93. Katagiri, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

94. Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," pp. 11-12; Ross Terrill, *800,000,000: The Real China* (New York: Dell Publishing Co.), p. 103.

95. Djerassi, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

96. Tai Wen-yi, "The 'Evil Wind of Early Marriage' in Communist China," and "Marital Problems of Youths in Mainland China," *op. cit.* Also see other references mentioned earlier in the previous chapters.

97. Tai Wen-yi, "Marital Problems of Youths in Mainland China," *op. cit.*, p. 37. A Japanese reporter recorded this in the *Mainichi Shimbum*, February 25, 1972.

98. Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," p. 14.

99. NCNA, "Advocate Late Marriage and Planned Birth; Dairen and Shanghai Establish New Mores," *Wen Hui Pao*, Hong Kong, February 8, 1975, p. 1.

100. Conversations with three former mainland China residents have lent considerable support to this inference.

101. Pi-chao Chen, "The Largest Nation on Earth," *The New Internationalist*, No. 15 (May 1974), p. 22.

6

CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENTS

> Our experience in planned birth is still not sufficient and we must continue in our efforts.
>
> Chi Lung, 1973*

Implications for China

The extent to which planned birth propaganda has affected China's population growth rate and the implications it may have for China have been subjects that interest both the Chinese and others concerned with family planning. Because of the lack of national statistics, however, any estimate of the propaganda's effect in bringing down the population growth rate is at best an educated guess.

In September 1965 Chou En-lai stated that China's annual population growth rate was about 2 to 2.2 percent.[1] In 1971 when Edgar Snow interviewed him and talked about China's planned birth campaign, Chou seemed less than pleased with the results. He indicated that at one time the population growth rate had dropped to below 2 percent annually but the anomie in the Cultural Revolution boosted it up to 2 percent. Chou hoped it would drop to below 2 percent soon and that it could be lowered further to 1 percent by the end of this century.

In October 1972, at a reception for returning overseas Chinese students, Chou said that China's population growth rate was below 2

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*Chi Lung, Deputy Representative of the Chinese Delegation to the 29th Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, gave this position on April 16, 1973. In "China Explains Her Views on the Population Question," *Peking Review,* Vol. 16, No. 17 (April 27. 1973), p. 17.

percent.[2] When the subject was brought up with Mao, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the planned birth work.[3] In August 1974 the Chinese delegation to the World Population Conference disclosed that the Chinese population had increased some 60 percent since 1950, which averaged about 2 percent a year.[4]

How reliable these statistics are cannot be determined. However, the growth rates seem to confirm that China's planned birth propaganda has achieved some preliminary success but is still not sufficient, as proclaimed by official Chinese sources.[5] Considering the intensity of propaganda and persuasion and the new approaches in recent years, such as the assignment of pregnancy quotas and the focus on personal contacts, it seems that China's current population growth rate is at best about 1.7 to 1.8 percent a year. At this rate, the increase of population on the Chinese mainland each year will be more than 13 million. Given the enormous pressures such increase may have on China's economic development, the planned birth policy is certain to be continued and the propaganda intensified in the future. Should this be the fact, China, though a developing country, would probably be able to reduce the growth rate to below 1 percent before the end of this century.[6]

It is generally held that a sustained low population growth rate cannot be achieved without accompanying industrialization and a rising standard of living. If China should be able to accomplish the same results without waiting for these two factors to appear,[7] this would certainly boost the morale of population control proponents and be an amazing achievement.

Whatever the achievements China has made in her planned birth work, the policy itself implies many things for the country and her people. Obviously, if the policy continues to be enforced in the future, it would mean a continuous decline in China's population growth rate. Further, with more and more women practicing contraception and having fewer children, China's potential labor force will be gradually increased by women relieved of household duties and child care, which has been one of the stated purposes of planned birth.

In addition to these more obvious implications, the people's living style is bound to be influenced. While life in any Communist society is regimented to a degree, the family as a social institution has been left relatively intact. The promotion of planned birth, however, has provided the regime with a fairly legitimate rationale for intervention.[8] Closely related to this invasion into the privacy of family life is the gradual shift from traditional loyalty to the family to that of the nation and the Party. Whether or not the family is going to survive will also mean a test of the extent a "proletarian dictatorship" can force its will on individuals.

While in other countries the availability of contraceptives and the profusion of contraceptive knowledge seem to have resulted in a more liberal or permissive attitude toward sex, China does not seem to have experienced this problem. It is true that the promotion of birth control and late marriage, which encourages the discussion of sex and criticism of old values, does seem to be breaking down many Chinese traditional attitudes toward marriage and family. However, sexual attitudes of the Chinese adolescents seem to remain unchanged. This has been achieved through controlled propaganda among married couples or newlyweds and traditional social as well as official sanctions against sex permissiveness. It seems that social sexual morals will remain very much the same in spite of the introduction and availability of contraceptive methods.

Assessment of IEC Work and Social, Psychological Conditions

China's experience in promoting late marriage and planned birth has again indicated for communication students, the important role personal media play in disseminating information and effecting changes. In the first two campaigns, China's approach was massive scale propaganda through the use of modern mass media, such as newspapers, magazines, exhibitions, films, etc. This proved ineffective and has been changed in the current campaign, which focuses on personal contacts and particularly the use of group or peer pressures to effect change or compliance. This approach, coupled with the Party's potential power of sanctions against deviation seems quite effective.

The effectiveness of this approach is further enhanced by the use of women and health workers who work and live among the people. In view of the fact that male contraceptive pills are yet to come into common use, men are likely to pass the birth control responsibility to women. This suggests that women will continue to be the main targets of persuasion. China's realization of the importance of women promoters has resulted in the training of more women barefoot doctors, midwives, health workers and women cadres.

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of China's planned birth propaganda is its integrated organization with other social and political institutions. Since the most available resources in China have been her people, China finds little difficulty in allocating personnel for the integration of the promotion of planned birth with existing organizations. Among those who have contributed most are these cadres. Further, these people have been brought under a unified leadership supplied by the Communist Party. The priority given to planned birth propaganda is also indicated by the fact that at each administrative level, whether rural or urban, a special committee on planned birth has been established under the guidance of the corresponding revolutionary committee's leadership cadres. All these have to be taken into account when considering the effectiveness of China's propaganda.

Nothing operates in a vacuum. The effectiveness of China's propaganda is also due to the existence of a favorable and unique social infrastructure. As far as propaganda is concerned, the most important factor is perhaps China's communication system, which is under the Party's tight control. A controlled system ensures a unified approach toward an already decided policy as shown by the nonexistence of dissenting opinions in communication media against the planned birth and late marriage policy.

Further, the communication network itself, consisting of both print and electronic media as well as the ubiquitous propagandists, has been expanding ever since 1950. In 1963 rural editions of provincial newspapers were initiated. These papers tried to use simple langauge so as to make them easily understood by peasants and illiterates when read to.[9] According to one late report, by 1974 nearly every county or city in China had its own radio rediffusion station. Especially impressive is the installation of loudspeakers in rural areas. It is estimated over 90 percent of the production brigades and teams now have their own loudspeaker system reaching some 63 percent of peasant families.[10]

Popular culture in the form of short stories, films, or cultural performances is also favorable. In quite a few cases, they are especially created for the purpose of promoting late marriage or planned birth.[11]

While barefoot doctors, health workers, or women cadres can all be mobilized for the promotion of planned birth, there are specially trained planned birth propagandists to disseminate contraceptive knowledge and mobilize people to attend study sessions or watch a "late marriage cultural performance."

The medical and health delivery system is another component in the favorable social structure. This system is based on decentralization of services through the use of millions of barefoot doctors, midwives, or health workers, who come from the people. Prepared with three to six months of training, they deliver the contraceptive knowledge and contraceptives to the individuals in need of services. In addition, their presence contributes to the improvement of rural and urban hygenic conditions, which in turn contribute to better health and a decline in infant mortality.

The rising status of women in China certainly must be included as one of the favorable social elements for the adoption of planned birth. The Chinese Communists have long encouraged women to play their function of "half of the sky" (the other half is the male). They are urged to participate in productive labor and do men's jobs. They are told that men and women are equal in the family and in the society. This policy provides Chinese women with a chance to perceive additional alternatives to merely doing family chores. Furthermore, men are encouraged to share the domestic work. This attitude has been spreading and is gradually bringing about a new perception of women's role by men and women themselves.

Reduction of illiteracy among China's rural peasants and urban workers also facilitates the transmission of contraceptive information as well as enhances the chances of adoption of contraception. This rise of literacy can be assumed as more and more schools have been made available for adolescents and juveniles. After the Cultural Revolution, though the quality of higher education suffered, education at the grassroots level seems to be spreading more rapidly and widely. Higher literacy has been found to be related to more adoption of contraceptive methods and reduction of birth rate.[12] This is certainly a favorable atmosphere for future promotion.

The Chinese social economic system and the security the government guarantees the people in terms of clothing, food, shelter, decent burial, medical services, etc., pave the way for the removal of traditional dependence on children for more income and protection in old age. More recently, the regime also encourages the "marrying off" of a man to the wife's home if the wife's family does not have any male children. All these help to reduce people's dependence on male and many children.

While the Chinese are definitely interested in sex, there is a lack of visual stimulation or inducement. Further, political and traditional social sanctions against sexual permissiveness remain strong and pervasive. This climate makes pre-marital sex almost non-existent. In addition, husbands and wives are encouraged to work at different places. Even during the very few visits allowed each year the local barefoot doctor would see to it that proper contraceptives are delivered to the couple.[13] This must certainly have helped the control of births.

The marriage registration system also serves as a deterrent to those who attempt to challenge the recommended age. Application for marriage permission may be rejected on grounds that the prospective couples do not belong to the same class, or do not share similar ideologies, etc., while the basic reason may be that the couples have not reached the recommended age for marriage.[14]

As far as promotion of planned birth is concerned, the whole atmosphere is very conducive to it. It can be assumed that these favorable conditions will continue to exist and improve. If all or most proclaimed policies for the welfare of the people are carried out, it can be inferred that the number of people practicing contraception or delaying their marriage will continue to increase.

Difficulties and Prospects

In spite of the favorable social psychological climate outlined above, China's planned birth promotion, as in many other countries, has experienced and will continue to encounter many bureaucratic and cultural difficulties. As pointed out earlier, the activities described are for the most part successes of which the regime encourages emulation. In reports of these success models, some clues reveal that in many areas the personnel in charge may not be paying enough attention to the promotion work or that they have not taken the lead. Or, in other cases, the responsible persons themselves are too burdened with other simultaneous duties to devote attention and time to planned birth promotion. These bureaucratic difficulties cannot be easily removed at present and they are most likely to exist in the future too.

While it has been the proclaimed official policy to raise the status of women, in practice, women are still discriminated against. For instance, wage discrimination against women prevails in rural areas.[15] Traditional values discriminating against women are still popular. Women continue to be considered inferior to men. "Land tilled by women won't yield. Trees planted by women won't grow. And when women go out there will be great chaos under the Heaven."[16] Sayings such as this are numerous and continue to influence people.

Male children continue to be preferred to female children. More boys than girls are sent to schools. In a commune in Wenan County of Hopei, among those school-age children not enrolled more than 85 percent were girls.[17] Peasants also anticipate male children for additional farmhands to earn more work points for the family. One peasant named his grandson *chih fen*, or "collect points" to show his elation over the boy's birth.[18] These are not isolated cases. Such traditional attitudes still permeate peasant thinking. Soong Ching-ling, vice chairwoman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, summarizes the situation well:

> . . . . In certain villages patriarchal ideas still have their effect. Proportionately, more boys than girls attend school. Parents need the girls to do household work. Some even feel that girls will eventually enter another family and therefore it would not pay to send them to school. Moreover, when girls are to be married, their parents often ask for a certain amount from the family of the would-be husband. Thus, the freedom of marriage is affected. Finally, as farmers want to add the labor force in their families, the birth of a son is anticipated while that of a daughter is considered a disappointment. This repeated desire to have at least one son has an adverse effect on birth control and planned births. A woman with many children around her naturally finds it too difficult to participate in any productive labor.[19]

What Soong outlined in early 1972 still holds today. The Chinese press continues to accuse the "five black classes" or Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, and Confucius for proselytizing traditional values favoring more children and male children. Women workers doing the same jobs as their male counterparts continue to be paid less. There are still cases where women continue to bear children even though they have already seven or eight daughters.

The deep psychological satisfaction derived from children is another strong motivation for having more children.[20] Although rations may be denied for the unplanned child, the peasants still find it psychologically rewarding to keep that child. For, children have become one of the few sources of joy in the drab life the peasants lead. Further, even the denial of a food ration does not constitute a threat for the peasants. They can usually compensate the loss by tilling their private lot harder. Moreover, when the child grows up he is able to earn more work points for the family.

All in all, China still has many difficulties to overcome. Traditional values and attitudes concerning family and marriage seem still the number one obstacle. Whether or not these values can be removed or re-channelled in another direction remains to be seen. Thus, the present state and prospects of China's planned birth campaign are perhaps very much the same as Bernard Berelson has outlined for the world's family planning programs in general.[21] That is, the state of China's planned birth programs is simultaneously impressive, frustrating, uneven, and inadequate. It is impressive because so much has been accomplished within such a short period of time. It is frustrating since quite a few leadership cadres responsible for the promotion of planned birth are not taking the lead. It is uneven because some places have achieved so much while many rural areas are still dominated by traditional attitudes favoring more or male children. It is inadequate since many problems still exist and many methods do not seem adequate.

As for the prospects, China's planned birth programs are both promising and dubious. They are promising because China's mass awareness of the problem has been on the rise and her contraceptive technology has been rather advanced and is improving.[22] They are dubious because the achievements made up to now cluster around urban areas and their adjacent rural counties and because Chinese traditional attitudes are still very resistant to the promotion of planned birth and late marriage.

Transferability of China's Approaches

While China herself finds the international exchange of experience in planned birth rewarding, it, nevertheless, considers such population activity a purely internal affair that is to be decided by the countries concerned.[23] This position is indeed well taken. The decision to learn or not to learn from others can only be made by the countries themselves. Then the question is: how transferable are China's planned birth approaches.

The progress of planned birth promotion in a relatively traditional country like China does provide grounds for optimism for birth control advocates. Naturally, such optimism implies that China's approaches may serve as models for other countries that wish to promote or are promoting birth control. However, many people have not examined closely the procedures by which China achieves the present results. Such examination is essential to the meaningful application of China's experiences.

In terms of the approach, the Chinese campaign has shifted from the massive media propaganda in the two previous campaigns to the current emphasis on personal contacts. This seems to imply that while mass media may be economical in terms of the great number of people they can reach, they are really not so effective in bringing about the adoption of contraceptive methods. This, however, does not negate the functions of mass media, only that their roles must be reassigned. China's experience indicates that mass media can still play the important roles of transmitting general directives, providing guidance, reporting models for emulation, exposing deviations, and creating a favorable climate. The crucial task of persuasion and conversions, however, must be entrusted to the most traditional communicators: people. After all, it is the people, not mass media, who can exert direct peer or social pressure to effect change.

This personal approach itself deserves careful examination. It is true that many countries have used fieldworkers or promoters to canvass the households and engage in casual conversations. They, however, are usually outsiders from adjacent urban areas. Further, they come to spend a period of time and then leave. To what extent they can effect adoption is indeed very doubtful. Thus, in the presence of fieldworkers, adoptions may be many. But once the workers leave, those who have adopted contraception either forget or ignore it all together. In other words, change does not seem to be permanent.

In China, however, those who are actively engaged in the promotion work as a rule are people who live and work among those they are to convince. This gives them a tremendous advantage. They can approach those deviant individuals so frequently as to constitute peer or social pressure. Or, there is the possibility that people will adopt contraception simply out of cordiality or social desirability. Then the change is again superficial compliance. However, once this has been achieved, the promoters can return often enough to ensure the continuation of the practice. This is what many other countries will find difficult to accomplish.

In addition to being close to those they seek to change, the promoters in China are further equipped with another advantage. That is, all contraceptives are delivered free of charge to the people. No matter how small such cost may be, it still may be enough of a deterrent to many potential adopters.

As far as the current planned birth propaganda is concerned, groups seem to have played very important roles. It is through groups that the dialectical discussion of current affairs and Marxism-Leninism-

Maoism is undertaken, that contraceptive methods are explained, that delayed marriage is urged, that the pregnancy quota is assigned, that criticism and self-criticism is conducted, and that "remember bitterness and think of sweetness" are carried out. Groups have indeed become the key to China's planned birth promotion.

In China almost every adult belongs to a study group that meets about three or more times a week. To what extent other countries can mobilize their people to form groups is a question that must be answered before China's approach can be transplanted. Further, even though groups may be formed, a question remains as to the extent to which there can be applied China's techniques of persuasion, such as the criticism or remembering sessions or the assignment of pregnancy quotas.

Also, the group approach is used mainly for the execution of an already decided policy, not to decide the policy. In other words, the options left for choice in the group sessions are quite limited. To what extent and how another country can achieve this is also a question.

China's planned birth propaganda is directed at married couples only. This is something that countries worrying about the deterioration of morality as a result of profusion of contraceptives need to consider carefully. The promotion of late marriage is an integral part of the campaign. This is a factor that countries with a prevailing practice of adolescent marriage would need to consider.

Perhaps even more unique is the almost complete integration of planned birth communication and organization in China's planning. At all levels of administration in China specific units for planned birth promotion have now been established. This is usually lacking in many countries. This integration of communication with existing administration deserves careful attention and diligent consideration in relation to transferability.

With such an understanding, perhaps the answer to the question "how transferable China's planned birth approaches are" is not hard to come by. In fact, the basic principles have already been provided by three communication scholars:

1. The more similar the social system, the more likely that a specific part of the Chinese experience with development communication can be satisfactorily transferred to it.

2. A non-similar system can transfer as much of the Chinese experience as it is willing to pay socially, politically, economically.

3. The lessons most developing countries can transfer from the Chinese experience are more often likely to be general than to be specific.[24]

As far as the transferability of China's planned birth experiences is concerned, these three propositions advanced by Wilbur Schramm, Godwin C. Chu, and Frederick T.C. Yu can apply just as well. However, each country still has to decide for itself whether to learn and what to learn. In view of the wide social and political differences among countries, perhaps most countries would still have to search for and develop their own approaches and methods for their own birth control programs.[25] China's experience in planned birth promotion, nevertheless, remains a strong stimulant to more serious and insightful contemplation of each country's own programs.

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APPENDIX I: POPULATION IN CHINA

In spite of the importance of demography in national planning, China has historically been negligent of the recording of her people. For various reasons, no Chinese government in the imperial dynasties or during the Republican years had ever undertaken this essential but difficult task. Most of the earlier population figures known are either estimates or guesses. To a great extent, this still holds true today for China under Communism.

In June 1953 China conducted her first nationwide census, which put her population at 582,603,417.[1] Since China was then the third Asian country, following Japan and India, to have conducted a nationwide census, the event and the population figures stimulated much interest and controversy. Critics questioned either the authenticity of the statistics or the methods used.[2]

Aside from this 1953 census, there were a few official estimates of China's population. In 1959, the State Statistical Bureau disclosed that China's population for 1957 was 646,530,000.[3] In the latter part of 1964, Mao Tse-tung was reported to have said that China had some 680 to 690 million people.[4] In mid-1966, when the Cultural Revolution broke out, several Chinese sources put China's population at 700 million.[5] In 1971, Chou En-lai said there were about 750 to 800 million Chinese.[6] In 1973, Chou referred back to the figure of 700 million again.[7] In 1974, official estimates ranged from 750 million (Planning Department) to 800 million (Chinese delegation to the United Nations Population Conference) to 850 million (Ministry of Commerce).[8] These statistics are what the Chinese Communists themselves have disclosed so far about China's population. There is no way of knowing which one is closest to reality.

Since China has been reluctant to disclose her demographic data or such data may not exist at all, many estimates have been attempted.

Among them, the most modest one is that reported in the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook*. Even such a conservative estimate, however, is enough to reveal the rapid population growth rates in China.

POPULATION GROWTH IN MAINLAND CHINA
1950-1974

Year	*Total Population (thousands)*	*Increase*	*Rate of Increase (percent annually)*
1950	532,870	-	-
1951	541,840	8,970	1.68
1952	551,520	9,680	1.78
1953	561,620	10,100	1.83
1954	571,920	10,300	1.83
1955	582,340	10,420	1.82
1956	592,840	10,500	1.77
1957	603,410	10,570	1.78
1958	614,090	10,680	1.76
1959	624,920	10,830	1.76
1960	635,950	11,030	1.76
1961	647,210	11,260	1.77
1962	658,740	11,530	1.78
1963	670,550	11,810	1.79
1964	682,640	12,090	1.80
1965	695,000	12,360	1.81
1966	707,600	12,600	1.81
1967	720,400	12,800	1.80
1968	733,370	12,970	1.80
1969	746,460	13,090	1.78
1970	759,620	13,160	1.76
1971	772,190	12,540	1.65
1972	785,440	13,150	1.71
1973	799,570	14,130	1.82
1974	813,960	14,390	1.79

Sources: 1950-1970: *Demographic Yearbook-1970* (New York: United Nations, 1971), pp. 128-129. Population does not include Taiwan and overseas Chinese.

1971-1972: *Demographic Yearbook-1972*, p. 142.

1973-1974: These are extrapolations based on a 1.8 percent annual growth rate.

N. B.: The 1975 issue of *Demographic Yearbook-1974* had a higher estimate of China's population from 1965 to 1974. For 1974, it was 824,960,000.

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APPENDIX II: MARRIAGE OF MEN TO THEIR WIVES' FAMILIES

It has been held for over two millennia in China when men and women are wedded, it is only natural for women to live in their husband's families. Although there has been a practice of men going to live in their wives' families after marriage, it has been deemed very disgraceful and only very poor families would allow their male children to do so and only as a last resort. This attitude is now regarded by the Chinese Communists as one of the reasons why people continue to prefer male to female children.

In recent years the Chinese Communists have been advocating the destruction of this attitude and urged men to live in their wives' families after marriage. This movement seemed to be gathering momentum in 1975. The following is a translation of an article in *People's Daily*, March 18, 1975, p. 3.

BREAK UP OLD HABITS AND ESTABLISH NEW MORES

An Investigation of the Promotion of Men
Going to Live in Women's Families After
Marriage in Ting County, Hopei

In the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, to break up old habits and establish new mores Hopei Ting County's Chinese Communist Party Secretariat (TCCPS) and Revolutionary Committee (TCRC) have mobilized the mass to deepen their criticism of such absurd assumptions as "male superiority and female inferiority" as propagated by Lin Piao, Confucius and Mencius. The promotion of "men going to live in women's families after marriage" has been deeply welcomed by the mass. At present, "men going to live in women's families" have amounted to more than 6,800 couples.

During a 1971 investigation of population growth trends, TCCPS and TCRC discovered: families with two daughters always wanted to have a son because they were afraid that no one would be there to care for them once their daughters were married. This has affected the unfolding of planned birth work. Therefore, the mass had been mobilized to criticize the reactionary ideology of "male superiority and female inferiority" so as to promote and support "men going to live in women's families after marriage," which would contribute to the doing of a good job in planned birth. To achieve this, TCCPS and TCRC convened meetings to make preparations and required party organizations and revolutionary committees at all levels to treat this question seriously. Li Tsun Tien Commune specifically formed a leadership small group, headed by the commune Party secretariat's deputy secretary. All production brigades also set up their corresponding organizations to do deep and fine ideological work and to help solve those problems concerning "men going to live in women's families after marriage." Cadres, League, and Party members took their lead in breaking up the old and establishing the new and gave full support to "men going to live in women's families after marriage." Wang Tung-hsueh, member of Pei Hsin Chuang Brigade's party branch and chairperson of its Federation of Women Representatives, not only supported her brother to live in her sister-in-law's family after marriage but also wrote her fiance a letter asking him to come and live in her family.

The promotion of "men going to live in women's families after marriage" is an ideological revolution that breaks up the old and establishes the new, and transforms customs and change habits. The class struggle in the field of ideology must be grasped well. The mass must be mobilized to criticize the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. The methods employed by Ting County are:

To Convene Different Kinds of Criticism Meetings—Since the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius was started, the whole country had called a total of more than 15,000 criticism meetings of large and small scales. Through revolutionary criticism and repudiation, ideological barriers in "men going to live in women's families after marriage" were swept. Each district, commune, and brigade had mobilized the mass to repeatedly and deeply criticize such bad books as *Three-Character Classic* (San Chih Chin), *Book on Virtuous Womanhood* (Nu Erh Chin), *A Collection of Quotations from Famous Scholars* (Ming Hsien Chi), which are filled with the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius.

To Organize Mobile Publicity Teams–In recent years those units or individuals who had done well in "men going to live in women's families after marriage" and planned birth work were frequently organized by this county into publicity teams to publicize [their deeds] deep into the communes and brigades around the time of spring festival. Upon their arrival at each place, these mobile publicity teams would carry out a social investigation, wholeheartedly exalt the new people, new deeds and new mores of "men going to live in women's families after marriage," and assist the communes and brigades to realize the Party's other related policies. This county had also held a "custom-transformation and habit-change exhibition" to propagate the model deeds of "men going to live in women's families after marriage."

To Organize Women Backbones to Demonstrate–Lin Piao modeled after Confucius in advocating the reactionary theory of "women being useless," in slandering the mass of women as "knowing only oil, salt, sauce, vinegar, and [burning] wood" and in shamelessly crying out that women "should focus their main energies on their husbands" to attempt to imprison women within the ritualistic bondage of feudalism so as to facilitate their restoration to capitalism. Women backbones of Chou Ville's Well-drilling Team, Ssu Chia Chuang's Iron Girl Combat Team, West Yang Ville Brigade's women technical small group, etc., who had emerged in the three great revolutionary movements [class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment], were organized by the county to use their heaven-combating and earth-struggling progressive deeds to criticize the reactionary and absurd theories of Lin Piao and Confucius. Wang Kun-ru, vice-chairperson of Shih Pan Commune's women federation, Yin Shiu-chin, secretary of Ssu Chia Chuang Brigade's Party branch, Chia Li-yin, chairperson of East Yang Ville Brigade's women federation, etc., even used the fact that their weddings were held at their mothers' families and their spouses had come to settle in their brigades to criticize the reactionary ideology of "male superiority and female inferiority."

To Repeatedly Grasp Policy Realization–To achieve "men going to live in women's families after marriage," related policies of the Party must be seriously executed. As to the questions related to "men going to live in women's families after marriage," *concerned departments of this county had set up concrete regulations so that after settling in women's families men's due political, economic, social, and familial rights would be guaranteed and no one whatsoever shall discriminate and scoff at them.* [Author's emphasis.]

The county's Party secretariat has learned through practice that the promotion of "men going to live in women's families after marriage" has many advantages:

1. *It Benefits the Unfolding of Planned Birth Work*–Since "men going to live in women's families after marriage" has become a new custom in the county's vast rural areas, those families with daughters but no sons have been relieved of their worries. They have voluntarily formulated their birth plans and actively adopted contraceptive measures. At present among the county's more than 76,000 couples, over 80 percent have used contraceptive measures. The natural population growth rate in 1974 dropped to nine per thousand.

2. *It Facilitates the Cultivation of Women Cadres*–Being wedded and settled in their own families, women are well acquainted with their local villages' situations. This facilitates their cultivation and elevation. Now 40 percent of those women who were married and settled in their own mothers' families have joined the Communist Party and Communist Youth League. They have assumed a variety of duties at the communes, brigades, and teams.

3. *It Reduces the Number of Five-guarantee Households**–At Pei Hsin To Brigade of Chih Fang To Commune, woman member Tso

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*Five-guarantee households are those families that receive welfare from the government. The five guarantees are: medical care, food, shelter, clothing, and a decent burial.

Hui-tseng's mother Wang Ta Niang lived alone as a widow for several years after her only daughter was married. Last spring the Brigade's Party branch secretariat supported her to invite her daughter, son-in-law, and grandchild to settle in her house. This gave the lonely, widowed old woman a "red" (that is, ideologically sound) and flamboyant family. Wang Ta Niang happily told everyone she met: "Chairman Mao has really given his full consideration to us poor and lower-middle peasants. I shall never forget the Party's benevolence." Since the promotion of "men going to live in women's families" in the whole county, the number of five-guarantee households has been greatly reduced. At Shih Pan Commune there are no longer any five-guarantee households.

4. *It Benefits the Transformation of Customs and Change of Habits*–The fact that women getting married in their own mother's families demonstrates that in everything men and women are alike. This has forcefully repudiated the feudalist ideology of "male superiority and female inferiority."

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